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Abstract
Haiti is one of the poorest and most severely hunger-stricken countries in the world (GHI
2013). Its contradictions are jarring: although Haiti has the largest relative agrarian
population in the Western Hemisphere and relatively less land inequality than the rest of the
region (Smucker et al. 2000; Wiens and Sobrado 1998), it is extremely food insecure. Almost
90 percent of the rural population lives below the poverty line (FAO 2014; IFAD 2014), and
Haiti relies on food imports for 60 percent of national consumption (OXFAM 2010). Some
scholars argue that the spread of commodity relations, persistent rural class differentiation,
and dispossession mean that most peasants can no longer reproduce themselves outside of
markets, having been transformed into petty commodity producers with many households
depending upon some degree of off-farm earnings (Bernstein 2001; Araghi 1995). Others,
however, claim that ‘de-peasantization’ is far from inevitable, and stress that peasants
continue to persist with varying relations to markets, still constitute a large share of
humanity, and are actively fighting to defend their livelihoods (Ploeg 2009; Borras and
Edelman 2008; McMichael 2006). At the broadest level, this dissertation explores
contemporary struggles facing Haitian peasants in the belief that while they face extremely
adverse circumstances, their continuing decline is far from inevitable. On the contrary, this
dissertation is premised on the conviction that improving the livelihoods of peasant farmers
is fundamental to reducing poverty and food insecurity in Haiti.
More specifically, the papers in this dissertation explore various key aspects of
Haiti’s agriculture and food system, including dietary aspirations, an intensifying agro-export
push, and competing visions for rural development in the wake of the disastrous 2010
earthquake. Individually and collectively, considerable attention is given to some of the
ii

enduring legacies of the colonial period, and the interconnections between race, class, and
food, while being sure to situate the cultural dimensions of peasant problems in their political
economic context. This includes focusing heavily on the role played by dominant
‘development’ actors in Haiti (the foreign donor community; NGOs; the state; transnational
corporations; domestic agribusinesses and merchant elites) and their relations with peasants
in the post-earthquake period. The foundation of this dissertation is extensive field research
conducted between November 2010 and July 2013 in a commune in Haiti’s Artibonite
Department, the most important food producing part of the country. Field research involved a
range of qualitative methods, including interviews, focus groups, and participant observation.
My hope is that this dissertation offers a rich, deeply grounded contribution into some of the
most crucial issues influencing agrarian change and food security in Haiti today, and
provides valuable insights into agrarian change and peasant livelihoods and struggles in Haiti
and beyond.
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1. Introduction: Research Problems and Approach
1.1

Contextualizing the Problem

The levels of poverty and food insecurity in Haiti are unmatched in the Western
Hemisphere, along with an extremely high degree of income inequality. Recent estimates
are that three-quarters of the Haitian population lives on less than US$2 per day and over
half live on less than US$1 per day (WFP 2015). Despite having the largest agrarian
population in the region – over 60 percent of the country’s labour force is involved in
1

agriculture (OXFAM 2010) – Haiti is a net food importer and imports account for
roughly 60 percent of food consumption in the country, including as much as 80 percent
of all rice, its most important dietary staple (Dupuy 2014; IFAD 2010). Since 1986, food
has become an increasingly significant part of Haiti’s persistent macro-economic
imbalances. The large trade deficit steadily increased in the 1990s, and by 2006 fourfifths of all export earnings went to purchase imported foods (McGuigan 2006). Just prior
to the January 2010 earthquake, in a country of around 10 million people, nearly 1.8
million were already considered food insecure (IOM and UN 2010), and this
subsequently got much worse.

2

1

The largest national peasant organization Mouvman Peyizan Papay (MPP) contests this
statistics, claiming 80 percent of Haiti’s population is involved in agriculture, but there is
considerable complexity since many peasant households rely on varying degrees of offfarm earnings.
2

According to the FAO (2009), food insecurity exists when people lack “physical, social,
and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs
and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” In a general sense, food insecurity
can be measured and experienced at the national, household, and individual levels. At the
household level, food insecurity is typically conceptualized in terms of the management
of the food supply, whereas at the individual-level food insecurity relates to experiences
of hunger and insufficient food consumption (Campbell and Desjardins 1989).

2

The earthquake was a catastrophe of staggering proportions: over 220,000 were
killed and as many as 3 million people were affected at some level. In 2010, estimates of
food insecurity soared, rising to between 2.5 and 3.3 million people (WFP 2010). One of
the major international responses to the disaster was, unsurprisingly, a flood of food aid.
On one hand, direct food aid obviously had a role to play in the face of the humanitarian
crisis. But on the other hand, as free and cheap food flooded local markets it dampened
the earnings and incomes of Haiti’s small farmers (Stephenson and Denyer 2010) and
threatened to worsen Haiti’s dependence upon imports and vulnerability to food price
spikes (FAO/WFP 2010).
The response of the international community to the earthquake also inadvertently
brought another deadly catastrophe, a cholera epidemic, which hit the Artibonite region
in October 2010 and killed over 3,000 people by the end of the year (Aljazeera 2010). It
was later confirmed that the virus was introduced to Haiti by UN military forces, and
outbreaks have continued to unfold ever since during the rainy season. By early 2015,
there have been over 700,000 cases of cholera in Haiti, the disease has killed more than
9,000 people, and it remains a major threat for over one-third of the population that lacks
access to clean drinking water. The food security outlook has also not improved; roughly
75 percent of the population was still deemed food insecure in 2015 (WFP 2015).
Vulnerability to cholera and food insecurity was especially acute for the more than
85,000 registered Internally Displaced People, and remains so for those who continue to
eke out an existence in over 123 congested camps, which are mostly located in what
amount to economic deserts (FAO 2015; IOM 2015; UN-OHRLLS 2015).

3

In large measure, media and scholarly explanations of Haiti’s food insecurity can
be divided into two broad camps. On one side, Haiti’s poverty, food security, and
underdevelopment are blamed on Haitians themselves, a central part of which is a belief
that resistance (to modernization, the state, urban elite, and foreign powers) among the
allegedly ‘backward’ peasantry coupled with overpopulation have inhibited progress and
development (Girard 2010; Felima 2009; Diamond 2005; Myrthil 1979). On the other
side, some critics have described structural adjustment dictated trade liberalization and
heavy flows of US food aid as the primary culprits that have exacerbated food insecurity,
which is often tied to the claim that Haiti was largely food self-sufficient before the onset
of adjustment in 1986 (Dupuy 2012; Schwartz 2008; McGuigan 2007). Both narratives
draw attention to some major issues, and they are not entirely exclusive. For instance,
some peasant land use practices (particularly cutting forests for charcoal production) are a
major force in environmental degradation, the period of structural adjustment clearly
ushered in a wave of food imports, and both narratives regularly include indictments of
corrupt and irresponsible governments, though with widely varying degrees of
recognition of the roles that foreign intervention has played in this.
Explanations of the earthquake disaster have generally mimicked these divergent
understandings of Haitian poverty and food security. Some laid blame on Haitians
themselves, with Pat Robertson the most notorious example, suggesting that the
earthquake was a consequence of Haitian Independence leaders once having made a “pact
with the Devil” (CNN 2010). Other mainstream media outlets similarly construed
Haitians as barbaric and unruly, albeit without the degree of racism and ignorance
displayed by Robertson, disseminating images of chaos and impending violence in the
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wake of the earthquake. Even when Haitians were painted as undeserving victims, it was
often in patronizing terms, without agency to adequately respond (Dubois 2012). Such
portrayals continued in the aftermath of the earthquake, with the mainstream media
typically ignoring the fortitude and solidarity of Haitians and their own contributions to
the recovery (Schuller and Morales 2012).

3

There has been considerable attention to rural poverty and pathways for change in
the post-earthquake period, with agriculture featuring prominently in post-disaster plans.
However, as I repeatedly emphasize, peasant perspectives remain peripheral to rural
development planning, though peasants still make up the majority of Haiti’s population.
This disjuncture between the increased attention to agriculture in development planning
and the neglect for peasant interpretations and priorities is at the heart of this dissertation.
I believe that if rural poverty and human suffering continue to the extent that they have,
and peasant producers continue to be politically marginalized, and isolated from debates
about the future of Haitian agriculture, then the unsustainable levels of rural-urban
migration that contributed to one of the most deathly disasters in modern world history
are likely to continue and intensify. This dynamic is starkly reflected in the fact nearly
half of the estimated 600,000 Internally Displaced People who fled the capital to the
countryside returned to Port-au-Prince less than a year after the 2010 earthquake, most to
the sort of conditions – rickety ‘lean-to’s’ on steep hillsides – where earthquake
casualties were concentrated (Bengtsson et al. 2010).

3

Better analyses of the causes of the disaster and its aftermath could be found in the
alternative media (Schuller and Morales 2012; Dubois 2012; Bell 2010).

5

At the broadest level, my research is guided by an argument made a quartercentury ago by one of Haiti’s most prominent scholars and peasant advocates, the late
Michel Rolph Trouillot. As Trouillot (1990, 229-230) put it:
Any solution to the Haitian crisis must find its roots in the resources of the
peasantry…And to do this…intellectuals, politicians and planners – foreign and
Haitian alike [must] talk less about (or ‘for’) the peasantry and begin listening
more attentively to what the diverse subgroups have said in the past and have to
say now about their own future.
From this starting point, I have sought to ground my research in the lived experiences of
Haitian peasants. My hope is to push beyond the piecemeal narratives of food insecurity
and peasant livelihoods in Haiti noted earlier and shed light on a much more complex
reality, drawing attention to crucial and underappreciated elements like food culture and
contemporary land struggles that are central to prospects for rural development. Yet
while I deeply admire the courage and resourcefulness of Haitian peasants, and have
sought to contribute to peasant struggles, I have also made concerted efforts to avoid
romanticizing rural Haiti and refrain from making lofty claims about peasant visions for
agriculture. My aim is to recognize peasant agency to shape their own futures in the face
of forbidding historical, cultural, and political economic circumstances, recognizing that
this agency is part of a long legacy of resistance against the political and economic elites
and international actors who have long dominated the country. Though the balance of
power is uneven, and the success of peasant struggles has been limited to this point, there
are many sources of inspiration and optimism in contemporary movements and I hope my
research might in some small way contribute to them.

6

1.2

Research Questions
This dissertation is centrally concerned with the problems and prospects for Haitian

peasants, including responses to recent rural development schemes (which include
dynamics that are in line with the wider phenomenon of land grabbing), food culture and
dietary aspirations, and the post-earthquake intensification of neoliberal agricultural
development policies. These objectives were framed by three interlocking questions:
1) How do post-earthquake reconstruction and development plans for agriculture
and rural development compare with the visions expressed by national peasant
movements in Haiti?
2) How do colour-coded class hierarchies influence attitudes towards food and
farming in Haiti, and how is this reflected in dietary preferences?
3) How are competing visions for agriculture among peasant groups and the key
4

creditor and donor institutions and Haitian government playing out on the
ground?
These questions reflect a tension between structure and agency, giving attention to the
weight of historical legacies (and the complex ways they are reflected in culture), power,

4

In Haiti, the line between creditors and donors is sometimes blurry as institutions like
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and World Bank (WB) have been
historically important creditors, yet at the same time have provided the Haitian state with
an unusual amount of aid and grants, especially in the wake of the 2010 disaster.
Alongside these influential multilateral institutions, which serve as both creditors and
donors, are many other donors, including both bilateral foreign aid agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOS). This combination of creditor and donor institutions
plays a significant role in informing state policy and development objectives in Haiti, and
hereafter (where specific institutions are not explicitly identified) it is referred to as
‘creditors and donors’.
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and inequality in Haiti, in a way that strives to be sensitive to peasant interpretations of
problems and visions of rural development.
1.3

Theoretical Context and Core Theoretical Foundations

1.3.1 A Brief Note on Neoliberalism
The obstacles faced by the peasantry have long and deep historical roots, as developed
especially in chapter 2. However, a significant share of this dissertation focuses on how
the policies associated with neoliberal economic restructuring, enacted since 1986, have
exacerbated the historic struggles of Haitian peasants.
At its core, neoliberalism is an ideological and political project that suggests human
well-being can best be enhanced by continually reducing barriers to businesses and
capital accumulation (Harvey 2005); or, as Klein (2007, 303) succinctly puts it,
neoliberalism is “capitalism stripped of its Keynesian appendages.” The neoliberal state
is expected to prioritize a favourable business climate above all else, securing and
extending private property rights and liberalizing markets, trade, and investment.
The neoliberal turn in development policy and planning took root amidst a series of
debt crises that shook much of the Global South in the 1980s, which followed a period of
declining terms of trade, state over-borrowing (largely from private financial markets),
and rising interest rates. To prevent widespread loan defaults and a global financial crisis,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank managed the repayment of
national debts to foreign creditors through extensive loans, which came with a series of
interlocking policy conditions that became known as Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAPs). In essence, SAPs necessitated: fiscal austerity and deep cuts in social spending;
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trade liberalization, market deregulation, and the encouragement of foreign investment;
the privatization of state corporations and services; and the extension of private property
rights. The ideological belief was that deepening integration within global markets would
enhance the flow of goods and investment, with countries such as Haiti gaining increased
foreign investment as result of the cheaper cost of labour, which in turn would enhance
export capacity and enable greater access to cheaper goods, spurring economic growth
and enable debt repayment (Weis 2007). Since 1986, Haiti’s policy restructuring has
followed the SAP prescription very closely, including: the privatization of many stateowned resources and public corporations (including the state-owned telecommunications
company Teleco, the state-owned cement factory, and the state-owned flour mill); trade
liberalization and deregulation (including massive reductions on import tariffs and a
series of bilateral trade agreements); and a decline in public subsidies, including for
agricultural production (though these were meager to begin with). In Haiti, as elsewhere,
these neoliberal reforms have led to the deepening of social inequalities and a steady
decline in most development indicators (Schuller 2010), as enormous reductions in public
spending have disproportionately affected the poor, while liberalization has failed to
improve unemployment rates or wage levels (McMichael 2012).
1.3.2 Theoretical Foundations
The core theoretical foundations for this dissertation are drawn most heavily from
literature in: agrarian political economy; political ecology; identity formation and
symbolic consumption; and peasant studies, including recent articulations of food
sovereignty. In a broad sense, agrarian political economy is a field that examines agrarian
change in the context of uneven power and social relations, and uneven distributions of
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land and wealth. As Bernstein (2010, 22) puts it, the essential questions through this lens
are: “Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets what? What do they do with it?” The
literature in agrarian political economy has provided a valuable theoretical framework
that helped me to frame my questions and analyses on land conflict and labour relations,
class and race-based differentiation, rural social movements, and peasant decision making
(Bernstein 2014, 2010, 2001; Ploeg 2010; 2009; Akram-Lodhi 2007a, 2007b; Bryceson et
al., 2000; Chayanov 1966).
My theoretical foundations are also informed by the broad field of political
ecology, which similarly aims to expose and denaturalize exploitative social relations,
with a focus on understanding how power and inequality relate to processes of
environmental degradation (Walker 2005; Robbins 2004; Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987).
A major theme within political ecology concerns how the unequal distribution of land
and other resources must be situated with attention to both wider spatial scales and older
historical processes (Robbins 2004; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). My research reflects
the ‘structure-agency’ tension that is common to research in political ecology,
investigating both the structural dynamics driving de-peasantization in Haiti (intensifying
with post-disaster rural development schemes and the rural commercial ventures of the
merchant elite) and the agency of individual actors in responding to these changes.
My research also draws from literature on identity formation and symbolic
consumption in the broad field of cultural theory. A theme in this literature focuses on
understanding how meanings, ideologies and symbols are used as tools for
communicating status and identity. I have drawn from the work of sociologists and
cultural anthropologists who have explored the social meaning of things; how human
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cultures seek social mobility through the consumption of prestigious goods; and how the
consumption of goods can influence identity formation and social standing (Douglas
2003[1970]; Appadurai 1988; Mintz 1986; Bourdieu 1984). I have drawn from this
scholarship to explore how ‘food meanings’ and cultural values of foods influence dietary
preferences and social relations in rural Haiti.
Finally, my research was informed by literature on food sovereignty, an
emerging concept that challenges dominant neoliberal policy approaches to food and
agriculture, and sets out alternative policies which would foster greater local and
democratic control over food systems (Borras 2008; Weis 2007a). While the meaning of
‘food sovereignty’ continues to be debated, in concrete terms it implies: action on such
issues as land reform that will lead towards more equitable social relations in agriculture
(including strong, explicit attention to improving gender equity); policy-making that is
centrally guided by the participation of small-scale farmers and the rural poor and
oriented towards ecologically sustainable practices; and trade policies that protect
domestic production from de-stabilizing imports. The emergence of food sovereignty has
contributed to a deepening critique of how industrial food systems together with global
market integration have negatively affected the livelihoods of peasants and the rural poor
in the Global South (Edelman et al. 2014). However, in celebrating the importance of
small-scale and more locally-oriented agriculture, and democratic governance, the
literature has tended to neglect or downplay the ways that social hierarchies have
influenced food cultures, and how things like ‘race’ and class can influence ideas of
inferiority and, in turn, bias food consumption decision-making. That is, negative
perceptions of domestic food and farming can act as a serious barrier to mobilization
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towards the broad goals of food sovereignty, and Haiti provides an illustrative case study
in this regard, which I explore in Chapter 3.
1.4

Methods and Methodology

1.4.1 Critical Ethnography
My methodological approach comes from ‘critical ethnography’, which involves situating
a local culture within broader historical, political, economic, and social processes (Van
Maanen 2004) and “begins with an ethical responsibility to address processes of
unfairness or injustice” (Madison 2005, 5). What makes ethnography ‘critical’ is to study
culture and knowledge in a way that seeks to reveal forms, ideologies, and symbols of
social control and oppression, expose hidden agendas, and ultimately to try to use new
knowledge to contribute to the process of social change (Madison 2005; Thomas 1993).
One of the principal objectives of ethnography, and a core goal of my research, was to
explore cultural and social patterns through experience and observation (Schensul et al.
1990) in order to establish a sound basis for knowledge (Van Maanen 2004), identifying
dominant trends rather than concrete truths.
The field research that informs this dissertation took place from November 2010
to July 2013 in the town of Dezam in Haiti’s Artibonite Valley (See Figure 1).

5

5

This period also included the birth of our second child Vienna on May 24th 2011 in the
small village of Deschappelle (roughly 20 km from Dezam), and a subsequent maternity
leave.
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Figure 1: Map of Haiti

Dezam

Source: Maps.com
To explore food culture and dietary practices I intentionally observed and
recorded various aspects of community food systems, such as foods sold and consumed
in public kiosks, street-side ‘restoran-s’ [restaurants], open-air markets, and homes, as
well as food practices during religious ceremonies and celebrations. I also actively
participated in community familial activities that I might not have been privy to without
intentionally seeking out opportunities to engage with people. This included working
with peasants on their land, participating in religious ceremonies and community
meetings, and cooking and sorting beans and vegetables with women and children. My
long-term immersion in the field enabled me to benefit and learn from many
unintentional observations. Lessons about social codes, jokes, food hierarchies, nonverbal cues, and meaning systems resulted from countless daily experiences living in
Dezam and performing very mundane activities and chores, from washing laundry and
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bathing in the river, to marketing for food and household goods, to gardening in our yard,
and perhaps most of all, to the activities surrounding raising my children. As Katz (1994)
so aptly put it: I was “always, everywhere in ‘the field’,” and because of this I frequently
found myself taking in unexpected and unrequested information about the lives,
practices, and coping mechanisms of very poor and marginalized peasants. I regularly
witnessed how peasants in the area suffer, adapt to scarcity, and negotiate various
challenges presented to them, sometimes struggling against exploitation.
My ability to be immersed over a significant period of time was a privilege that was
both personally fulfilling and invaluable to my research. I lived in the Artibonite Valley
for over 6 months before conducting formal interviews with key informants in the
community, and before finalizing my interview guides and food preference surveys with
community members. Miller and Crabtree (2004) emphasize that understanding the
research context and having a sense of participants prior to conducting interviews can
greatly enhance the rigour of qualitative research. In my work, I strongly believe that my
long-term immersion enhanced the quality of my interview guides, enabling me to frame
my questions in more appropriate language and deepening my sense of the community
food culture before I sought to identify and discuss complex subjects like food
hierarchies. In addition, long-term participant observation helped me, as it often does
(Herbert 2000), catch tensions between the words and actions of community members
that I might otherwise have overlooked. For example, while people tended to openly
articulate disdain for certain foods like pitimi [which refers to either sorghum or millet]
and black beans, I learned that they consumed these foods in private spaces, in Voudou
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ceremonies, and during konbits [collective agricultural work day, most often an exchange
without monetary compensation].
1.4.2 Study Site
I moved with my family to the rural community of Dezam in Haiti’s Artibonite Valley in
November 2010. Dezam is a growing town that straddles the urban-rural continuum. The
small tin shops that line the main road signal an interface between the global and the local
economy, as sacks of freshly harvested beans stand beside an auto parts shop that doubles
as a water filtration depot. The tarps of drying rice spread out on the road hint at the
engine of the local economy: rice. Hidden behind the bustle of the main roads and
concrete block fences lies some of the most fertile land in Haiti, locally referred to Bas
Rak [the lower stratum], which backs onto the Artibonite River, the largest river in the
country. During the colonial period the valley was a sugar plantation worked by slaves
while over time, the mountains above became home to maroon communities of escaped
slaves. In the 1930s, a US-based corporation, the Standard Fruit Company, enveloped
over 3,500 acres in this area to establish a large banana plantation, but in the periods
between sugar and banana plantations, the fertile valley has been subdivided into small
plots that are cultivated by peasants, many of whom cultivate several dispersed small
parcels. Today, the landscape is a patchwork of small plots irrigated by a decrepit canal
system that empties into the Artibonite River. The small plots are referred to locally as
jaden [gardens], and stretch through the valley and continue up the mountains that
surround Dezam. In the rainy season, the landscape resembles a quilt of fertile gardens,
whereas in the dry season much of it looks tormented: dry, deforested, and rocky. Dezam
sits at the bottom of a valley framed by two mountain ranges, the Maté range to the south
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and the Kayé range to the north. From November 2010 to July 2013 my family and I
lived off the main road about one-half kilometer in a small abitasyon [which roughly
translates to hamlet or neighbourhood].
Dezam is formally split between two municipal seksyon-s [Haiti’s smallest
political and administrative unit] in the Verrette commune, though in practice Dezam is
more of an informal designation, as boundaries shift depending on whom one asks, with
varying combinations of over 30 abitasyon-s counted in different definitions. The fluid
boundaries even between abitasyon-s make population estimates difficult to corroborate.
The Institute for Haitian Statistics and Informatics (2009) estimated that Central Dezam,
which includes about a dozen abitasyon-s, has a population of roughly 5,000, with a
population density of roughly 3,700 people/km2. The area of greater Dezam includes
approximately 12,000 - 15,000 inhabitants with rural areas in the commune holding about
260 people/km2, though the reliability of census data is difficult to assess as the most
recent national census was in 2003 and its accuracy is questionable (the challenge of
numbers is further elaborated below).
1.4.3 Class and Social Differentiation in Dezam
There are a range of rural classes in Dezam that are locally differentiated into four
primary strata: gwo planté [big planter], gwo peyizan [big peasant], peyizan [peasant],
and ti peyizan [small peasant]. While the “conventional hierarchy of status among the
rural poor … smallholder, tenant, wage-labourer” (Scott 1976, 34) broadly characterizes
the social relations in Dezam, many act as smallholder, tenant, and sharecropper
simultaneously, and it is not only land ownership but also land quality that influences
relative social positions (Ellie 1992). For example, ti peyizan-s generally own land, but it
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is often of such poor quality that they are also obliged to vann jounen [to work as daily
wage labourers]. At the same time, even the wealthiest people in the area, though they
may employ agricultural wage labourers, can be seen working on their fertile, irrigated
land in Bas Rak. Though I never encountered a person in Dezam who did not consider
him or herself a peasant, three individuals there are widely considered gwo planté
because they own large amounts of land (roughly 50-70 acres dispersed in multiple
plots), including sizeable parcels in the irrigated valley.
Disparities between rural classes are also marked in a few other ways. First, the
residence of the household and the location of land ownership reflects relative status,
with wealthier inhabitants living in the valley and cultivating land in Bas Rak and poverty
increasing as one ascends the mountains. Second, the produce grown and agricultural
practices of producers further influence relative social positioning, with rice cultivation
more prestigious than pitimi, for example, and fertilizer use a symbol of wealth. The
relationships that women in the community have to agriculture and food also influence
their socio-economic standing and household status. For instance, women who cook food
for konbit-s tend to carry higher social status than women who work the land, and women
who fè kòmès [purchase foods and goods to resell] tend to enjoy higher social status than
women who sell produce that they or their family members have cultivated. Housing
styles and materials are also obvious indicators of class. Peyizan and ti peyizan are more
likely to live in houses made of rock and mud, have their land fenced with candelabra
cactus, and walk longer distances to access water. Wealthier inhabitants of central Dezam
generally reside in concrete brick houses, and concrete roofs are more prestigious than
corrugated tin. Some gwo peyizan-s have solar panels, with the wall surrounding the
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lakou [the familial courtyard is composed of a cluster of homes] made of concrete bricks,
and a few have concrete water basins that collect piped spring water. Here, it is important
to note that the relative prosperity of gwo peyizan-s carries certain obligations to
neighbours, kin, and tenants, informal rules of reciprocity embedded in patwon-kliyan
[patron-client] relations that serve as a kind of social insurance for peyizan-s and ti
peyizan-s (Smith 2001).
1.4.4 Agricultural Practices and Land Tenure
The cultivation patterns of peasants vary by class and by geography. Key crops grown in
the valley include rice, corn, okra, eggplant, black beans, peanuts, and scallions, along
with some other minor crops like sweet potatoes. Mountain crops are more likely to be
sorghum or millet (pitimi), root crops like sweet potatoes or yams, and sometimes coffee.
Tree fruits like mangoes, avocados, or breadfruit may grow in the jaden but are more
common in the lakou. The majority of peasants, including the gwo planté-s, continue to
produce goods both for sale in local markets and for familial subsistence, and cultivate in
labour-intensive ways, polycropping with mutually beneficial combinations and limited
external fertilizers (fertilizer use in the region is most common among rice-growers in the
valley). The predominant agricultural tools are the hoe and sickle, and donkeys are the
primary means of transporting agricultural goods from farm to home or market. It is very
common for households to raise a pig in the lakou, and many peasants of some means
may own a small number of goats (1-3 is common), chickens, and ducks, all of which
roam free and return to the lakou in the evening. Some peasants raise guinea hens or
pigeons, though this is far less common.
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As occurs throughout Haiti, land access in Dezam is governed by both formal and
informal tenure systems. A recent demographic study in the area (financed by the
Canadian International Development Agency) estimated that over 55 percent of Dezam
households cultivate between 0.75 and 1.5 acres of land, with 75 percent of the
population cultivating less than 0.75 acres (GASA 2011). But this assessment glosses
over the reality that land access in Dezam is highly complex and lacking formal records,
as in most of rural Haiti, to an extent that it is often impossible to identify ownership
(Ellie 1992). In general, peasants make ownership claims from several different premises,
including if they have purchased or inherited land or if they cultivate té leta [state land].
There are also various leasehold arrangements between private interests and in gaining
access from the state. This can include direct rental of land for a season [lweyaj], for a
year [fèmay], or for many years [pòtèk]. Various sharecropping [demwatye] arrangements
also exist in Dezam, though the predominant deal is to split the harvest at a ratio of 2:3 in
favour of the tenant. Bay kenbe is a system of land exchange that tends to be sought when
a landowner faces financial struggles, owing to such things as funeral costs, familial
sickness, or successive poor harvests. In this system, the landowner is loaned cash for the
temporary use of land and can reclaim this land after repaying the debt, though in practice
it often proves very difficult for peasants to pay back the loan and hence regain access to
their land (Ellie 1992). In Dezam, the local irrigation committee estimates that half of the
land is worked under the bay kenbe tenure arrangement, but it is recognized that precise
data would be nearly impossible to determine due to the frequent changing of hands.
While many transfers occur peacefully, there is also a long history of land conflict
in Dezam and in the Artibonite Valley more broadly. The most prevalent form of conflict
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occurs between peasants, often caused by disagreements over the boundaries of inherited
land or the timing of irrigation schedules. Some recent cases of micro-scale land reform
in the region were initiated by the state Institute for the Application of Agrarian Reform
(INARA) during the Preval presidency (1995-2000), with small pieces of state land
distributed to peasants. More recently, larger scale conflicts have occurred around the
outskirts of Dezam, in which peasants have so far successfully resisted attempts from
large landowners who were seeking to extend their holdings in the mountain regions.
1.4.5 Public Infrastructure and Services
Like most of rural Haiti, public services are extremely limited in Dezam. Near the end of
my stay there, the main road was finally connected to an electrical grid, although the only
practical benefit at that point was one streetlight at the main crossroads. Various shops
and a local gas station did periodically use generators, and some solar power streetlights
(financed by international NGOs) were introduced on the main road through town.
Dezam has a decrepit water system that is sourced from a spring in the Maté mountain
range, which provides only sporadic access through open pipes that haphazardly stick out
of the ground, generally without faucets. Secretive tapping of the line is a chronic
problem and has caused heated community conflict. The poor quality of this water system
surely amplified the cholera epidemic, as did the lack of an ambulatory or emergency
6

system. Those with some cash resources purchased drinking water from a water
filtration depot in the town’s centre at roughly US$0.10/gallon, while others with less
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During the cholera crisis Hospital Albert Schweitzer funded an ambulance that served
the commune of Verrette, including Dezam, which is about 25 km away from the
hospital. As the sound of the ambulance echoed through the countryside, some would
note how it signaled another cholera victim.
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means treated river water with water purification tablets (when distributed by aid
organizations) or more regularly with klorox [clorox bleach]. Still others with the least
means drank from the canal directly – the same canals are where people bathe, wash
laundry, and draw irrigation water in the portions of the valley. There are no functional
indoor toilets in Dezam and household latrines are few, which presents major problems in
the rainy season when torrential rains wash over the mountains and the residue collects in
the valley below. Many expressed fears that the lack of sewage management was
increasing the spread of cholera, with one friend describing how she saw human feces
floating through the canal while working in her rice paddy.
There is a small health clinic in central Dezam that is operated by a medical
technician and a nurse and offers a range of antibiotics, vitamins, and vaccinations. A
large open-air marketplace operates bi-weekly and offers a wide range of goods, ranging
from processed foodstuffs and second-hand clothing from North America, to plastic
wares and garlic from China, to some foodstuffs like spaghetti and Maggi bouillon cubes
and polyester clothing from the neighbouring Dominican Republic. It is notable that
although diri miyami [imported rice from the U.S.] has flooded many markets throughout
the country, it was not available in Dezam. This might stem in part from the large supply
of local rice in the area, but peasant resistance to diri miyami has also contributed to its
absence. Peasant leaders spoke of how peasant demonstrations and roadblocks prevented
the entry of imported rice to the Artibonite department in the 1980s and 1990s, and there
has always been strong anti-diri miyami sentiment in the region.
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1.4.6 Study Site Selection
I chose Dezam as the primary study site for my research for a number of reasons. First, I
had experience working in this community and visited it regularly when I worked for a
medium-sized NGO in Port-au-Prince from 2007 to 2009. I had well-established
relationships and partnerships there, and a working knowledge of the power dynamics.
Second, the Artibonite Valley is one of the most fertile regions in Haiti and produces
roughly 80 percent of domestic rice, the country’s core food staple, and Dezam is in the
heart of the region (Winter and Samdup 2008; CNSA 2007). To enhance the reliability of
the food preference and dietary recall surveys I felt that it would be important to choose a
relatively fertile study site to limit the influence of lack of access to food or poor
agricultural production on food preferences. Third, as a fertile and productive region, the
Artibonite Valley is central to both agrarian change and any prospect for enhanced food
sovereignty in Haiti. It is a region that was highlighted as an important site for
agricultural development in post-earthquake plans, and it is still largely controlled by
small producers. This allowed me to investigate some of the struggles surrounding
agricultural development plans as new projects were initiated, a focus of Chapter 5.
Finally, as noted, there is a range of peasant classes within a relatively small area of about
30 km, and this was key to examining food preferences across class groups.
1.4.7 Cross-Cultural Fieldwork and Reflexivity
A core dimension of ethnographic research is the continual process of self-review by the
researcher, which means being reflexive about how the researcher’s positionality and
experiences of field research influence the data collected (Nayak 2006; Madison 2005;
Thomas 1992). In this section I offer a brief description of my field research experience
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with particular attention to how my position as an outsider in Dezam influenced the data I
collected.
The cross-cultural dynamics of this project were simultaneously deeply rewarding
and immensely taxing on many levels. One of my aims for field research was to integrate
myself, and my family, as much as possible into community life. Still, the power relations
marked by my phenotype, class, and nationality unavoidably influenced my relationships
and experiences. There has been extensive debate about the advantages and drawbacks of
researchers coming from an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ position (Nayak 2006; Ruben and
Ruben 2004; Shensul and Schensul 1999; Said 1989). Though theoretically I concur that
a researcher who shares the same phenotype, gender, or class group of the study
population will not necessarily be more capable of soliciting an authentic truth than an
outsider (Nayak 2006; Miles and Crush, 1993), I also must admit that being such a hypervisible outsider in Dezam created certain limitations. Outside of the ti wout [small road]
that I lived on, with roughly 20 other households, I remained ‘blan’ [a Kreyòl word
meaning both white people and foreign people, including non-Caucasian foreigners] to
most people in Dezam for over 2.5 years. For example, a neighboring young boy who
was a fast friend of my son and a daily visitor at our home took the better part of a year to
transition from calling me blan to calling me Marylynn.
I worked hard to find an appropriate voice in Dezam. In practical terms this
involved such things as: regularly going to the local market; cooking ‘Haitian’ food;
conversing with neighbours about how to master local recipes; gardening and raising
animals in our yard; getting Haitian dresses made and wearing them; seeking health care
in the local dispensary and hospital; and raising children among others in the town. Some
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of my most rewarding and informative moments were in the marketplace after I had
learned some of the art of bantering with Madanm Sara, the term for Haitian market
women who are known to chatter and gossip like the yellow and black canaries of the
same name. Still, often the race and class barriers seemed insurmountable and I would be
remiss to deny the reality that I was often met with varying combinations of suspicion,
hostility, and contempt. This meant that my subjective experience was often one of
unbridgeable difference and it frequently took considerable force of will to brave the
marketplace and the jeers.
In many ways I think my ‘race’ position served to enhance my understanding of
how racially charged rural Haiti is, a dynamic that may have been less visible for a black
Haitian researcher. Part of this was tied to an important decision I made early on not to
rely on a ‘fixer’ (a research assistant who might double as a sort of casual bodyguard) to
accompany me, with the exception of my research in Caracol in Haiti’s North
Department, an area that I did not know nearly as intimately. In most cases, I developed
relationships either through friends I had already established during my earlier work in
Haiti or independently. I strongly believe that decision was advantageous for several
reasons. First, my independence and lack of association with a Haitian community
member enabled me to be ‘strategically naïve’ (Smith 2001) and to ask detailed questions
about things like cooking practices, social codes and rules, farming, and eating
behaviours that people often seemed excited to share. Second, my autonomy allowed me
to experience and assess some of the race and class relations in the region that might not
have been obvious to me had I been accompanied by a local fixer. I often noticed that
when I walked with a Haitian friend or Haitian research assistant I was far less likely to
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be heckled or met with apprehension. Alternately, when I walked in the town
independently or with my children, the frequent race-based comments I received –
though a source of frustration – often provided valuable opportunities to discuss issues of
race with community members. At the same time, I was also mindful of the ways that my
class and phenotype influence social dynamics and concede that the perception of me as
an affluent blan may have inhibited me from obtaining truthful information from certain
research participants. To minimize this, I sought three Haitian research assistants who
helped develop interview guides and conducted interviews and surveys with community
members (the decision to have them conduct these interviews is discussed further below).
I subsequently conducted interviews with local leaders and key informants independently
after a lengthy discussion with research assistants about whether this would be
appropriate. The advice I received was that because power imbalances were generally
less stark between key informants and myself I could conduct these interviews and expect
to have open discussions. Certainly the accuracy of the data retrieved for this study is
dependent on the honesty of the participants, but I have no reason to question their
truthfulness.
While key informant interviews produced rich data in spite of my race and class
position, this positionality certainly complicated my initial desire to pursue participant
observation with peasant farmers in Dezam (along with daily life in general), and it was
much more difficult to find strategies to minimize this. I want to be clear that throughout
field research I was very aware that my very presence as a blan in rural Haiti might be
perceived as audacious and arrogant, and I often vacillated between feeling like I had no
right to conduct research or live in rural Haiti and frustrated by the lack of broader
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acceptance beyond a relatively small radius of people we knew me best. At times I was
met with staunch hostility; in one instance, I was surrounded by a group of furious rockarmed peasants for whom my skin shade evidently marked a threat. At other times I was
glorified as if I had special powers; once, I was followed by a young girl who urged the
small, half-paralyzed child she was carrying to touch my arm, whispering to her that I
was closer to God and might help her to heal. I offer these stories not to suggest that
either was the norm but to emphasize how perceptions of blan are often extreme, and
how the ensuing interaction can vary widely. I often felt like I was swinging on an
unpredictable pendulum, never really certain of how I would be perceived but always
aware that my skin colour carried enormous historical and cultural baggage.
As my knowledge of local race relations, food meanings, and markers of class
became more developed during field research, I became increasingly sensitive of the fact
that by doing things like buying and consuming things like carrots and rice (both
prestigious foods) I might be reinforcing the sorts of race and class stigmas I found so
problematic and wanted to struggle against. I dealt with these tensions by trying to
express my solidarity with peasants and by attempting to reduce some of the markers of
my class in different ways. Sometimes this meant eating pitimi [sorghum] and patat
[sweet potato], two foods widely disdained and associated with the lowest class of
peasants. At other times it meant putting on an alter-ego (what a mentor and friend called
my Madanm Sara look: firm and brave) which included trying to master the gestures,
expressions, and banter of Haitian woman. I took pride when people would say, “you’re
not a blan any more, you’re a Haitian.” Still, I often struggled with my failure to translate
my human-ness to many others for whom I recognize I never became ‘moun’, or a total
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person. Though in some spaces and relationships I moved closer to understanding, I
never escaped a power imbalance and the privilege of my circumstance. Ultimately, like
other foreigners have described (Katz 2010; Schwartz 2008; Smith 2001), I came away
with a deep but complicated love for Haiti.
Throughout my field research, I carried a deep tension and unease about the
privilege which allowed me to work in Haiti yet also leave it – my ability to get on a
plane, my ability to enjoy a life without hunger, without malaria, without cholera – and
these feelings are not yet resolved, as I return to in the conclusion of this dissertation. I
also remain uneasy with many of the choices I made in the field and frustrated by the fact
that I will benefit from this research professionally even as I cannot claim that it has
benefited research participants in any substantial way. I continue to wrestle with the
question of whether my research in an impoverished and exploited population was
ethical, and what moral and political responsibilities this entails. My sincere hope is that
my methodological choices facilitated some meaningful cross-cultural insights into the
problems of agro-food systems and the challenges of food sovereignty, and that my
writing and advocacy might, in some small way, contribute to the struggles of the poor in
Haiti against the enduring injustices they face.
1.4.8 Interviews, Focus Groups, and Sampling
The data for this dissertation was principally collected through qualitative research
methods. The most important methods throughout the dissertation were semi-structured
interviews with key informants and community members, focus groups with peasant
producers, and content analysis of key policy documents, while food preferences surveys
with community members were an important part of Chapter 3. All interviews and focus
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groups were conducted in Haitian Kreyòl, with the exception of the interviews with
representatives from the USAID, which was conducted in English. All interviews and
focus groups were audio-recorded, with permission, and were transcribed verbatim.
Chapter 2 begins with an historical analysis of Haiti’s agro-food system, before
exploring the competing visions for rural Haiti between those proffered in post-disaster
development plans and those articulated by leaders of peasant movements. The empirical
component of this chapter is based on a critical content analysis of post-earthquake
development and reconstruction plans and open-ended semi-structured interviews with
key informants. Long-term immersion in the field also enriched my ability to critique the
post-disaster development plans for agriculture, to see both visions and responses through
the lens of projects unfolding on a local scale. At the same time, my analysis of postearthquake development plans provided insights on the ideology and decision-making of
dominant actors and how new projects were re-shaping the agro-food system in Dezam
from ‘above’. I paid close attention to power relations between class groups throughout
my field research, and various interactions with peasant leaders, other activists, and
community members at large made the broad dissatisfaction with the post-earthquake
reconstruction and development agenda clear to me, along with the widespread
recognition it was largely orchestrated by external actors. The justification for sampling
leaders of peasant movements to inform this research was to identify ‘articulate persons’
(Baxter and Eyles 1999) who could speak for many, as their leadership position within
these movements made them well-positioned to represent the perspectives and concerns
that are at the basis of peasant mobilization.
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The research that informs Chapter 3 was based on two sets of semi-structured
qualitative interviews (n=108) and food preference surveys (n=108) with purposively
sampled community members, with the aim of understanding a range of dietary
preferences. The sampling sought to include an equal number of men and women but a
wide variety of class and age groups, with the intent of learning from a range of
perspectives (rather than aiming for representativeness) and enhancing credibility by
maximizing variability in the group (Rubin and Rubin 2004; Schensul et al. 1999). As
noted, poverty in the area tends to increase as one ascends the mountain, and three
abitasyon-s were chosen to get a range of class groupings: in the valley (n=36), halfway
up the mountain (n=36), and near the mountaintop (n=36). Several informants whom I
trusted assisted me in identifying individuals for the sample groups in each area, and I
relied on the following local categorizations of social class to inform the sampling:
individuals with plis mwayen [an individual of some means]; individuals who are plis w
mwens [an individual who gets by]; and those who are malere [very poor]. However, it is
important to note that perceptions of these categories differ from the valley to the
mountain. For example, a valley dweller with plis mwayen might have a concrete house
while a mountain dwellers with plis mwayen would likely have mud/rock house with a
corrugated tin roof. In response, I sought to diversify the class groupings within each
abitasyon (the sample guide used for each community is in Appendix 5).
Understanding local food culture was obviously a complex task, and I approached
this by exploring values, meanings and beliefs around foods and sought to explore how
these are reflected in patterns of food production and consumption (Lang and Heasman
2004). I drafted both the interview guides and food preference surveys in the field after
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living in Dezam and observing local food practices for roughly six months. This draft
was informed by many discussions with community leaders, market women, peasant
producers and neighbours, and by my own investigations into the types of foods regularly
consumed at home and those sold by street vendors, at street side restaurants, in the openair market place. After I had drafted an interview guide and food preference survey, I
sought input and advice from research assistants, who helped to re-shape some of the
questions, adding to certain areas and revising others. The process of developing
interview guides in a team and having multiple researchers work on this project can be an
important form of triangulation that can increase both dependability (Baxter and Eyles
1997) and scientific rigour (Turner and Coen 2008), and I have no doubt that the input of
the research assistants enhanced the quality of the surveys and interview questions and
made them more appropriate to the participants and the local food culture (the interview
guide is attached in Appendix 1 and food preference surveys are contained in Appendix 6
and 7).
As I navigated the insider/outsider question on the ground through a combination
of my own observations and experiences and discussions with various peers, community
leaders in Dezam, and my research assistants, it became clear that my positionality was
likely to influence responses from some community members. I made the difficult
decision that it was more appropriate for Haitian research assistants to conduct interviews
and food preference surveys with community members, and two research assistants
assisted with this. Prior to this field research, I held a full-day workshop on qualitative
methods and conducting interviews, which included attention to the importance of
allowing respondents to answer freely and without interruption, avoiding leading
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questions and inserting personal opinions, and gently probing for more detail when
necessary. We also reviewed the process of introducing the research project and
intentions to the participants, requesting verbal consent to participate in the study, and
reviewed the interview guides and surveys and conducted several practice interviews in
an afternoon workshop. The first round of interviews and surveys was conducted in
December 2011 and the second round in June 2012. The intent in this 2-stage process was
to capture food choices and agricultural practices both mid-way through the rainy season
and mid-way through the dry season. Interviews and surveys generally took between 45
minutes and 1.5 hours and participants were modestly compensated for their time in the
study.
Open-ended semi-structured key informants interviews (n=40) were a key
component of my field research that informed all four research chapters of this
dissertation.

7

The open-ended interview approach allowed for rich responses and

informal, free-flowing discussions. I conducted interviews with government officials,
representatives from bi-lateral organizations and NGOs based in Port-au-Prince,
representatives from the prominent Haitian agribusiness operating in the Artibonite
Valley, and leaders of peasant movements in a range of locations including Port-auPrince, the Central Plateau, various locations in the Artibonite Valley, and in the North
Department. A detailed list of the themes and questions that guided interviews can be
found in Appendix 1. Interviews ranged significantly in length from roughly 1.5 hours to
over one-half day, with some leaders of peasant movements inviting the conversation to

7

A detailed list of key informants can be found in each research article.
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continue over lunch. Although the broad interview themes remained consistent, I adapted
most interview guides in the field. This flexibility allowed me to adjust interview guides
as I became more familiar with the expertise and knowledge of each prospective
respondent and made interviews more focused and productive.
The research that informs Chapter 4 took place in the town of Caracol in January
2013 in Haiti’s North Department. Focus groups were a central part of this research, and
were conducting with a wide range of interests including: workers in the Caracol
Industrial Park (n=13); members of the Boards of Directors of Communal Sections
(CASECS) and Communal Section Assembly (ASECS) in the commune of Caracol
(n=15); peasants who were displaced because of the park (n=8); and members and leaders
of local peasant and community groups; a list of which can be found in Appendix 8). The
research drawn from focus groups was augmented by a few key informant interviews
including with the former and current mayors of Caracol and with the Catholic Priest in
the area. The interview guide that helped inform these meetings was created in
collaboration with Dr. Yasmine Shamsie of Wilfrid Laurier University (see Appendix 9).
In Caracol, the process of organizing focus groups and interviews was greatly assisted by
a member of a national peasant organization, and a Haitian research assistant helped
facilitate focus group discussions and the interviews that were conducted.
The empirical research in Chapter 5 involves a combination of content analysis of
policy documents, a few interviews with key informants, and focus groups with members
of a peasant struggle contesting a land grab near Dezam. Due to the fact that this research
concerned a very heated and complex land struggle, it was more difficult to access
participants because peasants were initially very apprehensive to meet and discuss these
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subjects. To build trust, I first met informally with the former lawyer of the peasant
organization/movement, and then later conducted an interview with him to get a more
detailed account of the nature and history of the land conflict as well as to share
information about my research project and politics, which the respondent then
communicated to the peasant group. Next, I met with a neighbour who is a confidant of
many peasants in the group and he facilitated a meeting with the peasants fighting to stay
on the land they had long farmed.
Peasant group members insisted on the location of the meeting, which was near the
contested land, and that it was a group meeting. My fluency in Kreyòl proved a crucial
means of establishing trust, since it is the language of the peasantry and of the Haitian
poor more generally (while this fluency helped to mark my solidarity with peasants in
other instances, nowhere was it more important than in this instance). In this focus group
(n=15), my broad thematic objectives were to: capture the nature and history of the land
conflict from the peasant perspective; detail acts of violence and injustice expressed by
participants; assess how the land conflict might threaten food security; and explore why
peasants were mobilizing to resist this land grab. This meeting was conducted in July
2013 and I returned to Canada shortly after. A follow-up focus group (n=8) with some of
the same peasants was conducted by a research assistant in December 2013 and sought to
get an update on the status of the conflict. Investigating this land conflict and the same
chronology of events from multiple perspectives helped build redundancy into the
research design and thereby increase the rigour of the data analysis (Rubin and Rubin
2004).
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1.4.9 Transcription and Analysis
I transcribed most interviews in the field, which had two major advantages: it helped me
to identify emerging themes and gave me insights on areas to explore in future interviews
and helped me to pay attention to emerging data and to identify when I had reached
‘sufficient redundancy’ of information (Schensul and Schensul 1999). However, not all
transcriptions were finished when I left, and the remainder were completed in Canada
between August 2013 and January 2014, during which time I also simultaneously began
the process of data analysis. I coded interview and focus group transcripts by identifying
major themes and then doing a line-by-line coding, which allowed me to group data on
various themes together in relation to the key research questions. I entered all survey data
into Excel, and conducted simple frequencies to determine food preferences. I also coded
interviews with community members with the aim of identifying all references to food
preferences and associations between food preferences and race and class hierarchies.
1.5 A Note on Numbers
Statistics on Haiti are difficult to acquire and to assess and “should be taken with more
than a small grain of salt” (Smith 1998, 36). This goes for a wide range of social and
economic data, such as yields, assessments of land ownership, population statistics and
household data, and unemployment rates. One stark example about the variations in
numbers can be seen in the spectrum of estimates of the death toll from the 2010
earthquake, which have ranged from 85,000 to 320,000. Another example can be seen in
a study of unemployment rates conducted in the 1980s, which initially estimated them to
be in excess of 70 percent of the national population, but which was later lowered to
between 5 and 20 percent – still a very large variance, which partly reflects the fact that
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many work in the hard-to-measure informal sector (Katz 2010; Fass 1988). I came to
question a lot of the data I encountered in agricultural reports and planning documents,
including production and exports statistics, as I learned that: harvests tend to be measured
by donkey (in loads); much of the land is measured in pa [strides]; and that sales of
grains, sugar, and beans are conducted in the local measuring units gode and mamit,
which are various sizes of cups and tins that are roughly consistent but hardly precise.
The problem with population statistics stems from a range of factors including a
low propensity for people to have birth records, a high propensity for undocumented
individuals to be excluded from reports, and the questionable accuracy of household
enumeration methods in general. Alvarez and Murray (1981) suggest that a household
tends to be understood as including those who eat from the same cooking pot rather than
household sleeping conditions, and note how this can confuse household sampling. In the
course of my research I became aware of a study by a local community development
organization for a latrine project in several abitasyon-s of Dezam that sought to assess
household numbers but (it was realized part way through) did not count children.
All of these examples indicate the enormous barriers to quantitative evaluations of
social and economic conditions, especially in rural Haiti, and are part of why I chose a
qualitative research approach, along with the fact that I was most interested in
motivations and perceptions and sorts of insights that are not generally accessible to
surveys and quantification.
1.6 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is organized in the integrated manuscript style, with Chapters 2 to 5
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composed of four research chapters followed by a brief concluding chapter. Chapter 2,
“Agrarian Roots of the Haitian Catastrophe,” starts with a historical analysis of peasant
farming and agrarian change in Haiti, arguing that contemporary food insecurity, rural
poverty, and peasant persistence must be understood as the culmination of a long history
of peasant exploitation by foreign actors, the state and the merchant elite. It then
examines the competing visions for agriculture that have in some ways been intensified
in the process of Haiti’s post-disaster reconstruction: on one side is the continuation of a
neoliberal approach from ‘above’, which is assessed through a content analysis of key
policy documents; on the other side is the resistance and alternatives that are coming
from ‘below,’ which is principally based on interview data collected from leaders of
peasant movements.
Chapter 3, “Eating Up the Social Ladder: The problem of dietary aspirations for
food sovereignty,” examines how food hierarchies in Haiti tend to mirror social
inequalities, in that conceptions of ‘black’ and ‘peasant’ foods are widely viewed with
disdain while ‘elite’ and ‘foreign’ foods are widely held in higher esteem, with dietary
aspirations geared toward the consumption practices of the lighter-skinned urban upper
and middle classes. This paper, which is based on qualitative interviews and food
preference surveys, argues that attitudes about food and dietary aspirations pose a
significant barrier to the prospects for food sovereignty in Haiti. This suggests a need to
appreciate how the cultural geographies of food interact with – and can in fact exacerbate
– political and economic inequalities, which raises challenging questions for peasant
movements and advocates of food sovereignty.
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Chapter 4, “Manufacturing Corporate Landscapes: The case of agrarian
displacement and food (in)security in Haiti,” investigates historical foundations and
contemporary causes of food insecurity, arguing that Haiti’s severe food insecurity today
is tied to a long orientation towards export expansion, driven by both foreign interests
and Haiti’s elite, at the expense of domestic production. This argument is informed by
Robert Fatton’s concept of the ‘outer periphery’, to draw attention to Haiti’s marginal
position as an exporter of a small range of cheap-labour goods in the neoliberal global
economy. The empirical focus of the paper examines the impacts of one post-earthquake
development project – the export manufacturing facility, the Caracol Industrial Park – on
peasant livelihoods and local food security in the surrounding communities.
Chapter 5, “Peasant Balances, Neoliberalism and the stunted growth of nontraditional agro-exports in Haiti,” examines divergent peasant responses to the various
models of export mango production that have been promoted in post-earthquake Haiti.
These responses range from outright rejection on one side to hesitant participation in new
marketing arrangements along with efforts to increase the scale of production on the
other, and a mix in between. The analysis of these responses is informed by a neoChayanovian framework that stresses attention to an array of balances that peasant
households seek to maintain, and the importance of thinking about labour outputs in
relation to household consumption. The paper suggests that by understanding the
dynamic tension in peasant-capital relations in contemporary Haiti the ways that capital is
attempting to organize production and the ways that peasants are inhibiting this. More
specifically, the paper argues that peasants are conditioning the dynamics of agro-export
expansion in Haiti and in the process frustrating some of the ambitions of the country’s
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political and economic elites. At a broader scale, this highlights some of the ways that
peasant producers can push back against exploitative arrangements and maintain a degree
of autonomy over their cropping systems.
The concluding chapter summarizes the major findings and unifying themes of
the four research chapters, before reflecting on the research process as a whole. One of
the overarching arguments is that the behaviours, perceptions, and mobilizing capacity of
peasants are such that they will not simply abide by development prescriptions and
projects determined from above. Centuries of slavery followed by varying combinations
of marginality and exploitation have not undermined peasant resilience and their desire
for autonomy and dignity. This suggests, I argue, that peasant perspectives should be a
fundamental component of development policy in Haiti if it is to have any possibility of
reducing poverty and enhancing food security.
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2. Agriculture In and Beyond the Haitian Catastrophe
Abstract
Although the devastation from Haiti’s 2010 earthquake was concentrated in urban
Port-au-Prince, it must be understood to have deep rural and agrarian roots. This
paper begins by situating Haiti’s urban poverty in the chronic exploitation of the
country’s agricultural producing classes, which provides a necessary foundation
from which to assess debates over the role that agriculture will play in Haiti’s
post-disaster reconstruction. The focus of the paper then turns to a critical
assessment of the competing contemporary visions for agricultural development;
both the continuation of a neoliberal approach from ‘above’, examined through a
content analysis of key policy documents, and the resistance and alternatives that
are coming from ‘below,’ an analysis based on qualitative interviews with leaders
of peasant movements. Ultimately, it argues that in light of the pervasiveness and
complexity of peasant land ownership, and the peasantry’s resolute determination
to maintain control over land, the future of rural Haiti will be shaped by the
peasantry – in spite of post-disaster plans. We also argue that the potential for
Haiti’s agricultural systems to move towards the core goals of food sovereignty
will be based on the strength of Haiti’s peasant movements and their ability to
collaborate and grow as a political force.
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2.1

Introduction: Historicizing the Haitian Catastrophe
Ti kou ti kou fè mò. (Enough little hits can kill you)
-Haitian Proverb
Overurbanization…is driven by the reproduction of poverty, not by the supply of
jobs.
-Mike Davis (2006,16)

On January 12, 2010, Haiti was hit by an earthquake that had an immense human impact,
affecting between 3 and 4 million – up to two-fifths of the national population (UNDP
2011). An estimated 220,000 people were killed (PDNA 2010), 300,000 injured, over 1.5
million people were displaced, and 85,000 remain in camps as of early 2015 (FAO 2015;
8

IOM 2015; UN-OHRLLS 2015). The devastation was largely concentrated in Port-auPrince, and on the streets of this ruined capital, the catastrophe quickly came to be known
by the haunting moniker “Goudou Goudou” – a onomatopoeic term for the grinding
sounds of the quake. Buildings, sanitation, and basic services were destroyed on a
massive scale: 190,000 homes were destroyed, 3,978 schools and educational
establishments were ruined, and 30 hospitals and health centers were severely damaged
(IHRC 2011; PDNA 2010). Economic losses amounted to US $7.8 billion, a staggering
120 percent of Haiti’s annual GDP (IHRC 2011). The mass exodus from Port-au-Prince
strained rural resources and households for months, but the lack of opportunity for
internally displaced people (IDPs) in rural Haiti has since meant that rural re-migration
has not been durable. A large majority returned to Port-au-Prince in the subsequent two

8

The death toll has been the subject of much contention. In the immediate aftermath of
the earthquake the UN stopped matching the toll given by the Haitian government after it
passed 230,000 (Katz 2013). The Haitian government finally placed the number above
220,000, though one USAID-financed study attempted to revise it considerably lower,
estimating that no more than 85,000 people died. Following that, a US academic team
asserted real death toll was 316,000 (UNDP, 2011).
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years, and it is widely recognized that those who have remained in rural areas often have
aspirations to return to the capital. A focus group (n=10) conducted in June 2013 with
IDPs residing in the Artibonite Valley shed light on why this is so, as respondents
despaired the lack of opportunity for work or education in rural areas. According to one,
Before the earthquake I was in 12th grade. Now, it's like I’m not living anymore. I
have nothing to do. Every day I ask myself: What will I do? How will I be able to
stand up? It’s not like I want to stay here, but I have no means to go back to Portau-Prince.
The enormous challenge of reconstruction efforts was further compounded by a serious
outbreak of cholera in late 2010, which infected over 650,000 people, killed over 8,000,
and was subsequently confirmed to have been carried to Haiti by UN Stabilization
Mission (MINUSTAH) forces whose presence went back to 2004 (GAO 2013).

10

As has been widely emphasized, this humanitarian catastrophe is not solely a
‘natural’ disaster. Haiti is by far the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and
though it is also the most rural, the proliferation of extremely vulnerable urban
environments cannot be understood apart from the country’s chronic rural poverty and

9

A study monitoring the migration of cell-phones and users found that by November
2011, 68 percent of those who had fled Port-au-Prince following the earthquake had
returned to the capital (Bengtsson 2011).
10
MINUSTAH was established by the UN Security Council the aftermath of the second
coup that toppled Jean Bertrand Aristide, and after the earthquake the scope of its
mandate expanded beyond ‘stability’ to include support for reconstruction. In addition to
their role in the cholera outbreak, some MINUSTAH soldiers were charged with various
counts of sexual abuse, including of minors. The result was widespread public anger and
low confidence (Schuller 2012).
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how it has driven unsustainable levels of urbanization. Port-au-Prince in particular has
long been characterized by: overcrowding; huge slums, many perched on steep hillsides;
poor infrastructure; a sizable sweatshop sector yet high levels of overall unemployment;
and a large informal sector with people hustling as petty traders. The suffering of Haiti’s
urban poor, in fact, drew considerable attention just prior to the earthquake, amidst the
volatility of world food prices in 2007-8. Various media outlets along with a number of
prominent scholars drew attention to the fact that people were rioting in response to the
rising costs of basic staples (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 2010; Bello 2009; Patel and
McMichael 2009).

11

Some aspects of the rural and agrarian roots of the 2010 catastrophe emerged in
subsequent media coverage and analysis, though often in fragments. One of the most
notable and frequently cited of these occurred when, in the near aftermath of the
earthquake, former US President Bill Clinton (and formal UN envoy to Haiti) apologized
for how US-directed trade policies had devastated Haiti’s agricultural sector. In a speech
to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 10, Clinton apologized for his
role in championing neoliberal economic policies in Haiti, including his support for the
liberalization of US rice imports which overwhelmed Haiti’s domestic rice production,
noting that it “may have been good for some of [his] farmers in Arkansas but it has not
worked. It was a mistake” (Katz 2010). Where this flood of cheap, subsidized US rice

11

Along with food price related riots, there were widespread reports that many poor
Haitians were eating ‘mud cakes’ in 2008 to quell their hunger. Without diminishing the
severity of food insecurity many faced, this story was grossly oversimplified, as clay
cakes have long history of production in Haiti. They are sourced from a specific area in
the central plateau, widely valued for pregnant women, and tied to the Voudou religion.
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was noted, it was regularly juxtaposed against the fact that Haiti was largely selfsufficient in the production of rice and basic foodstuffs only a quarter century earlier.
Some accounts have gone further back into Haiti’s long history of exploitation and
foreign domination, noting how slave plantations made it the most lucrative colony in the
world in the 18th century, and how France continued to extract onerous debt payments
well into the 20th century, more than a century after the Haitian Revolution. The
momentous biophysical problems of the Haitian countryside – in particular the nexus of
deforestation, soil erosion, and desertification – were also pointed to in some discussions
of rural poverty and migration, with varying degrees of historical context. In light of
Haiti’s enduring poverty and food insecurity, the magnitude of devastation to the built
environment, and migratory pressures (both rural-to-urban movement prior to the
earthquake, and urban-to-rural which followed it), the question of how agriculture will
factor in the country’s reconstruction is enormous and urgent.
One end of the spectrum of answers proffered might be characterized as disaster
capitalism (Klein 2009), flowing from much of the multilateral and bilateral donor
financing, which constitutes the overwhelming source of the government budget. This
includes a predominant focus on security and policing (via a combination of the Haitian
police forces, MINUSTAH, the US Marines, and private contractors), urban-biased
infrastructure (including to foreign contractors), and aggressive encouragement of foreign
investment in the hope that Haiti can recover and expand in its global economic niche as
an exporter of garments and other light manufactures. Implicit here is a recognition that
Haiti’s competitiveness in these products is fortified by its immense reserve army of
labour in the countryside, particularly as rural areas have been further strained by their
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role as a de facto sponge for the displaced. One explicit way that agriculture featured
directly in a disaster-capitalist reconstruction initiative was in Monsanto’s offer to donate
‘improved’ seeds, ostensibly to help ‘modernize’ Haiti’s backwards agricultural sector,
with the unspoken aim of inserting its proprietary technology into landscapes and farming
practices and establishing new dependencies and an input treadmill.
The other end of the spectrum of views on the future of agriculture in Haiti is the
case that ‘re-peasantization’ could be actively encouraged as a central pillar of Haiti’s
longer-term reconstruction, guided by the broad goal of enhancing food sovereignty. In
this conception of intentional re-peasantization, domestic food production should be
prioritized (including state flexibility to protect markets against de-stabilizing agricultural
imports) alongside support for redistributive land reform and agro-ecological research
and training. Obviously, this runs up against very powerful narratives of modernization
and development, and more concretely must face an emaciated state subject to the
tremendous influence of myriad multilateral and bilateral donors, an enormous NGO
sector that expanded in this vacuum, and an unrepresentative government with dubious
claims to legitimacy.

12

12

Yet while these barriers are formidable, there are some indications

The 2010 presidential elections, which came less than a year after the earthquake, had
questionable legitimacy from the outset as Famni Lavalas was forbidden from
participating, though it was by far the largest party in Haiti and had overwhelmingly won
the elections prior to the 2004 coup. The elections and their aftermath reflected the
unrepresentative nature of Haitian politics, the degree to which ordinary people recognize
this, and the willingness of the international community to turn a blind eye. Only about
one in five eligible voters cast a ballot and myriad observers reported widespread fraud,
yet the US, the Organization of American States, and Haiti’s provisional Electoral
Council deemed the process legitimate if problematic – content with the election of
reactionary former music star Michel (‘Sweet Micky’) Martelly (Coughlin 2011).
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that peasant movements are growing in strength, including the popular resistance to
Monsanto’s seed ‘donation’ and struggles against a number of collusive private sectorstate land grabs.
Our aim in this paper is to situate the acute vulnerability of Haiti’s urban poor,
exposed so devastatingly in the 2010 earthquake, within the context of the long-term
exploitation and marginalization of small farmers and agricultural workers, in order to
assess ongoing agricultural prospects, possibilities, and struggles. We argue that the
immense suffering from the earthquake can be seen along the lines of the proverb at the
outset: as a deathly culmination of a long history of foreign domination, surplus
extraction by the national bourgeoisie and a predatory state, and rural impoverishment.
This historicized lens helps to connect some of the fragments noted earlier, from
slavery (and France’s historic debt) to neoliberalism (and Bill Clinton’s apology), to the
unfolding disaster capitalism and the highly uneven contest over the nature of
reconstruction.
2.2

Slavery, Independence and the Emergence of the Haitian Peasantry

Haiti was the only successful slave revolution in world history, the first fully free
independent country in the Western Hemisphere, and to this day land inequality is much
less marked than it is in most other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean.
Nevertheless, there are few places in the world where the legacies of colonialism and
neocolonialism have been more intense and debilitating than in Haiti. As Trouillot (1994)
put it, the poor have been entrapped in a particularly powerful historical nightmare, and a
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long temporal lens is necessary to appreciate contemporary struggles over the future of
agriculture and food in Haiti.
In 1789, on the cusp of the French Revolution, Saint-Domingue was the richest
colony in the world, the famed ‘Jewel of the Caribbean’, and led the world in the export
of sugar and coffee and the import of slaves (Hallward 2010; Farmer 2003; Heinl and
Heinl 1996; Trouillot 1994, 1990). As throughout the colonial Caribbean and other slave
plantation economies, Saint-Domingue was overwhelmingly structured around a narrow
range of agricultural exports and reliant upon a wide array of imports – the first region in
world history where food security hinged so utterly upon the long distance movement of
basic foodstuffs like grains and dried fish and meat (Weis 2003; Mintz 1985).
The slave population of Saint-Domingue was roughly 500,000 in 1789, which
dwarfed the combined numbers of French planters, ‘small whites,’ mulattos, and free
blacks. The mulatto population had an important role as a social buffer between planters
and slaves, supplemented by the small number of free blacks. For the most part, the
cultural tastes and social aspirations of this small middle stratum were geared toward
ascending the social hierarchy rather than challenging it. Yet it was mulattoes, along with
white planters and so-called ‘small whites,’ who first gave spark to the Haitian
Revolution in 1791, each seeking to capitalize on the tumult of the French Revolution to
achieve divergent goals (James 1963).
This initial fracture was seized on by slaves (led by Toussaint L’Ouverture) who
rose up and won their Emancipation in a long and bloody struggle. L’Ouverture was the
pivotal figure from 1793 to 1803, and he took a conciliatory approach to white planters in
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the period between Emancipation and Independence. To him, plantation agriculture was
the inescapable core of Haiti’s economy, and the knowledge of the planters was needed
for the system to function, and for a time there was a remarkable revival of plantation
production from the ashes of war (James 1963). While L’Ouverture’s long-term course
was unclear, James (1963) urged caution in judging his unwillingness to confront
plantations, the planter class, and the harshness with which ex-slaves were compelled into
low-wage labour, insisting that it would have been very hard to see other options in the
short-term in light of the immense constraints set by Haiti’s history and geopolitical
circumstances. L’Ouverture’s pragmatism did little to placate France, and he was
deceived, captured, and died in a French prison as Jean-Jacques Dessalines was leading
the final triumph towards Independence for Haiti in 1803 in intense fighting that further
ravaged the agricultural landscape and the existing infrastructure. Haiti was, in short,
‘born in ruins’ (Galeano 2004).
It is impossible to overstate the challenge of reconstruction which followed more
than a decade of war: tens of thousands of working age men had been killed; most
plantations and sugar mills had been razed; and basic food security had historically been
contingent on colonial trading networks. Further, as Beckford (1972) emphasized, one of
the most persistent barriers to development in plantation economies was an utter lack of
internal dynamism and technological innovation from which to build post-slavery
societies. It is not surprising that Dessalines, like L’ouverture, could not see any
alternative but to attempt to rebuild the productive capacity of plantations. Unlike
L’ouverture, however, there was no conciliation with the planter class after Napoleon’s
forces (sent to reconquer and re-enslave Haiti) had been defeated, as all of the remaining
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whites were purged shortly after Independence. In the turbulent post-revolutionary
period, the process of class formation was influenced by three conflicting internal
dynamics. First, Dessalines led an attempt to forcibly establish quasi-serf relations as the
means to rebuilding plantation production, and appropriated for himself a series of large
estates (and the title of Emperor) before being assassinated in 1806. Second, the majority
of emancipated slaves resisted the reconfigured forms of exploitation on plantations, and
emerged as small peasants on land they were able to buy or occupy from the state or from
large landowners in retreat. Third, stemming from the powerful fusion of race and class
interests in the slave period, the mulatto minority maneuvered to capture the state and
assert themselves as the new elite in positions of political and economic control over the
black majority – which meant finding ways to extract wealth from the newly emergent
peasantry. Amidst these intense class struggles beyond independence, Haiti split for a
short period into a northern and a southern state before being reunified in 1820, in the
context of very forbidding external circumstances (Hallward 2010; Smucker et al. 2000;
Trouillot 1994, 1990; Nicholls 1985; Mintz 1974; Leyburn 1966; James 1963).
Overarching the internal reconfiguration of class relations was Haiti’s
complicated position as an extremely trade dependent economy that was cut off from its
historic metropole and isolated in a sea of imperialism, as France, England, and the US
all desperately wanted the revolution to fail. In 1825, the Haitian government was
effectively compelled into a neocolonial trap: in exchange for the promise of peace and
the renewal of trade relations it accepted an enormous debt burden to France for property
‘lost’ in the Revolution. This debt dwarfed the scale of the Haitian economy and forced
the state to borrow from French banks, and the debt and interest burden magnified the
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need to generate foreign exchange and the urgency of rebuilding the country’s export
capacity. A series of anti-peasant laws known as the Rural Code soon followed, aimed at
forcing emergent peasants into plantation labour by attaching workers to specific estates
for life. Despite this repression and reestablished trade relations with France, widespread
squatting persisted and plantations remained unviable. In addition to the aversion to
plantation labour, the revival of sugar was further complicated by competition from
slave-based sugar production from Portuguese Brazil, the British Caribbean, and Spanish
Cuba. By the 1830s, plantation land was increasingly being sold or abandoned, and by
the early 1840s plantation production of sugar, cotton, and cocoa had all but ceased, with
small farms coming to dominate the Haitian landscape. In this context, coffee emerged as
the primary export crop, as it did not have prohibitive scale demands and was easily
integrated into peasant cultivation patterns (Trouillot 1994, 1990; Joachim 1979; Leyburn
1966; Rodman 1961).
As this landscape of small farms took shape, many peasants felt no interest or
compulsion to work with the state to establish formal legal rights to land. Meanwhile, the
process of land inheritance – both legally and informally – followed the French tradition
in which property was divided equally amongst children upon the death of the landowner.
On one hand, as Geggus (1989) suggested, this inheritance system can be seen to have
broadened access to land, but on the other hand it also led to the repeated subdivision of
small plots – against which the Haitian government has sought, without success, to
legislate since the mid-19th century. This history helps explain why land distribution in
Haiti is much less unequal than in the rest of the region at the same time as many poor
rural Haitians lack formal legal claims to land. Excessive fragmentation of land is often
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given a central place in elite narratives about the persistence of rural poverty in Haiti,
typically alongside Malthusian images of high rural birth rates, overpopulation, and
environmental decline (Murray 1987; Lundahl 1984). However, the matter of scale
cannot be understood in isolation from struggles to control the surplus value from
production because while peasants were in a sense spatially triumphant in Haiti, the
central agrarian class struggle effectively shifted to attempts by political and commercial
elites to extract peasant surpluses. To put it another way, both the state and the
commercial elites in Haiti became utterly dependent upon their ability to squeeze value
from peasant production from a very early stage. For much of the 19th century and well
into the 20th century, the Haitian state was almost entirely financed by the revenues it
soaked at the customhouses, primarily from coffee exports (Smucker et al. 2000;
Trouillot 1994, 1990).
Exporters were aided by the emergence of rural middlemen, or spéculateurs, who
negotiated the purchase of coffee from peasants from very unequal positions. In general,
peasants tended to be poorly informed about market conditions, spatially isolated by
deficient rural infrastructure, and lacking alternative outlets, and hence were highly
dependent upon spéculateurs to transport and sell their product to exporters, a relation
which largely persists to the present day with coffee and mango production (Farmer
2003). Meanwhile, urban-based merchants failed completely to reinvest in industry or
technology; true compradors in the framework of dependency theory. The net effect was
a great transfer of surplus value from peasants to spéculateurs to exporters in ports such
as St. Marc, Jérémie, Jacmel, and Cap Haïtien, and to government coffers in Port-auPrince, dynamics which were hard for peasants to comprehend fully (Trouillot 1994,
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1990; Mintz 1974; Rodman 1961). As Trouillot (1994:48) put it, rural Haiti quickly
became “a class colony of the urban elites” beyond independence, as the “state
reproduced itself by sucking up the peasantry” while “the urban classes reproduced
themselves by sucking up the state and the peasantry”, within a political system that was
so opaque that “many peasants would not have been able to name the President” prior to
the rise of the François (‘Papa Doc’) Duvalier.
It is also crucial to appreciate the international dimension of this surplus
extraction, particularly through the staggering scale and persistence of Haiti’s postindependence debt. By the turn of the 20th century, roughly four-fifths of Haiti’s state
budget was still flowing to French banks, and payments on the original debt persisted for
decades further – a cumulative burden, in current terms, of many billions of US dollars
(Hallward 2010, 2004; Prince 1985). Because of this, Haiti effectively paid France three
times over – through slave labour, compensatory debt, and the enduring interest payments
– and as Hallward (2004, 26-27) puts it, “no other single factor played so important a role
in establishing Haiti as a systematically indebted country, the condition which in turn
‘justified’ a long and debilitating series of appropriations-by-gunboat.” Not only was this
burden directly borne by the Haitian peasantry, it also subverted the state’s capacity to
invest in rural development (Joachim 1979) would it have been so inclined.
Finally, in addition to the reconfiguration of exploitative class relations,
domestically and internationally, agrarian change beyond independence was marked by
profound environmental transformations. Throughout the slave-colonial period,
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settlement was concentrated on the coastal lowlands and river valleys,

13

and the

expansion of peasant farms carried with it a new wave of deforestation across the mostly
rugged interior, the impact of which was magnified by the accompanying charcoal
production for cooking fuel. The growth of mahogany exports was another major factor
in 19th century deforestation, with earnings again dominated by both merchant and
political elite. Less than one-tenth of Haiti’s land was forested by the middle of the 20th
century, and today only about 2 percent of the original forest cover remains. The rugged
nature of the Haitian landscape means that peasants have long had to wrestle with serious
problems of soil erosion and watershed degradation (Smucker et al. 2000; Dupuy 1989;
Zimmerman 1986).
2.3

From US Occupation to Duvalierism (1915-57)

While powerful economic ties to France persisted into the 20th century, reflected in both
export patterns and debt payments, Haiti became increasingly indebted to US financial
institutions. The transition from French to US dependency was capped by the US marine
invasion of Haiti shortly after the outbreak of the First World War, which was followed
by a two-decade occupation between 1915 and 1934. The US occupation involved the
rewriting of Haiti’s constitution to facilitate debt service and increase foreign investment,
most notably by taking control of the banking system and legally enabling foreign
interests to own land, which had been outlawed since the Revolution (Hallward 2010;
Heinl and Heinl 1996; Trouillot 1990; Nicholls 1986; Schmidt 1971). Worse still, the US
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The primary exception being Maroon communities of escaped slaves. Although
Hispaniola was relatively densely populated at the time of Columbus, Tainos settlements
were mostly on coastal planes and the island was almost entirely forested.
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occupation was paid for in part by borrowing from US banks and, much as had occurred
with the 19th century debt to France, the burden was again largely transferred to the
peasantry and collected through the customs houses (Lundahl 1982).
Considerable dispossession followed the legalization of foreign land ownership.
As many as 50,000 peasants with insecure tenure lost their land in the north alone and
plantation agriculture was re-established on over 250,000 acres of land, as constitutional
changes made it possible for companies like Standard Fruit to procure land and establish
large banana estates in the 1930s (Mintz 1974). Dispossession continued in the 1940s
through a collaborative project between the American and Haitian governments, the
Société Haitienne-Américaine Pour le Dévelopment Agricole (SHADA), which forcibly
evicted roughly 40,000 peasants, destroyed many homes, felled a million fruit trees, and
converted more than 47,000 acres of peasant land to large-scale production of sisal and
rubber for export (Smith 2009).
Another very important aspect of the US occupation was the increasing
centralization of power in the Haitian military. This stemmed from a desire to pacify
oppositional peasant groups known as cacos, which had been manipulated by political
rivals to help overthrow ruling governments and were consequently blamed for the
political instability preceding the US occupation. To do this, US marines used force at
first but over time transferred the job of internal repression to the Haitian military. Once
tasked with defending Haiti’s independence against recolonization, the National Guard
was strengthened and reorganized to discipline dissent in Haiti. By the time the US
marines departed in 1934, the National Guard was a source of not only military but
political power, capable of determining the rise and fall of Presidents. The rising
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authoritarianism that ensued was concentrated overwhelmingly in Port-au-Prince, and it
also transformed the nature of peasant exploitation. Before 1915, surpluses were
primarily extracted from peasants through the petty traders who preyed on the isolation
and knowledge imbalances, and through distant customs houses, but the rise of the Garde
made physical coercion and the threat of force a new feature disabling the ability of
peasants to seek better terms or to organize collectively (Farmer 2003; Heinl and Heinl
1996; Trouillot 1990; 1994; Nicholls 1986; Mintz 1974; Schmidt 1971).
Although one can easily see a direct line connecting the US occupation to the
increasing power of the Haitian Garde to Papa Doc’s rise to power in 1957, it is also
important to recognize that there were significant mass mobilizations during this period
which might have led towards a different course, as Smith (2009) emphasizes. In the
1930s, progressive social movements began taking on a more radical character from the
populist nationalism of the occupation period, led partly by the growth of organized
labour. Marxism came to inform ideas about class and inequality alongside a racialized
noiriste discourse, though the latter had a strong anti-liberal component.
After the Second World War, the Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan (MOP) (Peasant
Worker Movement) emerged at the forefront of Haiti’s racially charged class politics,
which had been enflamed by the establishment of large-scale plantations and destruction
of peasant holdings across large areas of Haiti’s best land in the 1930s and 1940s. The
MOP sought to represent the black working class and peasant farmers and to challenge
the prevailing economic and cultural power of the mulatto elite, and it quickly
transformed from a mass organization into a political party. Unfortunately, it was here
that Papa Doc Duvalier found his initial political foothold as general secretary, and he
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came to appropriate and manipulate the racialized noiriste discourse in the service of his
totalitarian government (Smith 2009).
The expansion of plantation agriculture and the SHADA project were flashpoints
in the 1946 overthrow of Élie Lescot, who was sympathetic to US interests and strongly
supported SHADA. The coup, led by a coalition of Marxist, noiriste, and populist groups,
gave rise to Haiti’s first black President, Dumarsais Estimé, whose government
nationalized the banana industry in 1947. This nationalization quickly proved
unsuccessful and lands were reconverted into peasant smallholdings with one great
drawback: the productive fruit trees that previously occupied the land were mostly gone
(Smith 2009). Estimé struggled to balance the coalition between more moderate factions
allied to mulatto interests, and more radical ones, especially organized labour, which had
brought him to power, and eventually he lost the support of both and was pushed out of
power in 1950. The next President, Paul Magloire, subsequently sought to ally Haiti
strongly with the US, create a favourable climate for foreign investment, and to pursue
export-led growth. For agriculture, this involved a renewed expansion of coffee
production, even in the face of low international prices, and the vulnerability laden in this
narrow export dependence was seen clearly in 1954 when Hurricane Hazel destroyed
nearly half of the total coffee crop (Dupuy 1989). Around this time, rural-to-urban
migration began quickening, and by the mid-1950s roughly half of the population of Portau-Prince had been born in the countryside, with roughly three-fifths of the housing stock
contained in growing bidonvilles, or shanty-towns (Smith 2009; Lundahl 1979). Amidst
deteriorating social and economic conditions, Magloire transferred power to Papa Doc
Duvalier in 1957.
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2.4

The Duvalier Dictatorships: Intensifying the predatory state (1957-1986)

Papa Doc’s rise to political power was enabled by his footing in the MOP, during which
time he spoke of the need to liberate Haiti’s poor black masses and improve the
conditions for the peasantry. But in practice he built an even more ferocious predatory
state on their backs, while regularly invoking a populist, pro-peasant rhetoric that played
on the racialized noiriste discourse. For Trouillot (1994; 1990), the predatory state was
essentially organized to prey on the poor rural majority, exclude them entirely from the
political sphere, and crush any dissent. Under Papa Doc, the state’s historic grip on the
peasantry tightened, as regressive patterns of taxation – skewed heavily towards both
peasant production and consumption – not only continued but became more systematic
and coercive, with very little returning to rural areas through social spending or
infrastructure. The centralization of wealth and power in Port-au-Prince was made worse
by the scale of state corruption, as some government officials embezzled huge personal
windfalls, and by the escalating repression against oppositional social movements, led by
Papa Doc’s personal security forces, the Tonton Macoutes (Hallward 2010; Heinl and
Heinl 1996; Trouillot 1994; 1990; Lundahl 1992a; Nicholls 1986; Mintz 1974). As
before, elite merchants still relied on spéculateurs to extract surplus from peasants, but
under Duvalier some came to work simultaneously as Tonton Macoutes, with
intimidation and violence amplifying the unequal relations. These exploitative conditions
contributed to growing rural-to-urban migration evident in Figure 2 (Trouillot 1994;
Dupuy 1989).
Figure 2: Percentage of National Population in Urban Areas, 1950-2010
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In 1971, an ailing Papa Doc transferred power to his 19-year old son Jean-Claude
‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier, and the US ambassador oversaw the coronation. The general flow
of the state’s tax revenue from rural poor to a small and mostly urban elite persisted, with
Baby Doc at the apex of state corruption and theft. The urban bias was also augmented by
the establishment of a light assembly export-oriented manufacturing sector in the 1970s,
with products like garments, sporting goods, and circuitry, in line with the global ‘offshoring’ of these industries occurring around this time. US advisors encouraged Baby
Doc to capitalize on Haiti’s growing urban population as a source of cheap labour
capable of attracting foreign capital, which was to be welcomed under generous terms.
This low-wage, low-tax investment climate drew increasing foreign investment, as the
number of light assembly manufacturing enterprises swelled from 13 companies in 1966
to 127 by 1978 (LCFRD 2006), and the relative share of light manufacturing in Haiti’s
GDP jumped from 17 to 25 percent between 1975 and 1985 (Katz 2013). But its ability to
absorb labour has always been modest: even at its highest levels in the mid-1980s low-
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wage manufacturing only employed 7 percent of the Haitian workforce (Dupuy 2010),
with roughly 250 assembly firms employed nearly 80,000 workers in the industrial parks
of Port-au-Prince (LCFRD 2006; Heinl and Heinl 1996).

14

Nevertheless, this

undoubtedly augmented rural-to-urban migration to some degree, adding to the push
associated with rural poverty.
By the 1980s, Haiti’s lack of agro-export competitiveness was also clear, with
traditional agro-exports coffee and sugar in sharp decline, though with marginally growth
in cocoa exports as evident in Figure 3. Making matters worse, domestic agricultural
production was largely stagnant in the context of a fast rising population – meaning that
per capita food production was declining.
Figure 3: Traditional Agro-Exports by Volume (000 Tonnes), 1961-2011
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The Haitian elite, who had been historically averse to productive investment, benefitted
from this growth through their position in sub-contracting relationships with US firms
and banked much of their earnings abroad (Dupuy 1994; Trouillot 1990, 1994)
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Source for data: FAOSTAT (2014)
In the early 1980s, the World Bank declared Haiti to be the poorest country on earth in
terms of food consumption. One clear indication of this was that the average Haitian was
only consuming 1,901 calories per day, 14 percent less than the minimum level
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO). This problem was
overwhelmingly centered in rural areas, where the average person was consuming a mere
1,300 calories per day, 42 percent below minimum WHO recommendations (LCFRD
2011).
One other noteworthy aspect of Haiti’s declining food security in the 1980s was
the drastic response to an outbreak of swine fever that occurred in some of Haiti’s Creole
pig population in 1982. Creole pigs had previously been at “the heart of the peasant
economy,” according to Aristide (2002, 1), with most peasants raising them in small
numbers. Pork made up about half of household meat consumption, and fat was used
abundantly to make mantég, a household-made cooking lard. Citing fears over the
potential spread of swine fever to North America, the Organization of American States
(OAS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) organized the
wholesale slaughter of Haiti’s entire Creole pig population, killing around 1.3 million
pigs over a 13-month period. New ‘Iowa pigs’ were subsequently introduced, but peasant
households were only granted one if they could demonstrate an ability to pay for
imported pig feed at a prohibitive rate, which led to a steep fall in domestic meat
production (Aristide 2002; Nicholls 1986) along with increasing dependence on imported
American meat and cooking oil (Smith 1990).
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Thus, while Haiti has sometimes been presented as a poster-child for declining
food self-sufficiency in the wake of structural adjustment and agro-trade liberalization, its
agricultural sector was far from healthy prior to this time.
2.5

Neoliberal Restructuring

Although Baby Doc pursued trade and investment liberalization as a central policy in the
expansion of light manufacturing, Haiti’s domestic food markets remained significantly
protected into the 1980s through a combination of quotas and high tariffs (Jensen et al.
1990). This changed quickly after Baby Doc was toppled in 1986, no longer able to
contain the enormous discontent welling up. Shortly after Baby Doc fled for France, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) quickly began the process of structural adjustment
with the transitional government in an economic context of stagnation, severe payments
imbalances, and extensive food shortages. As elsewhere, this included trade
liberalization, deregulation, export-promotion, currency devaluation, and fiscal austerity
(Hallward, 2010; Shamsie 2004; Lundahl 1992b). In short, the prescription for
dismantling the predatory state was a dose of neoliberal ‘shock therapy,’ which was
promised to bring macroeconomic stability and private sector-led growth. In addition to
adjustment, trade liberalization was also pursued through bilateral and multilateral
agreements, a key aspect being the 2000 Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
(CBTPA) through which Haitian textiles and apparel are granted duty-free access to U.S.
markets. In 2006, the CBTPA was bolstered when the U.S. Congress passed the
Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Acts (Hope I and Hope II)
guaranteeing Haitian exports duty and quota free access to U.S. markets, which was
expected to enhance Haiti’s position as an export platform for US markets – though
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employment levels in light manufacturing barely budged. For instance, only 5,000 of the
30,000 manufacturing jobs that were predicted to follow the 2006 HOPE Act
materialized in the ensuing years (Shamsie 2010).
In agriculture, structural adjustment was ostensibly intended to increase efficiency
and promote export growth. This included a plan to reorient 30 percent of Haiti’s arable
land from domestic to export-oriented production at the same time as quotas and tariffs
on cereals and other food imports were slashed (Jensen et al. 1990; Dupuy 1989) – a clear
reflection of the IMF’s free market approach to food security. That is, the basic
instruction was to find comparative advantages in exporting in order to enhance foreign
exchange earnings while opening domestic food markets to purchase the greatest volume
of low-cost imports (Weis 2007a). But as often occurred, these reforms contributed to a
dramatic increase in Haiti’s food import dependence, with rice at the forefront. Rice is
Haiti’s most important food staple, and though it was long imported in modest volumes,
domestic production had previously supplied the majority of national consumption. For
instance, in 1986, just prior to adjustment, Haiti produced 86,000 tonnes of rice and
imported a mere 7,000 tonnes. Rice imports took off after 1989, especially with the
second wave of extreme import tariff reductions on rice in 1993, and by 2010 rice
imports had soared to over 465,000 tonnes, an import surge that has contributed to the
stagnation of domestic rice production that is evident in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Haiti's Rice Production and Imports (000) Tonnes, 1961-2011

62

500
450
400
350

Onset of
Structural
Adjustment

Rice Imports

300
250
200
150

Rice Production

100
50
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009

0

Source for data: FAOSTAT (2014)
In addition to the pressure from import competition, peasant production has also
been affected by the intertwined dynamics of rapid population growth and continuing
land fragmentation. Haiti’s population grew by a factor of 2.5 from 1960 to 2010, from
roughly 4 to 10 million, while a complex inheritance legacy and patchwork of ownership
rights contributed to land division into smaller and smaller parcels.

15

The average

national landholding shrunk by more than one-third since the early 1970s, from over 3.5
acres to less than 2.5 acres today, in spite of the rising urban and external migration over
this period (IFAD 2010; Zuvekas 1978). Environmentally, this has contributed to the
further deforestation of steep hillsides for agriculture, in turn worsening soil conditions
and the desiccation of watersheds (Farmer 2003; Trouillot 1990; Zimmerman 1986).
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Most land has long been bought, sold, and inherited without updating land titles, and
ownership rights are not usually legally regulated. In the mid-1990s, it was estimated that
95 percent of all land sales avoided legal formalities associated with land title transfers
(Smucker et al. 2000).
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A few non-traditional agro-exports (notably mangoes, cocoa and essential oils)
did increase after the onset of adjustment but this growth has paled in comparison to the
sharp increase in food imports to Haiti, adding up a rising agro-trade deficit that is starkly
apparent in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Haiti's Total Agricultural Product Trade by Value (US$000,000 Base
Price) 1961-2011
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Source for data: FAOSTATS (2014)
The political context of Haiti’s neoliberal restructuring is also crucially important.
In 1990, Haiti’s first ever free and fair elections brought Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power
with two-thirds of the vote, which as Hallward (2010) convincingly argues, was the
culmination of very long struggles for democracy and social justice. Aristide and the
Lavalas movement sought to pursue a broadly pro-poor agenda, which involved
increasing access to health care, education, and adult literacy, disbanding the military,
doubling the minimum wage, supporting peasant farmers through land reform and other
programs, and establishing a food distribution network to provide low cost food to the
poor at below market prices. Such was the threat to Haiti’s elite that they engineered a
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coup soon after the elections, forcing Aristide to flee to the US, where he lived in exile
before being restored in 1994, at which point he was unable to seriously pursue the broad
program envisioned at the outset of his presidency (Hallward 2010).
In 2001, Aristide returned to power again, winning with an overwhelming
majority of over 90 percent of the vote. His criticism of trade liberalization and Haiti’s
place in the global food economy was loud and pointed, and he drew a clear link between
Haiti’s agrarian decline and its unsustainable urbanization: “our fear is that the global
market intends to annihilate our markets. We will be pushed to the cities, to eat food
grown on factory farms in distant countries” (Aristide 2000, 10). Yet there was a marked
disjuncture between his radical aspirations and rhetoric on one hand and the powerful
structural constraints facing his government on the other. Haiti was beset by severe
macroeconomic imbalances, including an unsustainable trade deficit and extreme
dependence on multilateral creditors and donors, and keeping the government solvent
depended upon appeasing foreign creditors and donors, led by the IMF and World Bank.
The net result was that while Aristide was openly critical of liberalization at the same
time as he was signing onto policies that deepened the neoliberal economic restructuring
of Haiti. Yet however much Aristide was constrained, he was still seen to pose a threat to
the Haitian elite and to foreign interests, and in 2004 the US organized another coup,
accompanied by Canada and France, and sent Aristide into exile in Africa (Podur 2012;
Hallward 2010; Engler and Fenton 2005).
On the cusp of the food riots in 2008 and the catastrophic earthquake in 2010 it
was estimated that 76 percent of Haitians lived in poverty and 54 percent were
undernourished, while the country had a Gini coefficient of 0.65, placing it among the
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most unequal societies in the world (CIA 2009; McGuigan 2006). The Port-au-Prince
metropolitan area was home to one in four Haitians, or about 2.5 million people (IHSI
2009) with a density of over 25,000 people/km2, had a formal unemployment rate of 46
percent, and the housing stock was dominated by makeshift lean-to’s on steep hillsides
(IHSI 2009; UNWUP 2009; DSNCRP 2007). Peasants remained firmly at the bottom of
the social order, in some ways operating much as they would have in the 19th century,
producing food for household consumption but generally dependent on buying and
selling for their food security, squeezed by both merchants and the state. However, as
noted, small plots of land had become smaller and more fragmented, with rural
population density estimated to be roughly 199/km2 (IHSI 2009), and domestic markets
had become thoroughly flooded with cheap food imports, which accounted for between
50 and 60 percent of the country’s total food consumption (IFAD 2010).
At the time of the earthquake, Haitian peasants were up against a long history of
exploitation and marginality that were being intensified by the pressures associated with
global market integration. Although peasants still accounted for by far the biggest social
class in Haiti, the rural population was declining by almost 2 percent per year by the late
2000s and the urban population was projected to continue growing steadily into the future
(UNWUP 2009).
2.6

Rural Poverty, De-peasantization, and Over-Urbanization in the wake of the
Catastrophe: Which way forward?

On a global scale, there is a strong link between the decline of the peasantry as a share of
the overall population and the rapid growth of the ‘Planet of Slums’ sprawling out across
much of the Global South (Araghi 2009; Davis 2006). Yet while rates of urbanization far
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outpace the growth of decent and stable livelihoods, it is important to recognize that the
world’s agricultural population is not declining in absolute size and there are many signs
of re-peasantization occurring in a range of settings (McMichael 2009; Ploeg 2008).
Although the global peasantry is extremely complex and differentiated, with many
households surviving through various forms of waged labour, the ‘death of the peasantry’
is far from inevitable and there are good reasons to imagine that – contrary to how
development has long been understood – policies geared towards supporting rather than
eliminating peasant agriculture might provide a crucial foundation for economic and
social improvements. This has become further apparent in light of the recent volatility of
world food prices, which has hit many of the world’s poorest countries, such as Haiti,
most severely (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 2011; Bello 2009). Indeed, there are few places
in the world where food import dependence, enduring rural poverty, and job-starved
over-urbanization are entwined to such a precarious extent as in Haiti.
The obvious problems of urban overcrowding, substandard housing, and poor
public infrastructure along with the subsequent dynamics of chronic rural-to-urban
migration seemed to provide an opportunity to rethink rural development, and even to
imagine how re-peasantization might be construed – not merely as short-term crisis
response but as a planned endeavor. Unfortunately, little seems to have changed, and
attention now turns to the competing visions of agriculture in Haiti at this momentous
potential crossroads, which are broadly framed as those coming from ‘above’, involving a
broad nexus of the Government of Haiti, creditors and donors, foreign investors, local
elites, and powerful NGOs, and the responses from peasant movements as they contest
top-down plans and struggle for alternatives.
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The vision of agricultural development from above is understood through: a
content analysis of key post-disaster development planning documents (identified in
Figure 6) and reports on their initial application; and qualitative interviews with key
informants in relevant government ministries as well as with representatives from the
USAID, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (the latter reflecting the fact
that the USAID and the IDB have been very influential agencies in post-disaster
financing and planning). The broad vision for agriculture set out in these plans is to
modernize production, led by domestic agribusinesses and a small class of more
entrepreneurial farmers, with support from transnational corporations. The majority of
peasants barely register, implicit in which is an expectation that they will be absorbed as
labour on larger estates or in other sectors like light manufacturing, or else will continue
toiling in poverty on the margins of Haitian society.
However, peasants are not passive actors resigned to their continuing marginality,
and peasant movements have begun to challenge some aspects of the plan to modernize
production, such as the promotion of GM seeds and attempts to grab land for industry and
export-oriented estates. The analysis of contemporary peasant struggles is based upon
qualitative semi-structured depth interviews and focus groups conducted between
December 2010 and July 2013. Interviews targeted a range of key informants (n=35) in
peasant and allied social movements and community development organizations listed in
Figure 7, and focus groups involved peasants in the Artibonite Valley (n=18) and Caracol
(n=11) and workers of the Caracol Industrial Park (n=12). The insights evident in
interviews and focus groups are strengthened by the growing vibrancy of wider
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movements, which are ultimately grounded in the intense commitment to the land held by
peasant farmers.
Figure 6: Key Post-Earthquake Planning Documents
Title
The PostDisaster Needs
Assessment
(PDNA)

Year
2010

The Action Plan
for National
Recovery and
Development
(APNRD)
The National
Agriculture
Investment Plan
2011-2016
(NAIP)

2010

The Vision and
Roadmap for
Haiti (PSEF)

2010

Recommendations

2010

of the Haitian
Diaspora Forum
(HDF)
The Growth and
Poverty
Reduction
Strategy Paper
2008-2011
(DSNCRP)

16

2009

2007

Supporting Agencies
Government of Haiti
(GoH), the World Bank
(WB) The Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB),
the United Nations (UN),
the European Commission
(EC) and the Economic
Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC).
The WB and IDB provided
research support.

Description
The foundational analysis of the
damages and losses incurred as a
result of the earthquake.

This agricultural plan was
created prior, and was
revised shortly after. It
intended to direct almost
US$800 million in
investment.
The APNRD, PDNA and
NAIP all urge increased
public-private partnerships,
which points towards the
importance of considering
private sector development
plans and objectives.

Created with assistance from the
IDB,16 WB, the U.S. State
Department, the FAO and the private
sector, and was later edited to
include results of the PDNA.

The Haitian Diaspora has a
considerable impact on
Haiti, both politically and
economically through
remittances and investment.
This document was an
extension of the Statement
of General Policy (2006),
which was ratified by
parliament in that year. The
DSNCRP was the chief
document orienting Haiti’s

The cornerstone document that
guided both short- and long-term
disaster response programming,
including budgetary guidelines.

This document was created by the
Private Sector Economic Forum and
involved consultations with over 150
institutions, including some of
Haiti’s most influential businesses
and business associations, as well as
bilateral and multilateral institutions
such as MINUSTAH, UNIBANK,
and USAID.
Based on the Haitian Diaspora
Forum in March 2010. These
recommendations were formally
presented to the Government of
Haiti.
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs) are prepared by member
countries in consultation with
development partners, including the
World Bank and the IMF.

In its Country Strategy Paper for Haiti, the IDB uses the NAIP (2009) as its framework
for agricultural engagement.
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development just prior to
the earthquake. Its inclusion
here helps to assess the
degree of continuity in
development planning in
the periods both preceding
and following between preand post-earthquake.

Figure 7: Peasant Organizations
Organization Name
Kooperative Prodikte
Agrikol Vigilan
(KOPAV) (Vigilant
Cooperative of
Agriculture Producers)
Mouvman Inite Ti
Peyizan Ayisyen
(MITPA) (United
Movement of Small
Haitian Peasants)

Founded
2008

1996

Funding
Member
contributions

Members
200 peasants

Area
Verette
Commune

Pre-earthquake
funding from
the Haitian
Institute CRAD
(Sant Réchech
Aksyon
Devlopman).
This funding
ended after the
earthquake.
MPP receives
funding from
selected
organizations
and NGOs, but
restricts its
donors.17
Groundswell
International

Before the earthquake
there were 3015
members, but lack of
funding and
programming since
has meant
membership has
dwindled to 2000

Artibonite

50,000 peasants

National

Works with various
peasant organizations
with their own
membership
RAKPABA is a
network of
cooperative, of which
there are there are 7
in the lower
Atibonite, and in the
Verette commune
there 2000 members
80,000 peasants

Various
Communes

Mouvman Peyizan Papay
(MPP) (The Peasant
Movement of Papaye)

1973

Partnership for Local
Development (PDL)

2009

Rezo Asosyasyon
Kooperative des Bas
Artibonite (RAKPABA)
(Network of Cooperative
Associations for
Agricultural Commerce
and Production in the
Lower Artibonite)
Tét Kole Ti Peyizan
(Heads Together Small
Producers of Haiti)

2002

Oxfam

1970

American
Jewish World
Service

17

Artibonite

National

For example, president of MPP Chavannes Jean-Baptiste describes that in the early
1980s while MPP denounced the eradication of the Creole pig, one donor threatened that,
“If we burned a grimél (foreign) pig they would cut our funding – we said ‘bye-bye’.”
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2.7

Old Wine in New Bottles: The crisis-tinged reformulation of neoliberal
development planning

2.7.1 Expanding Light-Manufacturing
Haiti’s post-earthquake development plans are heavily influenced by the 2008 IMFsponsored Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and in a general sense are underpinned by a
neoliberal ideological framework. An overarching tenet is that trade and investment
liberalization and export-led growth are essential to macro-economic stability and
poverty reduction, with a combination of foreign corporations and Haitian elites expected
to lead the way. Post-disaster plans consistently treat light manufacturing, especially in
textiles, as the most important vector of future economic growth, emphasizing the need to
take advantage both of preferential trade agreements and the 2002 amendment of Haiti’s
investment code to enable Export Processing Zones (EPZs), which effectively guarantees
even lower wages through investor-friendly labour laws and exempts the industry from
income and other government taxes as well as import duties on equipment and raw
materials (IMF 2013). Other recurring policy directives include: the orientation of
infrastructure investment to support light manufacturing exports (including highways,
ports and electricity infrastructure as well as residential projects in targeted areas to house
the manufacturing labour force); the need to pursue further free trade agreements; and the
need to establish a national land registry (which bears on plans for both light industry and
agriculture). Another central part of how EPZs have been promoted has been to identify
geographically strategic hubs. This includes both preexisting industrial parks, such as the
Société Nationale des Parcs Industriels (SONAPI) in Port-au-Prince and the Compagnie
de Développement Industrial (CODEVI) in Ouanaminthe, as well as the development of
new ones, such as the Caracol Industrial Park (CIP) in Haiti’s North Department.
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The CIP is a US$250 million mega-project financed by the US government, the
South Korean textile giant Sae-A Trading Co. Ltd, and the IDB (HGW 2013; IMF 2013;
IFC 2011). In 2010, the CIP was expected to be a major part of the expected growth of
jobs in textile manufacturing; initial projections were that it would create 20,000 new
jobs by 2015 and employ between 65,000 and 100,000 people once fully operational
(Johnston 2014; GAO 2013). The employment prospects of the CIP are closely tied to the
Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act (2010-2020), which extended previously
established preferential programs (Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership
Encouragement Acts) until 2020, with the goal of rapidly accelerating the export earnings
and jobs in light manufacturing (WEF 2011). However, as indicated earlier, the 2006
HOPE Act had little impact on manufacturing job creation, with inadequate infrastructure
cited as a prominent explanation for this failure (GAO 2013; IFC 2011).
The CIP mega-project is a clear illustration of how poor infrastructure has
continued to impede light manufacturing growth in the post-earthquake period. In 2010,
the road network, power plant, and deep-water port needed for the project were either
absent or dilapidated, and the CIP simply could not operate without enormous
investments in infrastructure. The IDB promised US$180 million in grants for the CIP
from 2010 to 2016, targeted for both the construction of factories and administrative
buildings and for a range of infrastructure, principally road networks. The USAID also
budgeted nearly US$100 million towards a power plant and US$72 million towards
rehabilitating the Caracol port (GAO 2013; IDB 2012). Although the buildings were
complete and the CIP was inaugurated in 2011, it had only one tenant by the end of 2013
(Katz 2013). Part of this was because the port and power plant, both vital to the project’s
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long-term viability, were still years behind schedule; only 6 percent of promised funding
for the port funding had been disbursed in the ensuing two year, and it was estimated that
the project could take another 10 years to complete (GAO 2013).
In addition to the trickle of promised financing, the port development has been
slowed by unforeseen costs which led one USAID official to warn of the “risk that no
private company interested in operating the port would be willing to cover the entire
remaining costs of construction” (GAO 2013, 26). A further problem relates to high
construction costs in the post-earthquake period. The enormous damage to the built
environment in Port-au-Prince was initially valued at over US$4.3 billion (PDNA 2010),
and the proliferation of reconstruction projects heightened demand for materials, mostly
imported from the US, and caused price spikes and cost overruns. In fact, the
International Financial Corporation (IFC 2011), a member of the World Bank Group,
estimated that building costs for factories in Haiti were over 50 percent above the global
average. High construction costs have also constrained the USAID-led housing project
geared towards CIP employees (GAO 2012). Initially, the USAID allocated over US$80
million to build 15,000 homes in the vicinity but numerous setbacks led to a greatly
18

reduced target of less than 3,000.

While development has been far behind schedule, the nature of the CIP posed
considerable risks even if it materialized as planned. For instance, advocacy

18

The USAID has had trouble maintaining staff (more than half of whom left Haiti
shortly after the earthquake) and there has been high turnover ever since. Project planning
and report submissions were consistently late and rising costs led to much higher
expenditures than predicted (GAO 2013; Katz 2013a; Sontag 2012).
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organizations like Haiti Grassroots Watch and Batay Ouvriye have expressed concern
that the project could attract somewhere between 100,000 and 300,000 migrants to the
region (KOIOS 2010), bringing with it the sort of slum development that has plagued
other light manufacturing hubs in the country,

19

risks that are obviously magnified by the

shortfalls in the housing project. The prospect of ‘slumification’ in Caracol is made more
worrying still by the low earnings of CIP employees. When CIP construction began,
workers earned barely US$4 per day, though the minimum wage subsequently increased
by Haiti’s Supreme Council on Wages, spurred partly by demands made by workers in
the CIP and other light manufacturing hubs.

20

These wage increases came in spite of the fact that industry leaders along with
some donors and influential Haitian economists railed against them, arguing that it would
impede the country’s competitive advantage (Roshan Lall 2013a), and there can be little
doubt they will fight further increases. Yet although Haiti still has by far the cheapest
average labour costs in the Caribbean region, it remains less competitive than its main
competitors in textile manufacturing, such as Bangladesh and Cambodia, partly owing to
the absence of a multi-shift workday. Thus, post-disaster plans, including a report by the
IFC (2011), argue against existing labour code restrictions that prevent three 8-hour work
shifts per day, with the claim that these are restricting investment and productivity
(although they have not succeeded as of 2015, this seems likely to be a flashpoint of

19

Camille Chalmers, who is an economics professor as well as the coordinator of
PAPDA suggested that “while SONAPI [Société National des Parcs Industriels] might
have created 60,000 jobs, it also attracted two million unemployed people” (HGW 2011).
20
The Haitian minimum wage was increased to roughly US$6.40 per day for some
sectors in October 2012, but this reform excluded garment workers who continued to
make US$4.30 per day until May 2013, when the wage was increased to US$4.81.
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labour struggles in the years ahead).
Another significant barrier to investment in light manufacturing is the expensive
and erratic energy supply, which partly reflects the heavy reliance on oil for electricity
generation, most of which is imported from Venezuela (Roshan Lall 2013b; IFC 2011).
Haiti lacks a national electricity grid and has the lowest electrification rate in the
Hemisphere and, with less than 60 percent of the population (and only 5 percent in rural
areas) having access to electricity, and those with electricity have it for only an average
of 10 hours per day. Only 15 percent of businesses have access to electricity and
industries pay an average of US$0.32 per kWh, more than double the Latin American
21

average (MIF/BNEF 2013; GAO 2011; IDB 2010).

For decades Haiti’s primary

supplier of electricity, L’Electricité d’Haïti (EDH), has not been profitable and since
2006, EDH has been at risk of bankruptcy (WB 2013; IDB 2010; KOIOS 2010). Postdisaster plans stressed the need to expand power plants and associated infrastructure
through public-private partnerships, drawing on disaster funds to encourage private
investment in light manufacturing

22

– though with a clear recognition that the instability

and expensive nature of the energy supply is not something that could be quickly

21

Haiti’s energy sector is also affected by the fact that one-third of electricity clients do
not pay their bills and tapping electrical lines is common throughout the country (IFC
2011), while an estimated 50 percent of electricity users connected to the electricity grids
illegally (MIF/BNEF 2013).
22

In the early aftermath of the earthquake, this included a US$16 million project to
rehabilitate the electrical transmission line connected to the Péligre Dam, financed by the
Haiti Reconstruction Fund (determined by a combination of the Haitian government, the
IDB, and the World Bank), and a US$1.25 million project to supply Liquefied Natural
Gas to EPZs in Port-au-Prince, financed by the IDB, Haytrak Power and Gas, and US
transnational AECOM.
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overcome (IFC 2011).
The final and perhaps most contentious obstacle to light manufacturing growth in
Haiti is the challenge of gaining land access for EPZ development. Haiti has no
functional national land registry and the IDB (2013) estimates that 60 percent of privately
owned land parcels lack a property title, a situation that has been widely sited as a
massive constraint to EPZ development (GAO 2013; IFC 2011; IHRC 2011; KOIOS
2011; WEF 2011). In response, the formalization of Haiti’s land tenure system was
identified as a key strategic priority in post-disaster plans,

23

although there has been only

modest tangible progress on this front. The primary change stems from an IDB-led
US$15 million project (co-funded by a number of other multilateral and bilateral
partners), entitled Institutional Strengthening and Reform of the Agriculture Sector,
which has made headway simplifying land registration procedures to an extent that has
24

decreased the average cost and time period to register a land title (IDB 2013b).

Nevertheless, the complexity and informality of much land tenure has proven to be a
barrier to EPZ investment. In 2011, as the site of the first new EPZ was being negotiated,
the IFC contended that “getting hold of an industrial building or serviced land is a
bottleneck that frustrates investment and Haiti’s economic development” (IFC 2011),
while a report prepared by a US-based consultancy emphasized that “many of the
planned industrial parks and free zone projects are based on a range of unrealistic

23

For instance, the PDNA (2010) recommended spending US$154 million alone on
efforts to enhance the land tenure management.
24

Between 2011 and 2015, the IDB (2013b) estimates that average number of days to
process a land registry declined from 400 to 70 day and the average cost fell from
roughly US$600 USD to $150.
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assumptions and are confronted by critical obstacles… [including] lack of land title”
(KOIOS 2011).
The conflict over the siting of the first new EPZ project after the earthquake gives a
powerful illustration of how land tenure has constrained manufacturing in Haiti. In 2010,
the Haitian government identified Corail-Cesselesse, a desolate stretch of arid land
approximately 10 miles north of Port-au-Prince, as the preferred location for this
development. Meanwhile, NABATEC, a conglomerate owned by some of Haiti’s
wealthiest families, claimed ownership over a portion of the land targeted for the EPZ
and NABATEC’s president sat on the steering committee that facilitated the contract
between the Haitian government and the Korean firm SAE-A Trading Co. The initial
contract was compromised, however, when the government reclaimed over 18,000 acres
of land in the area to establish a camp expected to hold 300,000 IDPs. In response,
NABATEC and other landowners demanded a hefty compensation package (roughly
US$20,000 per acre) from the state, which resisted, and after the refugee camps were
established IDPs described being harassed by ‘gangsters’ hired by landowners. This
conflict prompted the relocation of the EPZ to Caracol, where securing land also proved
problematic, though for very different reasons. At the Caracol site, much of the land was
assumed to be owned by the state though peasant producers had occupied it for decades,
and “the exact cadastral boundaries [of state land were] unknown” (IFC 2011). In the
course of establishing the CIP, over 350 individual plots spanning over 600 acres of
fertile agricultural land were expropriated from peasant producers, sparking community
conflict and local food insecurity (Steckley and Shamsie 2015; which appears as Chapter
4 in this dissertation).
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This expropriation, or land grab, was the impetus for intense and widespread
frustration with the CIP in many surrounding communities. In a focus group with
representatives of local government known as Conseils d’Administration des Sections
Communales (CASECs), the failure of CIP planners to engage in any local consultations
prior to the fencing and bulldozing of the land was collectively stressed. Representatives
then described telling CIP management that the community did not support the project,
and urged them to change the location. As one participant put it:
I told them it is a fertile zone, that the peasants will be victims, that what they’re
doing is wrong, and that they should have chosen another place. They said ‘No,
this is where we’ve chosen! Whether you want the park or not we’re putting it
here’.
Representatives also described how local peasants subsequently engaged in frequent
protests at the entrance to the CIP as it was getting constructed and how, though these
protests were always peaceful, the managers of the CIP called in the L’Unité
Départementale de Maintien de l'Ordre (the harshest branch of the Haitian police force)
to “take them out.”
Even many who were able to find scarce jobs in the CIP expressed frustration with
owners and management over earnings and working conditions. For instance, in a focus
group (n=12) with CIP labourers, earnings were consistently described as being
insufficient to meet daily needs for transportation and food, forcing many to rely on
credit – an obviously unsustainable arrangement that reflects both the lack of
employment alternatives and the pull of even meagre-paying EPZ jobs. After income
taxes were extracted and debts paid off, respondents estimated that their biweekly take-
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home earnings averaged roughly US$11.50, or a mere US$0.82 per day. They also
described how workers were frequently denied access to their employment contracts,
were prohibited from speaking with journalists, and faced regular incidents of physical
abuse from management, with one participant reporting sexual violence by a superior.
Yet while participants expressed that they wanted to resign, they also described a need to
continue to work to provide for their families. One put this compulsion in very stark
terms:
If we had a choice, we would not have let the industrial park come. I wouldn’t have
wanted it to come in. But we have to stay. We’re always thinking about our kids.
We have no option but to stay.
In short, the CIP has involved considerable expropriation and displacement, yet
brought few tangible benefits. To this point, it has neither attracted the anticipated
investors nor provided much employment. By the end of 2014, the CIP was still largely
unoccupied and provided fewer than 5000 jobs, and the jobs that have materialized are
most at the minimum wage level (USAID 2014; Johnston 2014) and give little indication
that this form of development is likely to alleviate poverty or contribute to more dignified
livelihoods even if it is to expand (Steckley and Shamsie 2015).
2.7.2 Modernizing Agriculture
While the goal of significantly expanding the light-manufacturing sector has been the
central pillar of post-disaster plans for future export-led growth, Haiti’s agricultural
sector has also been identified to have significant potential simultaneously to increase
export earnings and reduce imports. The goal of expanding agro-export production
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focuses on a few key crops, primarily fruit (like mangos, the focus of Chapter 5), coffee,
cocoa, and natural oils, along with enhanced agro-processing capacities. The goal of
import substitution in post-disaster planning focuses on increasing the production of
tubers, beans, plantains, grains and vegetables.
The desire expressed in post-disaster plans both to expand agro-export earnings and
enhance domestic production is united by a vision of agricultural modernization that was
previously articulated in a number of earlier plans (NAIP 2009; DSNCRP 2007). This
vision of modernization hinges on such things as: improving infrastructure; establishing a
formal national land registry to enable land security; encouraging the rise of
entrepreneurial farmers and the development of large-scale orchards; providing credit for
agricultural enterprises and small-holding producers; subsidizing agro-chemical inputs;
and taking advantage of high value export markets, including fair trade and organic
markets (the latter obviously sitting in tension with some other strategies). If such
modernization were seriously pursued, the PSEF (2010) projected that agro-export
volumes could be tripled between 2010 and 2015 and that such a boom could create
300,000 jobs by 2015, both on commercial farms and in agro-processing enterprises. In
interviews, representatives from the USAID and the IDB also claimed that increasing
production oriented for sale in domestic markets (rather than peasant household
consumption) had an important role in reducing rural poverty and food insecurity.
Two key infrastructure priorities highlighted in post-disaster plans are roads and
irrigation. The poor quality of Haiti’s transportation system was blamed for serious postharvest losses which, prior to the earthquake, were estimated to be as high as 35 percent
on products like fruits, vegetables, roots and legumes (NAIP 2010 APNRD 2010). With
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respect to irrigation, it was estimated that less than 60 percent of the irrigable land has
necessary infrastructure, resulting in diminished yields (PDNA 2010). In response, the
Haitian government allocated US$30 million to road-building and US$15 million towards
irrigation projects in the first 18 months following the earthquake, while an IDB financed
project expanded irrigation across 12,000 acres in the Artibonite Valley (IDB 2012). This
initial expenditure was accompanied by a commitment to devote a further US$600
million towards roadways and over US$100 million to rehabilitate 38 irrigation systems
and construct 15 new ones (NAIP 2010; APNRD 2010).
While there has been vast improvement in the condition of major highways, most
minor roads are in decrepit conditions and this continues to be a significant contributor to
high post-harvest losses (Fuller-Wimbush and Fils-Aimé 2014; MARNDR 2013). The
irrigation improvements in the Artibonite region noted above have contributed to
increasing land values there, which has had the serious and unforeseen consequence of
heightening land conflict. According to an IDB official, this increasing land conflict in
the Artibonite Valley should make creditors and donors wary of pursuing further
irrigation projects there and in other areas with land tenure insecurity.
As discussed earlier, the absence of a formal land registry has long been identified
as a significant barrier to agricultural modernization, and this was echoed again in postdisaster plans. As with light manufacturing, agricultural development plans aim to
establish a national land registry to identify clear legal private property rights (i.e.
formalizing land titles) and land values, in order to enhance the ability to buy and sell
land. Key informants from the IDB and the USAID also stressed the importance of
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formalizing land tenure in interviews, describing the complexity and informality of land
tenure as a major barrier to expanded agricultural production.
Another goal of establishing a land registry is to enable the Haitian government to
“make land concessions” of state-owned lands (PSEF 2010, 20) and thereby facilitate the
advancement of large projects – including commercial farms in addition to light
manufacturing projects (APNRD 2010; PSEF 2010; NAIP 2010). However, the
realization of this goal is filled with deep tensions and high uncertainty, one reflection of
which is the fact that some creditors, donors and NGOs have chosen to focus attention on
small-scale production in pursuit of export growth. Two good examples of projects
aiming to increase export-oriented production by working with small-holding farmers are
Haiti Hope, a US$7.5 million initiative co-financed by the USAID, the IDB, the ClintonBush Haiti Fund, and The Coca-Cola Company (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5),
and the Improving Lives of Farm Families through Post Harvest Loss Reduction
Program, led by Mercy Corp and the Taiwanese International Cooperation and
Development Fund. However, there have also been some attempts to scale-up agroexport production. For example, the Nourribio project, implemented by the Haitian
agribusiness Agritrans in Haiti’s Northeast Department, is Haiti’s first Agricultural Free
Zone, which implies an exemption from government taxes on export-oriented production.
If it materializes as planned it will convert nearly 2,500 acres of land into an organic
banana plantation, a trade-off that has come with a promise to provide 3,000 jobs (Haiti
Libre 2013a). Haiti’s largest agribusiness, AgroTechnique, has also been actively trying
to grow in scale, including multiple attempts to expand a 160-acre export-oriented mango
orchard in the Artibonite Valley. However, as is discussed in Chapter 5, local peasants
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have resisted AgroTechnique, accusing it of illegal and violent tactics.
Yet even as agro-exports are being encouraged in various ways, it is also important
to note that there is broad recognition amongst key international creditor and donor
institutions and the Haitian government that there is need to diversify and boost overall
agricultural production for domestic markets. The USAID has led some of the largest
domestic-oriented agricultural programs, including the Development of Agricultural and
Environmental Security project, which prioritizes corn, rice, cacao, beans and plantain
production (Haiti Libre 2013b), and the Feed the Future West program, which supported
the construction of over 300 greenhouses in the mountains above Port-au-Prince to
produce non-traditional crops like lettuce, broccoli, peppers, tomatoes, leeks, beets,
carrots, and strawberries to sell to domestic supermarkets, hotels, and restaurants
(Mattila-Litvak 2013; Haiti Libre 2013b).
While plans for export promotion are often tied to organic and fair trade markets,
new agricultural projects geared to expand domestic production tend to favour inputintensive methods, including the distribution of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and highyielding varieties (HYV) of seeds, which were contrasted against “traditional” peasant
practices described as “weak” (NAIP 2009, 31) and “rudimentary” (PDNA 2010, 95).
During the 18-month emergency period after the earthquake, the Ministere de
L'Agriculture des Resources Naturelles et du Developpement Rural (MARNDR) – with
funds from a range of foreign donors – initiated the US$687 million dollar Emergency
Food Production Assistance Program to increase the distribution of chemical fertilizers,
pesticides and HYV seeds (Claxton 2010). In 2012, the MARNDR (this time with
financial support from the IDB) spent US$1.5 million to subsidize the cost of 15,000 MT
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of fertilizer for agribusinesses and distribute fertilizer to over 4,000 farmers in four
departments, an initiative that was accompanied by putting a ceiling on the price for
fertilizer (MARNDR 2013; IDB 2013).

25

The USAID has also been at the forefront of

increased agro-chemical distribution since the disaster, the centerpiece of which was its
5-year, US$126 million dollar Watershed Initiative for National Natural Environmental
Resources (WINNER) program that includes the previously noted Feed the Future West
Program. The Feed the Future West Program introduced HYV seeds, some new
technologies (e.g. ‘mobile money’ to simplify transactions, mechanized hand tillers,
training in operating tractors where gradients allowed), and fertilizer to over 30,000
farmers (CJ 2013), and the Feed the Future North program is intended to reach 40,000
farmers with a similar array of supports.
In sum, post-disaster agricultural planning has set out to expand production both for
export and domestic markets either by transforming subsistence-oriented peasants into
more

commercially-oriented

and

input-intensive

operations

or

by

displacing

smallholdings with larger, consolidated farms, ostensibly creating new employment
opportunities for wage-labourers (APNRD 2010; NAIP 2009), while the poorest and
most isolated continue to be largely ignored. Ingrained in this prescription is a belief that
subsistence-oriented production is not capable of enhancing food security, a view clearly
summed up by a representative of the IDB, who noted that peasants must increase their
sales or the rural poor “must have employment” if they are “to access [more] food.”
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As of early 2015, this initiative was set to expand into a series of non-state subsidy
projects, to be financed by the IDB, WB and EU.
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As the next section will emphasize, such perspectives are not shared by peasant
movements, which contest the nature of agrarian change being promoted from above – an
approach they believe will only intensify rural inequality and reduce food insecurity for
the majority.
2.8

Peasant Struggles for Alternatives
The post-disaster plans do not coincide with the interest of peasants.
-Tét Kole leader
All official post-disaster discourse on agriculture is a strategy to eliminate peasant
agriculture and to empower the market. There is no project that supports the peasant
economy.
-PAPDA leader

Peasant leaders repeatedly expressed strong beliefs that post-disaster agricultural
planning and policies will accelerate rural differentiation and displacement, with some
expected to benefit at the expense of many. One peasant leader in Verrette described the
overall nature of the post-disaster agenda for agriculture as being rooted in “a capitalist
analysis of the food system, involving only an analysis of production and ignor[ing] the
peasant perspective.”
However, peasant leaders were not always aligned in how they critiqued postdisaster plans, and some of the visions of agriculture they articulated actually overlapped
with certain aspects of post-disaster plans. For instance, a number of peasant leaders held
conflicting views of the post-disaster fertilizer subsidies and distribution programs. At
one end of the spectrum, the president and founder of MPP was adamant that “chemical
fertilizer is a dependency trap, a petrol product that poisons the soil!” A MITPA
representative was equally disdainful of agro-chemical inputs, stating bluntly, “Fertilizer
makes people sick! We strongly discourage peasants from using chemical fertilizer.”
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However other peasant leaders were less resolute, exemplified by the co-ordinator of
PDL who noted that,
On one hand I have an ideological position, and I side with organic fertilizer,
composting, and with better management of organic matter. But, I am also a
pragmatist. I’m not going to eliminate chemical fertilizer in all instances.
The leaders of KOPAV and RAKPABA likewise expressed hesitancy about the efforts to
increase the use of chemical fertilizers while ultimately conceding that some agrochemical inputs are necessary. According to the coordinator of KOPAV:
We have goals to use other methods – for composting and organic practices – but
fertilizer is a total necessity for peasants. Peasants know that if they don’t use
fertilizer, their kids can’t go to school.
Peasant leaders also varied in how they view agro-export production. Although it
was generally assumed that production for local consumption should be prioritized, many
did acknowledge that export sales can enhance peasant earnings. One MPP representative
suggested that decisions about the markets for agricultural goods should be guided by
what he called a ‘food first’ logic; that is, where production for family consumption is
prioritized, followed by production oriented towards markets at different scales starting
with the village and moving outwards to national, Caribbean, and wider global markets.
The coordinator of PDL expressed a similar belief that a peasant should strive to “be able
to produce enough to meet his/her needs and to sell a portion of what he/she produces so
that he/she can conduct his other affairs [sic].” In discussing the post-disaster initiatives
to boost mango exports, the coordinator of MPP explained that, “we are not inherently
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against mango production for export, but we are against [the sorts of] mango production
that is detrimental to production for local consumption.” This implies that while peasants
might have mango trees interspersed on their land in ways that do not negatively affect
other food production, and might benefit from these sales, when mangos are produced in
commercial orchards there are very different implications for both food security and who
derives the benefits.
Peasant leaders also expressed a range of views about the need for a national land
registry and more formalized tenure relations, which as emphasized, has been repeatedly
professed in agricultural planning documents. On one hand, many agreed with
assessments that informal land tenancy and excessive subdivision can inhibit agricultural
productivity under some circumstances, yet most condemned the calls to establish a
national land registry. A PAPDA leader effectively summed up the widespread fears
underlying peasant opposition to the idea of a registry:
…[it] is another trap. The state wants to make a land registry to take land that
peasants have been on for decades. The state will sell that land to multi-national
enterprises. They want peasants to have legal land titles so that the land can be
bought from the peasants.
Rather than focusing on a land registry to enhance the buying and selling of land, which
seems likely to abet consolidation into larger estates, peasant movements advocate a very
different vision. One Tét Kole leader explained that any agrarian reform must first and
foremost ensure “that land is owned by those working it.” For him, this “doesn’t
necessarily mean that peasants must have title to the land they’re working – it could be
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state land – but peasants must have [some kind of] a guarantee that no one can kick them
off.”
While the complexity and informality of land tenure is seen from above to inhibit
an active land market, some peasant leaders expressed the opposite fear – that this has
actually increased peasant vulnerability to land appropriations since the earthquake.
Indeed many claimed that private land purchases, the sale of state land to private
enterprises, and outright land seizures have escalated since 2010, with informal claims
offering little defense. Some prominent examples were cited often, including: the 2011
eviction of 350 peasants to make room for the CIP; the attempted evictions of 140
families in Seguin in July 2012 (which erupted in a violent conflict between local
peasants and the Haitian police, with four peasants killed); and an ongoing conflict
between AgroTechnique and over 250 peasants in the Artibonite Valley (discussed in
Chapter 5). There is a strong belief among peasant leaders that the Haitian state is either
too weak to stop moneyed landowners from forcefully evicting peasants or complicit in
these evictions. In the words of one peasant, who was embroiled in a fight against a land
grab (of state-owned land that peasants have long occupied) in the Artibonite Valley:
“Our state is dormant, it’s not managing its land appropriately. It is corrupt.” Another
involved in the same fight nevertheless held out some hope that the state would
ultimately intervene on the side of local peasants:
Even as we leve kanpe [fight against] against this land grab, it will never be
finished until the state gets involved. Because now justice is not given to people
who deserve justice! It’s only those with money who get justice!
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Peasant leaders consistently expressed disdain for the leadership of both the Haitian
state and the various foreign organizations that exert such powerful influence over
agricultural policy, sentiments that relate to issues much broader than land. For example,
peasant leaders regularly made comments like:
•

“Peasants don’t recognize the state.”

•

“The state doesn’t do anything, so you can’t believe in it.”

•

“What the state says is not true. Even if what is written down in their plans, it
will not happen.”

•

“Every big country that says they’re our friend is lying!”

•

“With exception of Venezuela and Cuba, the other countries are hypocrites.”

•

“International organizations come in and do whatever they want. They hurt
the country terribly.”

The perceived incapacity (and, for some, corruption) of the state together with the
widespread suspicion of foreign leadership are central to why peasant leaders have little
faith in post-disaster plans. According to the coordinator of PDL, post-disaster plans were
flawed from the beginning because “the Haitian government did not have the capacity
either for post-earthquake diagnostics or to identify appropriate solutions.” Peasant
leaders consistently indicated their sense that post-disaster agricultural initiatives have
prioritized agribusinesses and the urban elite over the peasantry, and that whatever
participation has been invoked has been mostly cosmetic, merely to justify the priorities
of key creditor and donor institutions without genuinely seeking peasant involvement in
decision-making. Peasant leaders were most disdainful of programs geared to distributing
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foreign food and corporate seeds (including both GMO seeds and chemical laden hybrid
seed) frustration that was evident in comments like:
•

“The USAID does ‘food for work’ projects and gives out blè [a soy and
bulgur wheat blend]. In this scheme, Haitian peasants are working to support
American wheat, American farmers! They shouldn’t do that. They should be
buying local products to help our economy.”

•

“They always bring us food in cans! That’s not what we ask for.”

•

NGOs didn’t come to develop us, they came to envelop us!”

•

“The biggest organization in Haiti is USAID, and they are doing the worst
things in this country, like giving out seeds!”

•

“Seed projects that offer imported seeds will destroy our traditional crop
varieties. We will never work with the USAID or the FAO!”

•

“The USAID is trying to introduce seeds that will destroy the peasants!”

The critiques articulated by peasant leaders are not mere words, and the depth
with which they are understood is evident in the range of ways that peasant movements
have resisted rural development projects and land seizure attempts and struggled to
undermine the associated programs of the nexus of the state and key creditor and donor
institutions. One of the earliest and most celebrated illustrations of this peasant resistance
was organized by MPP on June 4, 2010, World Environment Day, when over 10,000
peasants marched in protest of Monsanto’s ‘donation’ of 475 tons of ‘improved’ seeds – a
donation that was approved by the Haitian government and was distributed through the
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USAID WINNER program.

One MPP leader described the peasant response bluntly:

“We fought against them! They planted them in the Central Plateau and we pulled them
up and burned them.” Other peasant leaders expressed firm belief that the distribution
was done under the guise of humanitarian aid, and that this was a ploy to create Haitian
peasant dependence on Monsanto seeds. Such views are reflected in comments like:
• “They put chemicals on those seeds that make the land infertile. They are not good
for us!”
• “The state and Monsanto are colluding to destroy peasant food sovereignty.”
• “Any institution that gives people a gift covered with poison –a gift he can kill
himself with – is not a humanitarian organization.”
One MPP leader suggested that the significance of this protest was reflected in how it
spurred struggles against imported seeds in another area of the Central Plateau:
The people rose up against WINNER-affiliated stores where they were selling these
seeds at a subsidized price [and] because of this, the stores in the Central Plateau
closed.
Peasant leaders drew from this example to stress both the importance of collective
peasant resistance and to highlight the power of peasant mobilization, celebrating the fact
that Monsanto has not returned to Haiti since these protests. Following this direct action
in 2010, MPP has continued to lead workshops and conferences for peasant producers,
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There is some controversy about whether these were indeed GM seeds; MARNDR
officials claim they were hybrid seeds but most peasant leaders expressed the belief that
they were GM seeds.
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and in March 2013 MPP organized a march for food sovereignty to denounce the
incursion of input-intensive agriculture. Forty thousand peasants participated, chanting
“Yes for an agro-ecological agriculture” and “We want genuine agrarian reform.” The
leader of MPP expressed “We are seeing a re-colonization of Haiti and we must do
something! We will demonstrate that peasants are a force in the country” (Haiti Libre
2013c).
Tét Kole has also remained a powerful peasant movement in the post-earthquake
period and has had a leading role in struggles against land seizures. Resistance tactics
have included organizing and sending groups of peasants and peasant leaders from some
areas to accompany peasants in other areas, in order to fortify those peasants under threat
and forge collective strategies. In describing one such case in July 2013, where peasants
were threatened by a land seizure from mining companies in Haiti’s North Department, a
Tét Kole leader noted how:
Peasants dechouké [ransacked] the housing and storage sheds that mining
exploration companies built. Now we are sending others to accompany those
peasants, to encourage them to stay on their land and to stand strong!
Peasants in the Artibonite Valley have also resisted land seizure attempts made by
the Haitian agribusiness AgroTechnique. Core resistance tactics have included: peaceful
protests to try to gain wider attention and rally support for their struggle; maintaining a
24-hour presence on the land; and digging trenches in feeder roads to restrict access to
the land by vehicles. Yet even in spite of this support, in a focus group peasants involved
in this struggle still described feeling too isolated, and strongly hoped to connect with a
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national peasant movement in order to make their struggles heard more broadly. National
peasant leaders expressed similar sentiments, with many pointing out how hard it is to
quickly communicate local level struggles to national-scale networks. Still, there is
considerable sense that new alliances are growing in strength. For example, after
suggesting that what is at stake with new policies, investments, and projects is nothing
less than a “plan for the total destruction of the peasant economy,” the coordinator of
PAPDA went on to convey his sense that,
There is growing unification and peasant movements are taking action and
working together! If we can continue to grow as a national movement, the
peasantry will have a bright future.
Peasant movements present a very different vision of agricultural development than
that coming from above, a vision that is broadly aligned with the goals of food
sovereignty as articulated by Via Campesina (some of the core ideas associated with Via
Campesina are discussed in Chapter 3). Figure 8 indicates the most common agricultural
priorities articulated by peasant leaders in interviews, and it is notable that all spoke in
terms of food sovereignty. Most peasant leaders also advocated the importance of
polyculture cropping techniques geared towards producing a range of healthy and
nourishing foods in ways that regenerate the health of the soil and minimize other inputs,
like fertilizers and agro-chemicals (though as indicated earlier, what exactly this means
varied somewhat with respect to input usage). Peasant leaders described poly-cropping
traditions as being essential to maximizing peasant autonomy and to any conception of
food sovereignty. As one peasant leader in Verette put it:
When a peasant plants a range of crops in his garden he can have food any time he
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goes to his land. That is food sovereignty. This is a form of peasant resistance that
is unconscious. The peasant isn’t necessarily conscious that he is being
revolutionary, he doesn’t yet agree to enter into a war against the capitalist system,
he doesn’t do it in the name of food sovereignty…but he is doing these things just
the same.
Only MPP and Tét Kole leaders articulated environmental principles in terms of
agroecology, reflecting the fact that both movements are well acquainted with the
discourse and concepts in critical agrarian studies and both are members of the global
peasant federation Via Campesina.
Figure 8: Key Priorities of Peasant Organizations in Haiti
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The pursuit of food sovereignty was understood to demand action at various scales
beyond the level of securing land rights. As indicated earlier, rather than establishing a
formal land registry and an active market in land, peasant movements are primarily
concerned with increasing the security of peasant rights to land, as well as supporting the
redistribution of state lands and other large-holdings where possible. They also generally
advocated that agrarian reform must go beyond redistribution and also include things like
technical training and ongoing extension support to maximize domestic agricultural
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diversity and subsidized agricultural insurance and credit. While peasant leaders stress
the importance of poly-cropping and that some subsistence orientation is fundamental to
peasant autonomy, many also identified the importance of changing the marketing system
to reduce or eliminate the power of spéculateurs and improve the share of profits that
peasants receive from the sale of their food in domestic markets. Along with this is a
common perception that the nation state must also have the power to protect domestic
markets against the foods that peasants produce. For example, a Tét Kole leader said that
at the national level, “arriving closer to food sovereignty means de-occupying the country
from food colonization,” with flexible trade policies seen to be essential in this. Related
to this, though beyond the realm of policy and into a greyer area of culture, peasant
leaders (as well as other leaders of civil society organizations) suggested that the pursuit
of food sovereignty demands an ideological shift on the part of Haitian consumers who
must begin to privilege peasant production in diets. For example the coordinator of the
PAPDA said:
Haitians must adopt another mentality, another mode of understanding both food
systems and peasants. The national mentality must be aligned with the interests of
the peasant masses and favour peasant production.
Peasant leaders were optimistic that national advocacy efforts to revalorize peasants and
peasant foods could motivate consumers to practice ‘dietary solidarity’ with peasants.
Further, some were also hopeful that such a cultural shift could in turn inspire peasants
who were not already doing so to farm in more ecologically responsible ways,
encouraging them to reduce inputs, practice poly-cropping techniques, compost more,
and end slash and burn practices.
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The deep commitment that Haitian peasants have to their relatively small plots of
land means that they tend to have shared interests in protecting what they have from
outside threats. Because peasants work and live in close proximity they regularly
communicate and organize quickly in response to recurring challenges like flooding, field
injuries, and transport for harvests, and this also abets the ability of communities to
respond to bigger, episodic threats like the sorts of land grabbing discussed earlier. To be
clear, this is not to say that peasants constitute a homogenous class group, or diminish the
fact that there are intra-peasant antagonisms and conflicts from time-to-time, but to
suggest that the strength of the shared commitment to land and water resources is a
powerful unifying force.
Many peasant leaders stressed that this combination of peasant commitment to land
paired with the capacity to mobilize against common threats helps explain why peasants
have maintained control over the large majority of Haiti’s agrarian landscapes, and why
they will continue to be a formidable force, which is further reflected in comments like:
• “If you take advantage of one peasant, they will all put you out! Mobilization is the
greatest tool of the peasantry.”
• “In Haiti, the revolutionary class is the peasant class … [The] Haitian peasant fights
for liberty!”
• “When there is a common peasant interest, we will leve kanpe [rise up] in an
instant! Peasants will get on their feet and move! The Haitian peasants, they will
never lose hope, they will never let go.”
2.9

Conclusion

Although the deaths and damage in the 2010 earthquake catastrophe were centered in
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Port-au-Prince, this paper argues that the magnitude of the catastrophe has deep roots in
Haiti’s agricultural history. The peasantry still constitutes a large share of the Haitian
population, and the problems they face stretch back to the era of French colonialism, and
the ways that they have been exploited by the merchant elite, the state, and international
powers ever since. The aftermath of the earthquake catastrophe also bears heavily on the
future of agriculture in Haiti. In the post-earthquake period, the neoliberal orientation of
development policy and planning has intensified, with foreign and state actors bent on
pursuing new projects and infrastructure to support Haiti’s perceived comparative
advantages in low-wage light-manufacturing and certain forms of agro-exporting – a
focus that has overwhelmingly ignored the visions and interests of peasants. But where
the land has been threatened, peasants have risen up, and there are important signs
peasant movements are growing in strength.
The long history of peasant exploitation in Haiti suggests that any radical shift
towards a pro-poor development agenda is going to have to come from the ground up,
which is why it is so fundamental to take seriously the strengths and visions of peasants
themselves. Peasant movements are struggling to resist powerful domestic and
international agribusiness interests, foreign donor projects, and complicit state actors, and
threats ranging from land grabbing to GMO seed ‘donations’. They have shown resolute
determination to maintain control over their land in the face of aggressive and even
violent attempts to take it. Rather than tying Haiti more deeply to narrow export niches in
the global economy, peasant movements are articulating demands in terms of food
sovereignty, and seem poised to grow as a political force as local struggles over land
grow and get connected to one another.
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Scholars and activists have an important role to play in supporting the peasantry, as
it is especially important at this juncture to shed light on the forces driving land grabbing
attempts and highly uneven consequences of rural development schemes. Most of all,
advocacy must start from a position of solidarity and process of engaged learning; as
Troillot (1990, 229-230) puts it: “intellectuals, politicians and planners—foreign and
Haitian alike—[must] talk less about (or ‘for’) the peasantry and begin listening more
attentively to what its diverse subgroups have said in the past and have to say now about
their own future.”
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3. Eating Up the Social Ladder: The problem of dietary aspirations for
food sovereignty
Abstract
In Haiti, as in many developing countries, the prospect of enhancing food sovereignty
faces serious structural constraints. In particular, trade liberalization has deepened
patterns of food import dependence and the export orientation of peasant farming. But
there are also powerful cultural dimensions to food import dependence that further
problematize the challenge of pro-poor agrarian change, which are sometimes
underappreciated in the food sovereignty literature that assumes there will a preference
for local or ‘culturally appropriate’ foods. In Haiti, historically ingrained and persistent
ideologies of racism magnify class hierarchies and the common perceptions of peasants
at the bottom of the social order. This paper explores the intersection of socially
constructed ideologies of racism with peasant aspirations for socio-cultural mobility,
drawing from 30 qualitative interviews with key informants in government, nongovernmental organizations, and social movements, and 108 qualitative interviews and
216 food preference surveys that were conducted in three sites in rural Haiti between
November 2010 and July 2013. The core argument is that racially-coded class
hierarchies exert a powerful influence on dietary aspirations, as ‘peasant’ foods like
millet, root crops and molasses bread are commonly devalued by Haiti’s poor, including
peasants themselves, while ‘elite’ and ‘foreign’ foods like white flour bread, Corn Flakes,
and spaghetti get held up as superior. This suggests a need to appreciate how the cultural
geographies of food interact with – and can in fact exacerbate – political and economic
inequalities, which raises challenging questions for peasant movements and advocates of
food sovereignty.
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3.1

Introduction: The necessity of food sovereignty in Haiti

Global circuits of agro-food production, distribution, and trade are increasingly managed
by large transnational corporations (TNCs) and are narrowing diets on a world scale,
undermining the local provisioning of food, and the livelihoods of smallholder farmers.
Across large parts of the Global South, dietary narrowing has been entwined with a
decades-long pursuit of modernity and development. Starting in the 1950s, industrialized
countries led by the US began dumping food surpluses in many countries of the Global
South, which simultaneously undercut the earnings of smallholder farmers and cultivated
tastes for foreign foods. Food import dependence was exacerbated by the debt
management policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank from
the 1980s onwards, and then the institutionalization of trade liberalization through the
World Trade Organization (WTO) after 1995. The global food economy is organized by
the imperatives of buying and selling commodities and the pursuit of capital
accumulation, without concern for either food security or farm livelihoods (McMichael
2013; Weis 2013; 2007a, Akram-Lodhi 2012; Patel 2010).
The neoliberal conception of development assumes that food security is best
pursued by freeing-up markets and organizing production according to comparative
advantage. Trade liberalization is expected to either discipline farmers to become more
efficient and competitive, or force them out of agriculture altogether and into sectors
where they can earn better wages to buy more food (Weis 2007a). This approach
continues to be pursued widely and aggressively, despite that it has done little to reduce
the population of chronically malnourished and hungry people on a world scale, with
estimates hovering between 800 and 900 million for decades (FAO 2013). Haiti
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illustrates powerfully the vulnerability of the free market approach to food security:
following roughly two decades of liberalization and austerity, the daily per capita caloric
deficit is 430 kcal and 45 percent of the population is undernourished – including a
staggering 87 percent of the rural population (SSSA 2010; Taft-Morales and Drummer
2007).
But while the global food economy threatens smallholder farmer livelihoods, it
would be mistaken to view farmers as passive subjects doomed to a bleak fate in the face
of market integration. On the contrary, new rural social movements have arisen and
grown in strength and international alliance over the past few decades (Borras et al. 2008;
Desmarais 2007), with the banner of food sovereignty increasingly used to frame various
smallholder struggles (McMichael 2013; Akram-Lodhi 2012; Patel 2010; Vía Campesina
2007). Although it is an evolving and increasingly debated conceptual framework
(Edelman et al. 2014), in a general sense food sovereignty challenges the neoliberal
approach to agriculture and food and advocates for a range of alternative policies to foster
more equitable and sustainable farming systems. Advocates also stress that enhancing
smallholder livelihoods and the localization of agro-food systems will tend to enhance
access to healthy, culturally appropriate food, which reflects the fact that diverse cuisines
historically emerged out of local agricultural conditions.
More specifically, food sovereignty can be seen to cohere around a number of key
pillars. These include calls for: redistributive land reform; increased transparency,
democratic control, and gender equity in all decision-making from farm households to
agricultural policy-making; support for agro-ecological research and pro-poor agronomy;
and recognition of the rights of nations and peoples to support culturally-appropriate and
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diverse food systems, including autonomy in trade policies (Edelman et al. 2014;
McMichael 2013a; Wittman et al. 2010; Patel 2010; Altieri 2009; Desmarais 2007; Bové
and Dufour 2001). However, some critics have pointed out that the literature on food
sovereignty has too often failed to interrogate certain theoretical ambiguities and
contradictions, and that there has been insufficient attention to such things as the
dynamics of patriarchy and racism, conflicting aspirations of differentiated producing
classes, and the role of markets and trade (Edelman et al. 2014, Bernstein 2014; MinkoffZern 2013; Park and Young 2013). Yet in spite of this conceptual imprecision, it seems
clear that the general aspirations of food sovereignty are extremely urgent in Haiti and
peasant movements there are increasingly drawing from the discourse and conceptual
framework of food sovereignty to articulate their aspirations.
This research was motivated in part by a strong belief that Haitian peasant
movements have tremendous potential to lead Haiti towards a healthier and a more
equitable, ecologically sustainable, and democratic agro-food system. But it was also
motivated by a concern that the pursuit of food sovereignty in Haiti faces considerable
cultural and ideological barriers; in particular that, as Smucker (1984, 46) suggested three
decades ago, there is a general “social devaluation of what is Haitian as opposed to what
is foreign or European,” and that this serves to deepen the political economic challenges
that peasants face. These persistent ideas of inferiority are rooted in colonial domination.
In the late 16th century, the indigenous Taíno population on the island of
Hispaniola – now Haiti and the Dominican Republic- was exterminated, and imported
African slave labour became fundamental for plantation sugar. The colonial plantation
system enforced race-based social hierarchies that were ruthlessly and violently imposed
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for over three centuries, but in 1804, the only successful slave revolution in modern
world history made Haiti an independent nation – an accomplishment for which Haiti has
never been forgiven. Following independence Haiti was cut off from trade relations with
Europe and in 1825 was compelled to accept a deal with France for the renewal of trade
in exchange for an enormous debt burden that crippled the country’s treasury and
undermined development for two centuries. The gaping disparity between the urban elite
and poor masses deepened over the centuries and today Haiti is one of the most unequal
societies in the region, with the wealthiest 2 percent of the population controlling 26
percent of the country’s wealth (IFAD 2014). This wealth disparity is tied to phenotype
in complex ways. Despite a successful slave revolution, colour coded class hierarchies
persisted (Trouillot 1990) and phenotype is still an important contributor to perceived
status. Deepening food import dependence in the neoliberal era has been transposed onto
complex race-class social hierarchies and this paper explores this nexus between raceclass social hierarchies and Haitian food culture by examining three interlocking
questions: How do race and class hierarchies influence attitudes towards food in Haiti?;
how is this reflected in dietary aspirations?; and how might peasant food culture
influence prospects to move towards the core goals of food sovereignty?
3.2

Approach and Argument: Exploring perceptions of food and their
implications

This research paper is informed by ethnographic field research that was conducted
between December 2010 and July 2013, and comprised two central components. The first
involved key informant interviews (n=30) with leaders of peasant organizations,
community groups and officials in relevant branches of government who were targeted
for their understanding of rural development and agriculture and food politics, their
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vantage that enables them to interpret many issues on a wider scale, and their influence
either within or outside of the state. Throughout the dissertation the organizational bases
of participants are referred to by their acronym or short name, as identified in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Organization Affiliations of Research Participants
• Kore Pwodiksyon Lokal (KPL; Support Local Production)
• Kooperative Prodikte Agrikol Vigilan (KOPAV; The Cooperative of Vigilant
Agricultural Producers)
• Mouvman Inite Ti Peyizan Latibonit (MITPA; The United Movement of Small Peasants
in the Artibonite)
• Ministère de l’Agriculture des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural
(MARNDR: The Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development)
• Mouvman Peyizan Papaye (MPP; The Peasant Movement of Papaye)
• Oganizasyon Devlopman Dezam (ODD; the Development Organization of Dezam)
• L’Organisation de Développement de l’Artibonite (ODVA; The Organization for the
Development of the Artibonite Valley, a departmental branch of the Ministry of
Resources and Agricultural Development)
• La Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif (PAPDA; The
Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development);
• Platfom Inite Des Oganizasyon de Dezam (PIOD; The United Platform of
Organizations in Dezam)
• Rezo Asosyasyon Koperativ Ba Atibonit (RAKPABA; The Cooperative Network of
Associations of the Lower Artibonite Valley)
• Réseau National Haïtien pour la Souveraineté et la Sécurité Alimentaires (RENHASSA;
The National Haitian Network for Food Sovereignty and Food Security)
• Santral Komitè Menonit Dezam (KSM: Mennonite Central Committee Dezam)
• Tét Kole Ti Peyizan (Heads Together Small Peasants)
The second component of the research was conducted with peasant producers
living in three areas of the Verrette Commune in the highly productive Artibonite Valley
(Haiti’s proverbial ‘rice bowl’): the town of Dezam (n=36); the village of Kristan (n=36);
and the mountain hamlet of Biquette (n=36). These study sites were chosen because they
represent geographic differences between valley, mid-mountain, and mountaintop
locations within the region, and contain different mixes of social classes, with rural-urban
differences particularly pertinent. This research involved qualitative semi-structured
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interviews (n=108) and food preference surveys (n=216), with two sets of surveys
conducted with each participant, guided by the basic goal of investigating how dietary
preferences and ‘food hierarchies’ are conceived. And following an assumption that
while a hard and fast ranking was impossible, a broad ordering could still be made out.
One important aspect of this was to explore the difference between the tastes of necessity
and the tastes of luxury (Bourdieu 1984); in other words, to try to unpack the relative
importance of cost incentives, social values, and perceptions in the purchase of foreign
foods. Another important line of investigation was to understand how participants
associate different foods with various segments of society, and centrally to race and class
differences, although participants were encouraged freely to describe these associations
without any prompting. I am cognizant that social hierarchies are linked to linguistic
differentiation in Haiti and that the lack of access of Haiti’s poor majority to the French
language is tied to their denial of social mobility, while Haitian Kreyòl is often an
important and unique expression of peasant culture (Valdman 1984). It is for this reason
that I use Kreyòl spelling throughout this paper.
The core argument of this paper is that while there are certainly powerful
structural dynamics that impede the pursuit of food sovereignty and shape food choices
among Haiti’s poor majority (i.e. trade liberalization and the surge of cheaper
industrialized and subsidized food imports), dietary aspirations are also heavily
influenced by race and class-based social hierarchies that have long, historical roots
extending far beyond colonial slavery (Allahar 1993). I argue that ‘food meanings’ and
dietary aspirations are important and underappreciated aspects of the severe stratification
of Haitian society, and are largely geared towards the consumption practices of the

105

lighter-skinned urban elite and consequently biased against local production. In more
basic terms, there is widespread cultural esteem for ‘elite’, ‘foreign’, and ‘white’ foods,
alongside widespread disdain for local, ‘black’ peasant foods, patterns that have been
widely internalized by poor people in Haiti, including many farmers themselves. Efforts
by TNCs to engineer tastes and transform diets towards processed and packaged food
durables have, in effect, been grafted onto deeply rooted social pathologies. Ultimately, I
argue that peasant movements and their allies in Haiti must consider how race and class
shape perceptions of food, including certain key food staples (e.g. white flour, white rice,
and chicken meat) and symbols associated with Western diets (e.g. soda pop, hot dogs,
Corn Flakes, and spaghetti), and recognize how this is an inescapable part of struggles to
transform the agro-food system, which in turn points to the need to devise strategies to
problematize the existing food culture and renew appreciation for Haitian foods.
3.3

Internalizing Inferiority: The Complexity of Colour in Haiti’s Social
Stratification
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas…The
class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has
control at the same time over the means of mental production. The
individuals composing the ruling class…rule also as thinkers, as
producers of ideas.
-Marx and Engels (1965, 61)

Marxists have long emphasized the importance of false consciousness, which implies that
dominant social classes not only control disproportionate shares of material resources and
the means of production, but also tend to exert a great deal of influence over the symbolic
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systems in social life. Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of habitus helps us understand the
importance of these symbolic systems in reproducing inequality. Habitus, for Bourdieu,
implies that human history and memory have durable impacts within individual and
collective consciousness, and that these combine with personal histories and positionality
(stemming from things like education, upbringing, and social class) to produce social
structures that help to guide and constrain behaviour (Bourdieu 1990). Bourdieu (1980)
builds on one of Gramsci’s (1971) great insights about the nature of hegemony: the idea
that many people in poorer social classes tend to internalize, or at least tacitly accept
ideologies of social elites that run directly counter to their own class interests, a dynamic
that helps to support the continuance of the existing power relations. For Bourdieu,
symbolic systems operate as important mechanisms of exploitation and inequality when
the economic domination of upper classes is disguised and ultimately becomes widely
accepted in non-economic terms, with social superiority instead linked to other attributes
(e.g. by race, ethnicity, religion, education, style of dress etc.).
Another way of describing this dynamic is that economic capital can produce
symbolic capital that in turn reinforces and braces its power (Bourdieu 1980; 1977). This
notion of symbolic capital helps to understand persistent ideologies of racism in many
post-colonial states, and how they can foster destructive social conflicts and help to mask
class inequalities (Allahar 2005; 2002). One outcome is that instead of thinking in classconscious terms about systemic inequalities, many individuals with limited economic
mobility instead try to attain symbolic capital by mirroring the values, tastes,
mannerisms, consumption patterns, and other social codes of the elite classes, as a means
to symbolic mobility. In this way, elite domination of the symbolic systems in social life
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acts as an important mechanism of social control, to the extent that it fosters a fixation
with climbing up the social ladder rather than confronting it.
In Haiti, the widespread pursuit of symbolic capital by mirroring elite values
includes a tendency to enact racist ideologies. This phenomenon is prevalent throughout
the contemporary Caribbean and is rooted in “the internalization – or better, the
epidermalization – of inferiority” (Fanon 1967, 313). As Allahar (1993) tells us, negative
associations with blackness dates back to the Greco-Roman period when Ethiopians were
the first to be viewed as inferior because of their phenotype. This ideology persisted,
deepened, and took root concretely in colonial slavery. In the Caribbean region, the
‘mindset of inferiority’ (Allahar 1993) developed over centuries of racial stratification,
violent oppression and psychological abuse during slavery, when an important aspect of
social control was to entrench racialized ideas of inferiority and foster aspirations to
assimilate to the planters’ culture (Schuller and Morales 2012; Prou 2005; Farmer 2003;
Trouillot 1990; Beckford 1972; Memmi 1965; Fanon 1963). Although colour prejudice
indeed began long before the rise of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, the slave trade can
nevertheless be seen as the central foundation of modern racism (Jordan 1977), and while
the biological fallibility of race is clear, it continues to be overshadowed in many places
by pervasive perceptions that link race to social status and then influence social
behaviour. The enactment of racist ideologies has taken various forms going back to
colonial St. Domingue, when mulattos – who along with freed blacks could own property
but were excluded from political power and elite social standing (Dupuy 1989) – tended
to mimic “white habits,” seek “whiteness in their marriage partners” (Rogozinski 2000,
165), emulate “the style of the whites,” and generally attempt to “drown all traces of their
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[African] origin” (James 1964, 39). Today, race- and class-based social hierarchies
persist in complex ways. For instance, lighter-skinned elites tend to be prioritized in
hospitals, banks, and government offices, lower-class Kreyòl-speaking women tend to
face more physical abuse and have less credibility in the eyes of the law than middleclass women (Bell 2013), and development aid tends to privilege the needs of the wealthy
and perpetuate existing inequalities and the social order (Katz 2013; Schuller 2012;
Schwartz 2008). Pervasive perceptions of blan (a Kreyòl word meaning both white
people and foreign people, including non-Caucasian foreigners),27 suggests that
perceptions of class in Haiti are seriously complicated and “confused by national and
racial difference,” as Wilentz (2013:242) puts it.
The race and class configuration is more complex still. Though social judgments
of skin colour are “generally Western dominated,” blan are not the exclusive objects of
social aspirations. While Haitian society continues to have an “aesthetic in which
blackness [is] found at the bottom of the scale,” there is not a direct conversion, as white
“is not considered to be the most pleasing color,” nor is it attached to a fixed class
position (Trouillot 1995, 112). Rather, colour in Haiti signifies much more than skin
colour, and though phenotype is crucial to the social evaluation of colour, it never
operates alone. Socio-economic class clearly influences perceptions of colour and yet, as
Trouillot (1995) indicates, colour can include many other characteristics, such as skin
texture and tone, hair colour and density, and facial features, noting how two people who
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In Haitian Kreyol, blan is used as both singular and plural (unlike French, les blancs).
In English, some writers translate as ‘blan-s’ for plural, while others maintain the blan for
both singular and plural, as I have chosen to do.
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share the same skin shade could be classed in different colour categories because of some
other feature. Two brief examples help to illustrate the complexity of the ‘colour
continuum’ in Haiti. When I lived in Haiti, friends sometimes introduced me by saying
“she’s Haitian,” or “This is Marylynn, she’s a blan nwa [a black white person, or in a
more fluid translation, a white skinned person who is black inside].” These introductions
reveal how ‘colour,’ and even nationality are flexible, and also how proficiency in
Haitian Kreyòl can be recognized as a sign of solidarity with pro-peasant struggles, which
suggests that language is also important to social evaluations of ‘colour,’ and suggesting
that ‘colour’ can extend beyond physical features into ideological commitments. A
second example of how colour is contingent on other characteristics occurred one day
when I was at a spring with my daughter. A woman from the mountains walked by with
her young son who was noticeably lighter-skinned than most in the area, people often
referred to him as klé [clairs in French]. When the mother noticed my daughter and me,
she teased to her son: “They’re blan, the same as you! And you’re not even going to talk
to them!” In spite of being a member of a rural peasant family, his unusual colour
designation, klé, temporarily gave way to a blan label, an outcome of both his phenotype
and the fact that my daughter and I were in his company.
In short, there is a broad shade continuum that generally corresponds with wealth,
“with lighter Haitians being richer and darker ones poorer” (Rogozinski 2000, 216),
though there are important exceptions too. Other physical and socio-cultural features (e.g.
lips, nose shape, hair, education, dress, and diets) and sometimes even ideological
commitments also influence status, and make racial hierarchies far from fixed or clearcut. Another reflection of this is the fact that even the race-based monikers blan and nwa
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(a Kreyòl word meaning black, from the French noir) are somewhat ambiguous,
signifying much more than phenotype. For instance, blan can be used as marker of class,
to identify a moneyed dark-skinned person, or to mean ‘foreigner’ regardless of
phenotype, and it can even be used as an ironic designation for a slightly lighter-skinned
peasant. The symbolism with wealth was illustrated in the comment by a member of the
community organization ODD, who noted: “when Haitians see a blan from lòt bò [Kreyòl
for ‘the other side’28] for him, he symbolize[s] a lot of money.” Nwa, on the other hand,
is generally associated with poverty and can be used as an insult. A good example of this
is how youth in Dezam frequently mock each other by saying “misye sa tout nwa nét”
[meaning ‘that guy is completely black’]. Race and class-based prejudice are entwined
and difficult to isolate and – however make-believe race is in a biological sense –
phenotype matters socially and in distinguishing economic status.
The disastrous 2010 earthquake amplified the already pervasive ‘aid landscape’
and climate of dependency in Haiti, and many have suggested that these dynamics
reinforced some of the class-infused racial pathologies described above; in essence,
ideologies of racism fed the common tendency to look to the soaring number of blan for
resources and solutions (Bell 2013; Schuller 2012; Podur 2012; Edmunds 2012). As a
leader of the national peasant organization Tét Kole put it, “you found blan all over
[following the earthquake] and the peasants believe that when the blan comes he will
bring a solution. So he hates himself and he gives over to the blan.” At the same time it
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This is also short hand for Lòt bo dlo, meaning ‘the other side of the water’, and it
usually means anywhere overseas but is also sometimes used to refer to the Dominican
Republic, so is generally used to mean ‘in foreign lands.’
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should be emphasized that the immediate aftermath was also filled with immense
solidarity and fortitude, as Bell (2013) details well. According to the coordinator of the
advocacy organization KPL, the Haitian masses were standing up and beginning to
organize collective rebuilding efforts before the tidal wave of aid, reflecting a Haitian
paradox, in that strong views about ‘black’ pride, tenacity, and togetherness can exist
alongside powerful stigmas about racial hierarchies.
Since race and class-based social hierarchies are shaped by varying perceptions
about economic positioning, socio-cultural characteristics, and physical features, the
symbolic means by which poor Haitians attempt to enact a higher social standing takes
various and often highly contradictory forms. The president of KOPAV described it this
way:
The history of unequal class relations is still following us … afranchis
[freedmen],… esklav [slaves],… kolon [colonists]…those things are
still in our spirits. People with means still consider the peasants as
slaves. They consider you as savage, as wild. Peasants want to show
that they are not those things, so they imitate [Haitian elites] in
everything they do. They want to resemble Europeans, the urban
people, so they let go of everything natural, in terms of food, religion
and how they dress.
The coordinator of the community organization PIOD, a university educated man, said
that in order to be respected he must “act in the way that society appreciates. I have to use
skin whitening cream and perfume for people not to have a problem with me. Haitians
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always believe that blan are superior.” Racialized ideologies are also enacted in more
subtle social and economic ways. For example, the director of KPL explained that if
someone presents them self “as a serious and honest person, people will say [they] are
just like a white person.” Similar sentiments echoed over and over during the course of
the fieldwork, with people said to be acting “just like a blan” when they did something
upstanding or trustworthy, like paying back a loan.
In short, social stratification in Haiti is extremely complex, and this paper argues
that dietary aspirations are, to a considerable extent, bound up in these historically
ingrained ideologies about race and class. To put it another way, food choices are an
important means through which many Haitians, including peasants, seek to imitate the
behaviours and consumption practices of the country’s mostly urban elites. To develop
this argument further, and appreciate how this food culture bears on prospects for food
sovereignty, it is important to first clarify the position of the peasantry at the bottom of
Haiti’s social hierarchy.
3.4

The Disdain for Peasants

The blurry and sometimes conflicting perceptions of race and class divisions discussed in
the previous section have some role in obscuring the gargantuan material gap that exists
in Haitian society between the mostly urban elites and the overwhelmingly poor peasant
masses. There is an extensive literature on the complexities of the definition of
peasantries as a class (Bernstein 2010; Van Der Ploeg 2009; Mintz 1973), and the unique
history of peasant agriculture in the Caribbean (Mintz 1989; 1985; Beckford 1985; 1972;
Horowitz 1971), discussions that are beyond the scope of this paper. For here it is
sufficient to say that peyizan [peasant] is how Haitians refer to smallholder farmers, the
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great majority of whom control less than 2 acres of land and who combine varying
degrees of market-orientation and self-provisioning.
Since colonial times, economic wealth and political power have been heavily
concentrated in towns and cities, and both upper and middle classes have “despised the
black peasants” (Rogozinsky 2000, 219) and “jealously guarded” their spatial distinction
from the rural peasantry” (Dash 2001, 12), a division that has been long recognized.29 In
other words, social hierarchies have always had geographical dimensions, and the urbanrural divide further adds to the complexity of how race and class are perceived. A small
class of lighter skinned elites sits decidedly at the top of Haiti’s social and economic
order, located in major urban areas, especially the capital of Port-au-Prince but also
secondary cities like Jacmel and Cap-Haitien. This elite, which is dominated by five
extremely powerful family empires, owns much of Haiti’s industry and trade, including
such things as the: major sites of warehousing and shipping (allowing them to benefit
disproportionately from both export and import trade); light assembly and textile
sweatshops (that arose in the 1980s); food processing factories; cement plants and the
construction sector; and luxury hotels and restaurants (Dash 2001; Hallward 2007;
Abbott 2011). Haiti’s relatively small middle class occupies administrative and servicesector jobs such as bank clerks, nurses, and bureaucrats in government and NGO offices,
and almost all have some capacity in, and gain prestige from using, French, rather than
Kreyòl (Valdman 1984). Some of the urban poor in Haiti’s burgeoning bidonvilles find a
range of relatively precarious work, from hustling as traders and petty merchants in the
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Dash (2001) points out that the social stratification in Haiti in the early 20th century
was so rigid that James Leyburn (1948) described it as a virtual caste society.
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informal sector to work in garment sweatshops, though many suffer from widespread unand under-employment and rely on networks of family and friends to survive. Yet
however distant the poorest slum-dwellers are from Haiti’s upper and middle classes,
they generally still perceive themselves to be superior to moun andeyo – “the people out
there” (Smith 1998, 14) or the “people on the outside” (Dash 2001, 35). For urban
dwellers, andeyo [the countryside] connotes a virtual oblivion.
The urban-rural divide is also reflected in the disdainful way that peasants are
conventionally spoken about in Haiti. For instance, a common insult in urban areas is to
call someone a peyizan or abitan [a rural dweller], and a Tét Kole leader made it clear
that peasants understand they are “the most despised” social class and “held in
contempt” across the country. Another reflection of this derision can be seen in the fact
that the former director of ODVA, a governmental agricultural organization in the
Artibonite Valley, made the dubious claim that “there is no place on earth where a
peasant wants to be a peasant.” This also plays out at the level of the Haitian state, which
many peasant leaders pointed out, is largely ignorant of the problems in rural areas.
While andeyo carries mostly very negative connotations, perceptions of class in
rural areas are still full of racial and spatial complexities. For instance, peasants who live
higher in the mountains are typically poorer and perceived as being more nwa while
wealthier peasant classes live in towns and valleys.30 Again, derisive language reflects
this, as moun monn [mountain person] is another insult that is commonly used, and rural
people were often witnessed arguing about relative status based on whose family is from
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Based on research in rural Haiti, Schwartz (2008, 32) affirms that the “people of the
Village consider themselves better than the peasants who live in the countryside.”
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further up the mountain. In basic terms, moving down in elevation broadly translates into
moving up in social status. As one peasant leader put it, “There is not one person in
central Dezam [in the valley] who considers people in the mountain bon nonm [comrades
or equals]. In his perception, people who live in the mountains are vye moun [archaic or
worthless people], people who don’t have much value or importance.”
Key informants recurrently described these deep, culturally ingrained perceptions
of peasant inferiority. For instance, the treasurer of ODD noted how “people from the
mountain consider themselves inferior to us”; the former ODVA director suggested that
peasants themselves often say “that peasants aren’t good”; and the President of ODD said
that “if a peasant sees someone wearing nice clothes who works everyday, they know
he’s not their comrade. They see him as high and they are low.” The President of PIOD
illuminated the dehumanizing prejudice against mountain peasants:
Mountain people stay in the same clothes, with a bad smell, and appear in
places where you shouldn’t appear like that. It’s only food that interests
them. Sometimes even I say, ‘ughh! Those people from the mountains!’
It’s a way to keep him in his place. It’s a way to psychologically play with
his spirit and his confidence.
Some of the villagers who were interviewed went so far as to claim that “mountain
people are more Haitian than us,” as a means to discursively distance themselves from
their Haitian-ness while connecting perceptions of inferiority, blackness, and mountain
peasants with what it means to be Haitian. These perceptions of peasant inferiority
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translate into a variety of grotesque social practices, something that was driven home by
the story of the treasurer of ODD who described an experience at the hospital where:
…there was a lighter, trendy looking guy looking to get in – they let him
in. Then a mountain person came up. His clothes were dirty. He waited
for such a long time outside. They gave him so much pressure. They
mistreated him. The discrimination is serious, it’s in the hospitals, the
schools… it’s everywhere.
As noted earlier, one of the ways that many poor people in Haiti respond to these cultural
prejudices is by enacting behaviours associated with elites, in the hope of gaining some
degree of symbolic capital and social prestige. This research suggests that the
consumption of prestigious goods, including certain foods is an important way that
symbolic capital is pursued.
3.5

More than a Structural Problem: Food hierarchies and the disdain for peasant
foods

In large measure, Haiti’s growing food import dependence is rooted in the same broader
structural dynamics affecting many parts of the Global South, such as competitive
pressures from cheap industrial surpluses and trade liberalization (McMichael 2013;
Akram-Lodhi 2012; Weis 2007a). For example, in the 1950s and 1960s imported bread
and wheat-flour biscuits began to displace kasav [locally-produced cassava flat bread] in
Haitian markets, spurred by US-sponsored food aid that brought cheap wheat and wheat
flour. But it was not until the 1990s that food imports really began to soar, triggered by
the conditions of IMF and World Bank-prescribed structural adjustment. One condition
of adjustment was that Haiti cut rice tariffs from 35 to 3 percent, which led to a surge of
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imported rice that accelerated the displacement of traditional peasant grains, including
pitimi [a term that denotes both sorghum and millet], cornmeal, and domestically-grown
rice. Adjustment-dictated trade liberalization also increased the availability of many other
imported food durables and flavourings. For instance, Maggi’s MSG-laden bouillon cube
began to displace traditional herbs and flavours, including parsley, thyme and sour
oranges; imported citrus powder and imported vinegar began to displace limes for
cleaning meats and preparing sauces; Sweety, an imported powdered drink, began to
displace natural fruit juices; and imported peanut butter brands began to displace local
varieties. The displacement of local foods by imports has even led to noticeable changes
in the meals served during konbit, the traditional form of collective agricultural labour in
Haiti. Until the 1990s, konbit meals typically included sweet coffee and root crops in the
morning and a hearty meal of pitimi or cornmeal with vegetable and bean sauce in the
afternoon, sometimes with a goat or pig slaughtered for a large event (Smith 1998).
Today, sòs makawoni [a sauce made from imported macaroni noodles] and spaghetti
have largely replaced the vegetable and bean sauce served over the main cereal, which is
now overwhelmingly imported rice. As a MITPA representative put it, “before in konbit
we boiled yam, sweet potato, and had cornmeal or pitimi. Spaghetti was never here! But
now everyone leaves their food culture for spaghetti!”
While political economic dynamics explain how imported foods often sell more
cheaply than local products, these are not the only causes of rising food import
dependence. As Edelman et al. (2014: 917) suggest,
Dietary changes are often assumed to be primarily a function of
cheapness…yet…we must be careful not to underplay the extent to which dietary
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aspirations have been affected by long-term trade patterns and corporate branding,
and the extent to which consumer preferences now lean towards processed
products.
Haiti offers a forbidding example where cultural perceptions of food, including
preferences for imported foods, are furthering food import dependence. The president of
ODD encapsulates this very well, explaining how “Haitians are proud when they eat food
from overseas [because] it has grandeur, it gives them prestige.” As with many countries
in the Global South, food import dependence in Haiti has been bolstered by the powerful
marketing efforts of TNCs together with the penetration of foreign, especially US media.
Multiple key informants stressed the influence of corporate advertising and media on
food perceptions. For instance, the Secretary of State for the MARNDR described how
TNCs have “created desire and new tastes for imported foods in Haitians homes [that
make it] difficult for people to return to their traditional foods.” The coordinator of
PAPDA went further, insisting that cheap food imports coupled with aggressive
marketing constitute a form of neo-colonial violence, which was echoed by a Tét Kole
leader who suggested that the blan seem intent to “make us hate our own culture.”
Still, it is important to remember that although corporate marketing and foreign
media may have bolstered aspirations for Western diets, these aspirations have older
cultural roots. Thus, it is better to understand food marketing and media in Haiti as being
grafted onto a cultural landscape in which strong pre-existing race-class pathologies
already encouraged the cultural tendencies to internalize inferiority and to emulate the
elite, including the blan.
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To deepen this consideration of Haiti’s food culture, attention turns now to an
examination of food hierarchies. The analysis is based upon a combination of key
informant interviews and food preference surveys conducted in the Artibonite Valley,
which sought to understand perceptions of specific foods in relation to price, marketing,
colour, and class. The food preference surveys were drafted in the field in consultation
with various community members and Haitian research assistants. The intention here was
to identify traditional and imported foods that commonly make up major meals and
snacks rather than to achieve a representative sample of all food choices available in
Haiti. The results revealed strong tendencies to devalue manje peyizan [peasant foods] on
one hand, and to valorize foods that are associated with blan and urban elites on the
other, including a combination of imported and domestically-produced foods, which
indicates that food hierarchies cannot be reduced to a simple foreign/local dichotomy.
While this research reveals that social tendencies to revere elite and imported foods are
powerful, the intention is not to suggest that these perceptions are total – there are
important examples that challenge these food hierarchies, and social movements that are
struggling against these trends. For example, traditional and peasant foods are often
privileged and valued in Haitian folklore and in Voudou religious celebrations, and the
national food justice organization Kore Pwodiksyon Lokal [Support Local Production]
has gained strength in the past five years. Still, the strong tendency, to devalue traditional
peasant foods, illustrates clearly that food sovereignty advocacy must take food cultures
into account and not assume that dietary preferences will tend to align with local
production and support small farmers (Edelman et al. 2014).
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A good place to begin is with the ranking of locally grown staple grains, which
overwhelmingly followed a rice-corn-pitimi hierarchy in the food preference survey. The
vast majority of survey respondents ranked pitimi as the least preferred staple grain, and
strongly associated it with peasants. A leader of Tét Kole summed this finding up well,
noting simply: “most people revile pitimi.” Among the grains, cornmeal was ranked
second by most participants. One reflection of its higher status than pitimi is its
occasional presence in local eateries, where pitimi never appears. Virtually all
participants identified rice as the favoured grain, and its consumption was strongly
associated with social prestige, blan, and urban elites in both surveys and qualitative
interviews. According to the director of PAPDA, rice is the “the food of Kings,” and
multiple key informants noted how even poor mountain peasants will sometimes sell their
pitimi to buy rice.
Yet there are also some complexities in how different varieties of rice are valued.
For example, the large majority of survey respondents indicated that the most socially
prestigious variety of rice is Diri Sheyla [Sheyla rice], which is traditionally grown in the
Artibonite Valley and is popular throughout the country. This was followed by Diri blan
[white rice], another traditional variety grown locally in the Artibonite Valley. Both local
varieties were widely considered superior to TCS rice, an imported hybrid variety from
Taiwan that is grown locally, and ‘Miami Rice’, a general term given for rice imported
from the US via the major USDA export terminus in Miami, which held the lowest
standing among rice varieties. The clear preference for Artibonite rice stands in contrast
to broader preferences for foreign foods, though Miami Rice is still preferred to locally
grown cornmeal or pitimi.

121

The general rice-corn-pitimi hierarchy is likely influenced by (and influences)
price, at least to some degree. In two food price surveys conducted in representative food
markets in the Artibonite region during the period of interviews in 2011 and 2012, rice
was found to be the most expensive grain per cup (250 ml), selling for between US$0.17
and US$0.35 (depending on variety) in comparison to cornmeal (US$0.10) and pitimi
(between US$0.12 and US$0.15). While the higher cost of rice could both influence and
reflect its elevated status, there are indications that cost alone is insufficient to understand
grain preferences, including that there was a wide divergence of prices for different rice
varieties and that cornmeal was widely preferred to pitimi despite being less expensive.
Another factor that could influence how various grains are perceived is the
differential labour requirements to prepare and cook them. Pitimi and cornmeal are
generally seen to require more effort and time to prepare and cook than rice, so that
households with relatively higher incomes and time constraints may prefer to purchase
rice in order to save time. However, the large majority of survey participants (88 percent)
were not employed in waged labour relations, and those who were employed mostly held
part-time positions, whereas roughly three-quarters of participants farmed either as
smallholders, tenants, or sharecroppers, and most had family members who contributed to
farming and cooking chores, which helps explain why participants generally did not link
the greater time and effort needed to cook corn and pitimi as a reason for their lower
status to rice.
Grain preferences in Haiti must also be understood in the context of the old raceclass social stratifications discussed earlier. Cornmeal and pitimi were, along with root
crops, mainstays of slave diets, whereas there was a long historical association of rice
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with blan and as a luxury food, and a number of key informants believe that this has had
an enduring influence on how these foods are perceived. The former director of ODVA
suggested that the desire to consume rice was part of a deeper desire to emulate the urban
elite and blan that has existed for centuries: “What makes everyone andeyo want to eat
rice everyday [is] to resemble ‘them.’ They teach people that they should eat rice to
resemble other people.”
By the 1950s, Sebrell (1959, 552) found that rice was more commonly eaten
amongst the poor than in the past, though it was largely reserved for the special Sunday
meal, and that pitimi was “referred to as the ‘poor man’s rice’ by higher classes of
Haitians.” Sebrell (1959) also identified that Haitian peasants tended to exaggerate the
amount of rice and downplay the amount of pitimi that they consumed. Similarly, the
survey I conducted revealed a strong association of rice consumption with urban areas
and higher social classes: eighty-one percent of survey respondents associated rice with
urban populations, nearly half said it was for the rich, and almost 40 percent of
respondents said rice was for blan. In addition, survey participants regularly made
comments like:
•

“The rich can choose good things to eat, like rice”;

•

“Rural people only eat rice once in a while”;

•

“The poor will only eat rice if they happen to have the opportunity”;

•

“The poor can only eat diri kase [broken rice grains].”

The president of ODD described his sense of how a strong desire to consume rice
stretches into the most remote areas of Haiti:
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We did a study in the highest mountain villages and found that even though
people certainly do eat yams – in fact, most people eat yams and there are
even people who don’t ever eat rice – they want to seem enlightened, so
when we ask what they have eaten they’ll say they ate rice!
In the survey, 57 percent of respondents associated cornmeal as a food of the poor,
often with very negative associations. One respondent put it simply, “poor people eat
food that is bad, like corn.” These associations are becoming so pervasive that, according
to the former Mayor of Dezam, “children are now being raised not to eat cornmeal”. But
as indicated earlier, pitimi is perceived even more negatively than cornmeal. In the
Artibonite Valley, for example, it is never served in local eateries, or even in more
informal market stalls. For some, pitimi amounts to a social disgrace, reflected in the
common expression that “pitimi pa monte tab” [pitimi is not fit for the table], and its
description in the Dezam market as chyen jambe [food that dogs have jumped over]. The
signification of pitimi with poverty holds in spite of the fact that some kinds of rice were
not that much more expensive in rural markets.
Thirty-three percent of survey respondents also said that pitimi was only something
to be consumed by the poor, and 46 percent said it was for people andeyo. Only 4 percent
of survey participants associated pitimi with urban populations, and no one associated it
with the upper classes. Another indication of how pitimi is perceived can be seen in social
codes of etiquette, which prescribe that pitimi is never served to guests; as the Former
Deputy of Verrette says, “You must serve guests rice. You cannot cook corn or pitimi!
People are ashamed of it. Pitimi characterizes people in poverty.”

In sum, trade

liberalization and the influx of subsidized US rice imports since 1986 were central to the
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displacement of locally-grown cornmeal and pitimi, but there are also older cultural
factors – in particular, associations between rice the urban elite and blan – that are
fortifying the shift towards imported grain staples.
In the case of breakfast snacks, participants were asked to rank locally produced
kasav and white bread rolls made with imported wheat flour. Both are commonly served
with peanut butter and portions sell for US$0.10 in the local market. Eighty-four percent
of survey respondents said white bread rolls were more chelbe [cool], with one
respondent explaining how it is “blan and rich people that eat things made with pat
[dough made from wheat flour].” The survey also asked participants to rank kasav against
Corn Flakes, which is another similarly priced breakfast food, and 94 percent of
respondents preferred Corn Flakes. Surveys also indicated striking preferences among
more substantial breakfast meals, with roughly three-quarters of respondents preferring
spaghetti (which in Haiti is sometimes consumed at breakfast, and is composed of
entirely imported ingredients) to a traditional breakfast plate of plantains and yams or a
plate of traditionally prepared cornmeal. A leader of Tét Kole suggested that people are
widely coming to prefer spaghetti because they think it “is a food for good people.” Other
survey respondents expressed similar views, with one suggesting that “urbanites eat good
food that’s preserved and in a box – like spaghetti,” and “poor people eat roots [i.e. root
crops].”
Many key informants spoke about the negative connotations that root crops carry,
as illustrated in the followed set of comments:
•

“Anyone who has means in our society will not eat yams or sweet potato or
manioc. People don’t think these are dignified foods”;
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•

“People are completely humiliated by the sweet potato”;

•

“Some people will even hide if they are about to eat sweet potato – so that
they can eat it out of sight!”

The common preference for packaged spaghetti over fresh and locally produced foods,
like root crops and cornmeal, has a doubly negative effect, 31 simultaneously undermining
peasant agriculture and perhaps the nutritional quality of diets.32
The surveys also indicated strong preferences for imported and packaged snack
foods in relation to comparable locally-produced items. For instance, bonbon sél [cream
coloured imported salt crackers] were ranked as the most chelbe by 58 percent of
participants, and chiko [an imported cheesy snack] was widely regarded as the second
favoured snack food, whereas bonbon siwo [a deep brown coloured, locally made
molasses sweetbread] was identified as the least preferred snack food by the vast
majority. The former Mayor of Verrette suggested that bonbon sèl “appears
sophisticated” while bonbon siwo is seen to have lower social prestige because “it is
made by hand,” adding that while “bonbon sél was once something you only saw at a rich
person’s house, now [poorer] people eat it” in efforts to show “their higher social
standing.” Another illustration of the elevated status of bonbon sèl and chiko is the
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James Scott (1976:17) found a similar tendency in Malaysia, where despite the fact
that cheaper and nutritionally superior diets could replace more expensive ones, only the
desperately poor would accept this “cost in taste.”
32

The quality of food import-dependent diets has been a growing debate among the
donor, NGO and civil society communities in Haiti, many of which claim that traditional
diets are more nutritionally sound than food imports (For an overview of these debates
see The Economist 2013).
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increasingly common tendency among mothers to feed these snacks to their children. The
former Deputy of Verrette suggests that preferences for imported packaged snacks is such
that most bakeries today “no longer sell bonbon siwo. They say it’s a vye bagay [an old,
useless thing].” A Tét Kole leader suggests that the denigration of bonbon siwo is so
severe that “people must hide to eat” it, reflected in the fact that it is widely referred to as
kaka chwal [horse shit].
Another way that the strong social preferences for foods associated with the urban
elite and blan are manifested is in the elevated social values attached to various meats.
Common views were reflected in comments like blan and wealthy people “eat good food
like fried meat,” and “The rich always eat better. They eat beautiful meat, and a lot of it.”
One indication of these preferences is that imported chicken is regularly chosen for
celebrations and important gatherings, and respondents regularly associated it with
urbanites and blan. A leader of Tét Kole connected these attitudes to the challenges
facing peasant movements, noting with frustration how:
When someone is eating a chicken thigh from lòt bò, a meat that comes in bags,
that passes so much misery – he is proud! Especially if someone sees him eating
it! He would rather eat the meat that comes in bags than the chicken from his own
yard!
It is also noteworthy that there are different preferences for various types of chicken.
When participants were asked to compare the social value of imported and locally
sourced chicken nearly 2/3rds of participants said imported chicken was more
prestigious. Although many participants asserted that poul peyi [literally national
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chicken] was of higher quality, was more nutritious and was better-tasting – and while
poul peyi was the clear preference for Voudou celebrations and to celebrate Independence
Day - imported chicken was associated with the elite and was the preference for many
public gatherings and celebrations, and was more likely to be served at street side
restaurants. Participant comments also indicated associations between chicken
preferences and class and race social hierarchies. One respondent described how: “On
Sundays people here love to make beautiful food. When they do that, they cook chicken,
white chicken [literally meaning chicken with white feathers].” Other survey respondents
affirmed this saying “blan eat white chicken,” and “rich people eat white chicken.”
The colour of food and its social value also reared up in preferences for various
beans and sugars, which further illustrate the complex ways that perceptions of race
influence food choices. Participants were asked to rank white sugar, brown sugar, and
rapadou [a coarse dark brown sugar, sold in cakes]. Though white and brown sugar
ranged in price from US$0.25-$0.30 per cup in the Dezam market, 87 percent of
participants ranked white sugar as the most prestigious. Indeed, it is the sugar of choice
for weddings and community events and is proudly served to guests. Rapadou, was
overwhelmingly ranked last, and is scoffed at as a peasant food and never consumed in
public or served to guests. Decades ago, Mintz (1985) noted how Haitians associated
rapadou with the poor, an observation that was echoed both by key informants and that
rang out in the survey, as 96 percent of participants associated rapadou consumption with
the poor majority in Haiti.
These subtle links between the valuation of the colour of foods is further suggested
in the hierarchy of beans that was evident in the food preference survey data. Although
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many participants expressed that black beans were more nutritious, the overwhelming
majority (90 percent) of participants identified butter beans as the most prestigious, with
a large majority (75 percent) ranking pwa miyami [literally ‘Miami beans,’ the common
term for imported red beans] ahead of black beans. This bean hierarchy was reinforced by
observations that butter beans are preferred for community celebrations, including
marriages and funerals, and are the favourite bean for gifts. It is interesting to consider
how this bean hierarchy largely mimics the colour prejudice in Haiti, particularly in light
of the fact that in addition to the common social labels ‘blan’ and ‘nwa’, sun-tanned
Caucasians, milat [mullatto], and Dominicans are often labelled ‘wouj’ [red]. Some key
informants also speculated on the valuation of beans based on colours. A KSM
community development worker noted that:
At a wedding, everything is completely manje chelbe [cool food]. There is
always rice and beans, but it’s not just any bean – it must be butter beans!
People would not make rice with black beans and put it on the table! That’s
because black beans are lower! On the social level, they’re lower.
Their perceived inferiority of black beans:
Firstly it’s because of people’s mentalities. Sometimes black beans are less
expensive, yes. But one of the things people say is that black beans make
food dirty. That means they make the food black – completely. And it
seems, I suppose, that black is a dirty colour. And butter beans leave a
colour that’s more or less beautiful.
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The bean hierarchies, as with other food hierarchies discussed, reveal that Haitian
dietary aspirations cannot be reduced to price or to preferences for imported
foods, but are also complicated by long-standing social hierarchies and colour
prejudice.
3.6

Conclusion

Food choices often mark identity and legitimize social differences (Appadurai 1988;
Bourdieu 1984), and in Haiti this is entwined with common beliefs that “things made in
Haiti are inferior” and “what foreigners bring is always better,” as leaders of KPL and Tèt
Kole put it. The pervasive cultural preferences towards imported foods in Haiti, together
with the disdain for local peasant-produced foods, reflects a process that Mehta (2009,
118) describes as “culinary colonization,” whereby conflicting Caribbean and Western
cultural values warp food cultures in ways that tend to “inspire hatred” and “feelings of
shame for belonging to an ‘inferior’ culture.” In Haiti, there are strong associations
between elite and blan populations with imported foods, whereas many traditional foods
associated with the rural black peasantry are strongly and widely disparaged. Longstanding colour-coded class hierarchies continue to reinforce preferences for foreign
foods, and constitute a formidable problem for peasant movements. This illustrates that
food cultures can bear considerably on prospects for food sovereignty.
In Haiti, this research represents a call to action for peasant movements and food
justice advocacy, which must move food justice conversations beyond trade policies and
land reform, and find ways to address the fact that deep social inequalities and colour
prejudices also impede the prospect of reinvigorating local production. For international
aid workers and scholars in Haiti, the fact that persistent race-class hierarchies are
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intertwined with local food cultures in ways that perpetuate inequality demands action on
two counts. First, there must be greater efforts to support agricultural projects that
respond to peasant visions for agriculture and support traditional diets, and this must be
combined with careful investigation of how creditor and donor-led agricultural
programming is perceived on the ground (for example projects geared towards the
production of roots crops and pitimi might have to overcome considerable cultural
barriers). Second, this research demands recognition that the dietary choices of foreigners
and elite class groups can serve to perpetuate race-class hierarchies and undermine
peasant livelihoods. This presents opportunity for foreign organizations to support
peasant movements and peasant agriculture through dietary solidarity – a powerful tool
that must not be underestimated. Any prospect of valorizing local food in Haiti will
demand valorizing peasants themselves, and the key creditor and donor institutions have
a significant role to play here.
Beyond Haiti, this research calls on international food sovereignty movements
and scholars to explore how food cultures and dietary aspirations compound structural
political economic challenges and bear heavily on prospects for food sovereignty in other
contexts. Although the influence of Haiti’s race-class social hierarchies on the country’s
food culture may be extreme, strong cultural preferences for foreign foods are pervasive
in many parts of the world (Orlove 1997), from the Trinidadian penchant for Coca-Cola
(Miller 2005) to the consumption of KFC fast food in Beijing (Lozada 2005), and moving
towards the core goals of food sovereignty will most certainly demand attention to how
food cultures can exacerbate social inequality, along with strategies for confronting them
where they exist.
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4. Manufacturing Corporate Landscapes: The case of agrarian
displacement and food (in)security in Haiti
Abstract
This paper explores the historical and contemporary sources of food insecurity in Haiti.
It begins by detailing the impact of colonial legacies on the Caribbean region as a whole
and Haiti in particular. The adverse consequences associated with this period include,
deforestation, soil infertility and food import dependence. The paper then turns to more
contemporary trends, namely the influence of thirty years of neoliberal ideology. It
argues that the belief that Haiti can best achieve food security through the pursuit of
comparative advantage, a notion advanced and supported by powerful international and
domestic actors, has served to reinforce harmful historic trends. We support this
argument with recent fieldwork findings that highlight how the construction of a new
export processing zone (EPZ), following the 2010 earthquake, has generated troubling
environmental and food security concerns.
4.1

Introduction

Haiti is the most environmentally degraded and food insecure nation in the Western
Hemisphere (Shapouri 2010). Less than 1 percent of Haiti’s landscape is under dense
forest coverage, food imports account for 60 percent of total food consumption, and the
country’s Hunger Index is 11th worst in the world - the only country in the Western
Hemisphere with ‘alarming’ levels of hunger (IFPRI 2013; IFAD 2010). This paper
explores food insecurity and environmental decline in Haiti providing evidence for two
arguments. First, we contend that the subordination of domestic food security to agroexport production has had enormous environmental and social consequences, including
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deforestation, soil infertility and food import dependence. Second, we believe that the
renewed privileging of export manufacturing in the wake of the 2010 earthquake, a
project which is being advanced by powerful domestic and international actors (Haiti’s
merchant class, corporate actors, and select members of the NGO community), is
generating food systems that clash with the long-term food security interests of Haiti’s
poor.
There are sound reasons for spotlighting Haiti. While it is extremely food
insecure, and severely environmentally degraded (UNEP 2010), in some important ways
it is poised to adopt alternatives to corporate agriculture and market-driven food security,
and to engage with the current global food system on its own terms: fertilizer use is
among the lowest in the world (NAIP 2010), and the country has a longstanding and
persistent peasant class, relatively low land inequality (Mintz 1989; Zuvekas 1978) and
90 percent of farmers have access to land (Wiens and Sobrado 1998). This makes the
current drive to transform its natural and agrarian landscapes into corporate-industrial
ones worthy of close examination.
We begin by exploring briefly the ‘food security through trade’ paradigm, which
underpins the policy prescriptions of Haiti’s largest international creditors and donors.
We then zoom out to historicize Haiti’s food insecurity and environmental vulnerability
within a broader regional context. We argue that contemporary Caribbean food insecurity
is rooted foremost in Caribbean subordination within the capitalist system (Best and
Levitt 2009), manifest first in the colonial plantation system, and then through the
persistent subservience of Caribbean environments and people on the world scale. The
paper then provides an examination of how food insecurity and environmental conditions
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have fared since normative principles of neoliberalism began to take hold in the 1980s.
We conclude with a snapshot of the ‘food security through trade’ logic that currently
underpins the post-earthquake funding of international creditors and donors.
4.2

Islands of Neoliberalism: Haiti in the world’s outer-periphery

This paper proceeds from the premise that Haiti’s approach to food security is nestled
within a broader neo-liberal model of development. There is agreement among
officialdom that the development potential of the world’s post-colonial states hinges on
an ability to attract foreign investment.
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For instance, economist Dani Rodrik has

observed that, “Global integration has become, for all practical purposes, a substitute for
a development strategy” (Rodrik 2001, 55). Robert Wade concurs, arguing that the
prescribed route to economic development today amounts quite simply to “liberalization
and unmediated integration into the world economy, supplemented by domestic
institutional reforms to make deep integration viable” (Wade 2003, 630). In Haiti too,
post-earthquake recovery and the pursuit of development have been framed in terms of
continued integration into the world trading system.
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In Haiti, post-disaster reconstruction and development plans to boost foreign direct
investment are supported by a broad range of multi-lateral institutions: The Action Plan
for National Recovery and Development (APNRD) 2010, the cornerstone document that
guided both short- and long-term disaster response programming, was supported by the
World Bank (WB) and the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), the Post-Disaster
Needs Assessment 2010, the foundational analysis of the damages and losses incurred in
the earthquake was supported by the Government of Haiti (GoH), the World Bank (WB)
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations (UN), the European
Commission (EC,) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), and the National Agriculture Investment Plan 2011-2016 (NAIP) was created
with assistance from the IDB, WB, the U.S. State Department, the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), and was later edited to include results of the PDNA.
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This unwavering faith in export-led growth informs how Haiti’s creditors and
donors have pursued food security. The official understanding of food security is
described by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) as a
“situation when all people, at all times, have physical social and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for
an active and healthy life” (FAO 2001a). Self-sufficiency is not mentioned. Rather, this
widespread conception is outward-oriented drawing heavily on neoliberal principles such
as “keeping the markets free of government intervention, further liberalizing food and
agriculture, and increasing productivity through high-tech approaches (e.g., the adoption
of genetically modified seeds)” (Otero et al 2013, 269). The ensuing policy prescriptions
focus on generating income opportunities (so that people can buy imported or local food)
and adopting free trade policies, given that food imports are key to achieving food
security (Otero et al 2013, 268). As Otero et al. (2013) perceptively note, this prescription
not only alienates food security from self-sufficiency but it rests on the assumption that
achieving the former through the latter is “costly and inefficient” (Otero et al. 2013, 268).
In Haiti, the powerful domestic and foreign interests have converged to support this
approach to food security.
On another plane, Haiti’s approach to food security is conditioned by its place in
the world, or more specifically, its links to the global economy and its relations with
outsiders. The concept of ‘outer-periphery’, developed by Haiti scholar Robert Fatton, is
particularly useful for understanding how integration with the neoliberal global economy
has affected Haiti and its prickly and complex relations with international creditors and
donors. Drawing on the work of Immanuel Wallerstein and world-system’s analysis,
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Fatton argues that thirty years of neoliberalism have created a new zone in the world
system – the outer-periphery. Countries in this zone are extremely poor, politically
unstable, and thoroughly dependent on the international community. For decades, they
have been compelled to adopt neoliberal policies in order to secure loans, aid, foreign
investment, and debt relief.
These countries are positioned “at the extreme lower end of the production process
with wages that barely assure the biological reproduction of the individual worker, let
alone of his or her household” (Fatton 2014, 26). This leads to an important observation.
While outer-periphery zones are ‘open for business’, foreign capital is nevertheless
scarce. When foreign investment does arrive, it settles in discreet micro spaces within
these zones, for instance, industrial parks or mining operations. One could say that capital
is very confined, transitory, and sparse in its coverage (Fatton 2014, 28). Indeed, the last
section of our paper focuses on one such micro space - the newly built Caracol Industrial
Park (CIP) - where farmland has been transformed into an export-manufacturing facility.
In addition to these points, Fatton (2014) argues that what makes Haiti a
paradigmatic case of the outer-periphery is the almost total lack of control over its own
affairs. To be sure, the policies of all states in the Global South must conform to the
exigencies of transnational and global markets. However, the degree of dependence
exhibited by those in the ‘outer-periphery’ is profound. Fatton (2014) describes this zone
(and Haiti in particular) as “a de facto occupied territory under the surveillance of foreign
peacekeepers and under the control of international financial institutions and
nongovernmental organizations” (Fatton 2013, 14).
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4.3

Regional Context

The shared historical legacies and similar ecological features of Caribbean nations
crucially influence contemporary regional food security. Ecologically, Caribbean
susceptibility to hurricanes has meant flooding and wind destruction of crops has been a
persistent threat across the region, chronic lack of access to water has always been a huge
constraint, and thin levels of tropical topsoils are perilously vulnerable to exposure
(Thomas 1988). Before the Triangular Trade, these environmental restrictions were
largely mitigated. Indigenous Arawaks practiced cropping patterns known as ‘conuco,’ a
system of raising root crops that was not vulnerable to hurricanes and made very minimal
landscape modifications (Richardson 1992). The impetus for Caribbean food insecurity
and environmental degradation - the embodiment of Caribbean disenfranchisement as we
know it today - was colonial conquest. The globalization of Western capitalism, marked
first by the Columbian exchange, and manifest concretely through the plantation system,
utterly transformed Caribbean landscapes to fulfill the intensification of European
hegemony over the next four centuries (Mintz 1989).
From the start, the plantation system clashed harshly with Caribbean ecologies,
imposing tropical commodity production, principally sugar, on large estates, with
devastating environmental consequences (Best and Levitt 2009). The vast clearing of
virgin forests, along with the introduction of crops and livestock, were huge
environmental overhauls carried out to fulfill European ‘tastes of luxury’ (Bourdieu
1984). Massive deforestation in the 18th century, known as ‘the Great Clearing,’
represented “a sharp ecological discontinuity with the past” (Richardson 1992, 30). For
example, on the island of St. Croix, French colonizers burned the entire island of all
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forests and bush covering (Dirks 1987), and already by 1665 in Barbados only small
pockets of forest remained (Watts 1987). Soil infertility and the inability for forest
regeneration was exacerbated by the introduction of livestock: cattle, pigs, chickens,
goats, donkeys, and horses, which continue to destroy and consume the brush that would
otherwise develop in regenerative cycles, transforming large land areas to savannah
(Weis 2007; Murray 1984).
Various export crops were introduced to the islands, cotton, indigo, cacao, but
most important was King Sugar. Plantation sugar and environmental decline have always
gone hand in hand. Across the Caribbean, sugar plantations monopolized interior valleys
and coastal plains and led swiftly to soil exhaustion and increased vulnerability to pests
and disease, which were magnified by a capitalist drive that brought “every part of the
soil into use” (Franklin 1828, 14). Since low-lying areas were monopolized by sugar,
hillside agriculture was the only choice for slave subsistence plots (Sauer 1954), which
incited the beginning of a long history of unsustainable mountain agriculture, and
corresponding soil erosion.
By the mid-1700s, soil depletion in traditional sugar colonies was extensive and
was raising the cost of the colonial enterprise: the search for new territories to exploit
began (Thomas 1988). Cuban sugar gained momentum in the early 19th century (as a
direct result of the Haitian Revolution) and by the mid 1800s, West-Indian colonies were
economically anachronistic (Williams 1944). Soil exhaustion and the accompanying
declining importance of British colonies in the sugar trade motivated British preference
for free trade and abolition (Williams 1944). After four centuries, and the movement of
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4.6 million people from West Africa to the Caribbean, the economic inefficiencies of the
slavery-based plantation system led to emancipation.
The end of mercantilism and emergence of free trade spurred a reorganization of
agriculture, geared towards economies of scale. Yet, Caribbean agrarian landscapes were
still shaped largely by capricious foreign powers. For example: the 1874 British abolition
of sugar duties marked the beginning of the end of St. Vincent’s sugar industry, and the
transition to cotton as the primary agro-export, which massively propelled soil erosion
(Grossman 1998); in the early 1900s, the surge of Jamaican banana production was
driven by the British desire to prevent U.S. corporate monopoly of the banana industry
(Striffler 2003); and, also in the 1900s, Cuban and Dominican landscapes, monopolized
by the U.S. Boston Fruit Company for banana production, were overhauled and reverted
back to sugar production when American preference for banana production shifted
towards Central America (Richardson 1992).
Throughout the early 20th century and into the Fordist era, Caribbean
subordination continued, though by no means did it lose its status as an important
peripheral region. Weakening British hegemony and rising U.S. imperialism meant the
Caribbean became an economic appendage to the U.S, with significant agrarian
consequences. Mimicking U.S. agricultural objectives, Caribbean islands sought
economies of scale: large-scale American operated estates became widespread and small
agricultural holdings disappeared (Gumbs 1981). American capital transformed Puerto
Rico, Cuba and the Dominican Republic into huge sugar factories, sparking the collapse
of the small hacienda between 1873 and 1948, (Mintz 1989; Richardson 1992) and
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intensifying food insecurity. By the 1930s, “the systemic divorce of domestic output from
consumption became more accentuated than ever” (Thomas 1988, 40).
The precarious reliance on large-scale mono-crop export-oriented agriculture
became even more palpable during the Great Depression as markets for Caribbean
tropical commodities plummeted (Thomas 1988; Grosfoguel 1995). During the WWII
period, tropical commodity substitutes (like the sugar beet and high fructose corn syrup)
reinforced the redundancy of traditional tropical commodities, and Caribbean landscapes
experienced another wave of transformation. Traditional agro-export crops were
abandoned (an exception is Cuba, which remained the main supplier of sugar to the
Soviet Union until 1989), with some nations focusing on agro-production oriented toward
domestic need (Trinidad and Tobago, for example), though most focused on
industrialization, tourism and mining (Mintz 1989; Thomas 1988).
In 1945, the Moyne Report (also known as the Report of West India Royal
Commission) cautioned that if mono-cropping and soil depletion continued, ‘it [would]
be impossible for agricultural production to provide even the essentials of life for the
growing population.’ Chronic environmental neglect had led to huge biodiversity losses
and growing food import reliance, but agrarian decline worsened still in the 1950s and
1960s. As Caribbean nations gained independence, domestic governments adhered to the
hegemonic post-war logic that developing states should pursue industrialization and rely
on food imports (that would be paid for with profits from export manufacturing, mining
and tourism). Expansion in tourism and mining led to decreases in total farmland, (Levitt
1996) and never lived up to expectations in terms of national development.
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Throughout the 1970s, Caribbean industrialization was financed through World
Bank loans. Agriculture, though low on national agendas, replicated the intensive
American model embedded in the logic that food security could best be achieved through
modernization, including increasing agro-chemical use and mechanization. This locked
producers in an input treadmill that created dependence on agro-chemical manufacturers
34

and necessitated the agro-export orientation

that was worsening soil fertility: by 1985,

soil erosion was the most serious threat to loss of Caribbean agricultural land (Thomas
1988). In the same period, cheap food dumping from the US severely undermined prices
for domestic goods, displaced traditional diets (Araghi 2009; McMichael 2009;
Friedmann and McMichael 1989), and intensified food import dependence (Winders
2008) - an important foundation for contemporary food insecurity. As a percentage of
food imports, Caribbean imports of cereals increased from 6 percent in 1955-60, to 46
percent in 1965-1970, and then to 60 percent in 1971-1975 (Gumbs 1981).
The neoliberal restructuring of agriculture, which hinged on the implementation
of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), (Bernstein 2001) was a final blow to
Caribbean food systems. SAPs enforced state cut backs, market and trade liberalization,
land privatization, and currency devaluation, with the reasoning that increased export
revenues would service debt, that market liberalization would enable the cheaper
production and the global flows of goods, and that these would maximize productivity
and reduce poverty and food security (Teubal 2009). Instead, neoliberal globalization has
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Lappé et al (1977) demonstrate how imports, such as pesticides, create a need to focus
on export crop production to earn the foreign exchange to pay for them.
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entailed chronic declining terms of trade, depeasantization, greater rural poverty,
increased unemployment, and an inability to diversify economically or agriculturally
(Bello 2009). Across the region, food import dependence has worsened: from 19751989, food imports rose from 8 to 16 percent in Trinidad, from 11 to 40 percent in
Guyana, and from 21 to 36 percent in Haiti (Grosfoguel 1995). The Caribbean is now the
most food import dependent region in the world and most Caribbean nations have a food
deficit (Weis 2007). Haiti, for example, imports 60 percent of the food it needs, including
as much as 80 percent of the rice it consumes (IFAD 2010; FAOSTAT 2001a).
4.4

Historicizing Food Insecurity in Haiti

As noted, Haiti is the most environmentally degraded and food insecure nation in the
Western Hemisphere: only 1 percent of the nation is under dense forest coverage (IFPRI
2013; IFAD 2012), the daily per capita caloric deficit is 430 kcal, and 58 percent of the
population (87 percent of the rural population) is undernourished (FAOSTAT 2009; TaftMorales and Drummer 2007). Haiti is also the only country in the Western Hemisphere
with ‘alarming’ levels of hunger (IFPRI 2013). Given these statistics, it is worrisome that
current land appropriations for industrial purposes are eliminating farmland and
damaging environmental spaces. Yet, these contemporary land struggles have historical
roots. In the following section, we historicize food security and environmental decline in
Haiti. We argue that contemporary hunger and ecological fragility have evolved due to
the prolonged exploitation of Haiti’s rural landscapes and communities by foreign
powers, the Haitian state, and the country’s export-oriented elites, whose high lifestyles
are subsidized by the working masses.
In the 18th century, St. Domingue was the Jewel of the Antilles: “Its plains and
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valleys presented the most inviting scenes from the richness of the pastures and the
verdure with which they eternally abounded… and produce timber admirably adapted for
every useful or ornamental purpose. Nothing could exceed the extreme salubrity in the
whole country” (Franklin 1828, 14). But virgin forests were fast displaced by plantations.
By 1701, 35 sugar mills were already at work and deforestation of the vast part of the
Western half of Hispaniola (now Haiti) had “set in motion destabilizing ecological
processes that ultimately would lead to some of the most severe environmental problems
in the world” (Richardson 1992, 31). By the later half of the 18th century, French Saint
Domingue was the richest of all the sugar islands. But shortly after the Haitian
Revolution (1791-1804), Alexandre Pétion initiated a land redistribution program, and
since 1818 Haiti has been one of the only Caribbean nations to maintain a majority
peasant population, engaged in small-parcel poly-cropping traditions (Dash 2001).
Despite the domination of peasant agriculture, Haiti has never been a
predominantly subsistence economy (Alvarez and Murray 1981; Smith 2001): the Haitian
peasantry has always been “fully integrated into the Haitian economy, which itself [has
been] fully integrated into the larger capitalist world-economy” (Dupuy 1989, 103).
Throughout the 19th century, peasant food security, and socioeconomic mobility was
chronically undermined through the surplus extracting of profits from agro-exports,
principally coffee. Haitian peasants were crippled from the beginning: incapable of total
self-sufficiency in agriculture, since they relied on cash crops (coffee) to finance other
needs, yet simultaneously exploited through onerous coffee taxes (Trouillot 1990).
In the 20th century, small-scale agricultural production came under more direct
attack. Haiti was a geographical lynchpin for America to protect its control of Panama,

143

and U.S. necessity to control Haiti was the key incentive for dismantling French and
German hegemony in Haitian finance and politics (Trouillot 1990; Bellegarde-Smith
1984). To start, the U.S. quickly secured the Haitian market for its exports. Indeed,
Haitian consumption of U.S. products doubled between 1903 and 1911 (Plummer 1981) –
a point worth highlighting given the impact it would have on food-import dependence
later on. In 1915, under the pretence of protecting a failing state, the U.S. occupied Haiti
until 1935. During this time, U.S. influence over Haitian agriculture increased markedly.
For instance, Washington sponsored a re-writing of the Haitian constitution to enable
‘alien landownership’- a policy change that had huge ecological consequences. The
environmental harm that occurred during colonialism paled in comparison to this era: ‘the
greatest attack on the balance in the ecosystem happened under the American occupation
… under the policy of concentrating landownership’ (our translation, original in French)
(Michel 2005).
Before the occupation, forest coverage represented 60 percent of Haiti’s total land
area - forest coverage fell to 21 percent by 1945, and to 12 percent by 1954 (Béliard and
Norris 1996). High deforestation rates were largely due to various large-scale U.S.financed agricultural projects, which led to American control of 22 percent of cultivatable
land - over 120,000 hectares. They included: The Haitian American Sugar Company
HASCO (1910); the Haitian-American Development Corporation (1927), which
produced sisal in the North Department; and the Standard Fruit Company contract for
banana production in the Artibonite Valley (1937). The monopolization of land had a
huge “negative impact upon food production…the immediate impact upon the
peasantry…was scarcity of land and food” (Bellegarde-Smith 1984, 275). For instance,

144

SHADA (Société Haitiano-Americaine de Développement Agricole) (1941), a US$5
million U.S.-financed project geared to produce rubber, resulted in the clearing of
133,000 hectares of prime fertile land, including the felling of nearly a million fruit trees
and the forceful removal of 40,000 peasants from their land (Smith 2009; BellegardeSmith 1984).
In 1956, President Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) inherited an environment in severe
decline, a massive external debt (US$61 million), an economy based on declining
competitiveness of its main export, coffee (Trouillot 1990), and a burgeoning and
increasingly poor population - between 1930-1950, Haiti’s rural population grew by more
than a third (Trouillot 1990). But in almost every category, the Duvalier dictatorship
institutionalized these crises. The twin pillars of the Duvalier economic model were
manufacturing and agriculture, which were largely financed by loans from International
Financial Institutions (IFIs). But the regime was also financed by the persistent
exploitation and siphoning of resources from the peasantry. In his seminal work State
Against Nation, Trouillot chronicles how surplus extraction from the peasantry was
systematized under Duvalierism (Trouillot 1990). Taxes on coffee, for example rose from
16 percent in 1953 to 27 percent in 1957, and taxes on household essentials like flour,
petroleum, and sugar, accounted for 25 percent of government revenue in 1985 (Trouillot
1990; Hooper 1987). While meager peasant cash resources were being siphoned off by
the state, US aid (from 1954-1984) encouraged small peasants to produce cash rather than
subsistence crops, which undermined subsistence security.
In manufacturing, Francois Duvalier promoted Haiti as a corporate paradise of
docile labour, low wages, and non-existent taxes. In the 1950s, Haiti’s first sub-
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contracting firms were U.S. enterprises. In the end however, U.S. and Haitian bourgeois
skepticism of Duvalier restricted investment, and growth in manufacturing was slow.
When Duvalier died (1971), his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier took over with the goal of
luring more US firms to Haiti. U.S.-financed manufacturing in Haiti soared: by 1972
there were 150 (mostly U.S.) firms in Haiti, centered in Port-au-Prince. That number
nearly doubled by 1977 (McGowan 1997). By the end of the 1970s, the net value of
exports in assembly industries was increasing by 10 percent a year and in the 1980s Haiti
was “ninth in the world in the assembly of U.S. goods for consumption” (McGowan
1997, 6).
But the assembly industry never provided the economic uplift that was anticipated,
producing only 40,000-60,000 jobs (Rogozinski 2000). Moreover, wages were so low
they failed to create a domestic market that could spark growth in other sectors of the
economy (Dupuy 2012). Still, the prospect of urban jobs ignited a rural exodus. The news
of urban work hit impoverished rural communities just as tropical commodities prices
were declining on the world market and burgeoning rural populations were putting
pressure on familial lands and resources. Port-au-Prince grew from a city of 15,000
people in 1950 to 732,000 in the early 1980s and boudainvilles on steep hillsides
mushroomed.
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Urban overpopulation, motivated by exploitation and poverty of the peasantry, was the
impetus for the massive slumification of Port-au-Prince in the 21st century. By the time of
the 2010 earthquake, 80 percent of the people in Port-au-Prince resided on 20 percent of
the land (Etienne 2012). The exploitation and neglect of Haiti’s poor classes (both rural
and urban) were embodied in these urban slums, and culminated in the earthquake’s
tragic death toll - over 220,000.

146

At the same time, peasant food security was being squeezed from pressures at
multiple scales: predatory section chiefs expropriated peasant land (Dash 2001); the
siphoning of peasant surplus left peasants ill-equipped to purchase market staples; and
declining terms of trade made cash crops unviable. Those still maintaining a meager
existence based on agriculture received another major setback when a hurricane in 1980
destroyed 60 percent of the coffee crop, increasing reliance on food aid. By 1981,
imported food accounted for 23 percent of national consumption (Girault 1984). Haitian
food security was dealt a final blow when the Kreyòl Pig population was destroyed, an
act that Smith compares to the Great Stock Market Crash (Smith 2001). The Kreyòl Pig
was a virtual savings account for peasant families: they fattened up on kitchen scraps, by
scavenging, and were a basis of financing children’s school fees. In 1979, pigs infected
with African Swine Fever were found in the Artibonite Valley and though the disease
was far from widespread, the Organization of American States (OAS) sponsored a
massive eradication program - 1.3 million pigs were killed between 1981-1984 (Smith
2001). The eradication of Kreyòl pigs changed diets, but it also increased dependency on
American imports, and heightened deforestation, as peasants turned to charcoal
production for cash income (Smith 2001).
By the mid-1980s, Haiti’s food situation was bleak: over reliance on coffee and
declining world coffee prices eliminated possibilities of making even a meager cash
income; and stagnant agrarian production caused major food-price increases - the average
price of food more than doubled between 1975 and 1985 (Trouillot 1990). The decreased
subsistence threshold led to declining food security, including food shortages in many
regions. In 1984, the first protests against Jean-Claude Duvalier’s regime were food riots.
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Duvalier fled Haiti in 1986.
While it would be difficult to overstate the contribution of Duvalierism to agrarian
decline and contemporary food insecurity in Haiti, in some important ways environments
and food systems were marginally preserved under the Duvaliers. Indeed, interviewees in
the Artibonite Valley were nostalgic for the tree coverage and diverse wildlife the area
boasted until 1986. Duvalier’s section chiefs were ruthless, but part of this brutality was
directed against those who felled trees without permission. Under the Duvalier
dictatorship local section chiefs enforced strict rules against free grazing, preventing the
disastrous environmental consequences of free-roaming goats. Additionally, Duvalier
refused to reduce tariffs on imported goods, largely protecting domestic markets and
peasant producers from the competition of lower priced imports. This is not to suggest
that the Haitian peasantry was subsistence-based under Duvalier (in the 1980s, for
example, food imports accounted for 19 percent of the country’s food needs (Dupuy
2012), but there has certainly been qualitative deterioration of the subsistence threshold
since 1986.
4.5

Haiti in the Neoliberal World Order

In the post-Duvalier period (1991 forward), we see the persistence and intensification of
earlier trends related to food security. The logic of pursuing food security through trade
continues to guide policy and the country’s reliance on food imports persists – causing
food riots in 2008 when world food prices spiked due to the financial crisis. Serious
consideration for how economic development plans could affect the natural environment
is still lacking.
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The election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 ended 29 years of dictatorship, but
the country faced an arduous journey forward – particularly on the economic front.
Because of its enormous external debt obligations, the government was once again forced
to accept loan packages from the IMF and the World Bank conditioned on the acceptance
of structural adjustment. As noted earlier, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) seek
to make a country’s exports more competitive on world markets by removing tariffs on
imports, taxes on exports and barriers to foreign investment. The government was also
forced to cut its spending and privatize state-owned enterprises. These policies made it
almost impossible for the Aristide administration to carry out his pro-poor agenda to tax
the wealthy and increase domestic food security (though early intervention resulted in
declines in food prices and malnutrition) (Podur 2012). Instead SAPs enforced a policy
set that liberalized agriculture and removed subsidies that benefited the sector. Although
Aristide’s 1990 policy agenda (which remained later in 1994) had a strong rural
component, the substantial and consistent financial support that an integrated approach to
rural development would have required clashed with the structural adjustment policies
creditors believed were indispensible (Dupuy 2012).
The general point to take away from this period (1990-2010) is that the
ascendancy of the neoliberal model of market-led development undermined the country’s
agricultural sector (Dupuy 2007). Adherence to structural adjustment conditionality
during the 1980s and 1990s forced the government to cut what few subsidies there were
to staple foods, agricultural credit, fertilizer, and water and to remove tariffs, fully
exposing Haiti’s food markets to global production. This reduction in support to farmers
led to a sharp drop in agricultural exports while free trade policies encouraged a massive
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surge in cheaper subsidized food imports from the US. Food imports increased from
about US$80 million per year during the mid-1980s to the early 1990s to more than
US$350 million by 2007 (Damais 2008). It is not surprising that, against this
unfavourable background, many farmers were forced off the land.

4.6

Post Earthquake: Manufacturing trump’s machèt

36

Post-disaster development plans have barely diverged from past formulas. Indeed,
although many viewed the earthquake as a potential ‘game changer’, the thinking on food
security – that it should be realized through trade - has remained remarkably unaffected
(Shamsie 2012). More resources have been directed to agriculture, by both the
government and international donors, but the priority has been to support agricultural
exports rather than self-sufficiency. For instance, Haiti’s Ministry of Agriculture
(MARNDR), USAID, the IDB and the private sector prioritize export-oriented mango
production, and the Haitian National Agricultural Plan NAIP (2010) suggests mango
exports constitute a huge potential source of capital for domestic exporters. And yet, from
a food security perspective, peasants view fruit trees as extremely risky: high dependence
on external markets jeopardizes local food security, and the actual economic gains from
agro-export sales for peasants are usually meager (Murray 1984).
Alongside agro-export promotion, international creditor and donor institutions
and the Haitian state are placing more faith and resources into the export-manufacturing
sector. This post-earthquake statement by the influential Rand Corporation reflects their
thinking.

36

A machét (machete) remains an important agricultural tool in rural Haiti.
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Some of Haiti’s best prospects for growth are to attract foreign and domestic
investment to the garment industry. Haiti has too many people engaged in
agriculture. The country is heavily populated, and more land is cultivated than is
ecologically sustainable. In contrast, labor-intensive industries, such as garment
manufacturing, provide an attractive source of jobs and income, especially given
Haiti’s competitive, low-cost labor force (Crane et al, 84 cited in Fatton 2011,
175).
As the statement asserts, the export-manufacturing model of development, supported by
US trade preferences, is still viewed as the most likely vehicle for improving living
standards and, consequently, food security. Indeed, immediately after the earthquake, the
US Congress passed a new preferential trade agreement for Haiti. The Haiti Economic
Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 extended the trade benefits of the 2006 Haitian
Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act, which was
the first trade preference mechanism Washington devised to boost Haiti’s apparel
exports. Though HOPE proved unremarkable, the 2010 HELP Act extended the trade
benefits until 2020, increased tariff preference levels, and expanded duty-free treatment
to additional textile and apparel products. Because HELP’s trade benefits are better than
those granted to its regional competitors, the Government of Haiti (GoH), international
creditors and donors expect Haiti to become an even more appealing offshore export
platform to the US market (Shamsie 2010). This explains why the post-earthquake plan to
build an industrial park in Haiti’s North East region received such strong support from
creditor and donor institutions. Quite simply, for those who subscribe to the ‘food
security through trade’ approach, the industrial park will create jobs, providing workers
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with food security through their wages. What is absent from this line of logic is that the
displacement of peasants as a result of the construction of an industrial park is likely to
produce a surplus population that puts a downward pressure on wages (Shamsie 2010).
This should be of concern since decreasing the purchasing power of workers would
inevitably make them less food secure.
4.7

The CIP: Land appropriations for industrial purposes

The peasant gardens surrounding Caracol, a community whose 15,000 inhabitants rely on
fishing, agriculture and salt making, were chosen by the government of Haiti as the site
for the new 246-acre Caracol Industrial Park (CIP). The CIP is a US$300 million project
jointly funded by the IDB (initially providing US$105 million and recently promising an
additional US$40.5 million), the U.S. State Department (US$124 million), the Clinton
Foundation, and the Korean apparel manufacturer Sae-A Trading Co. Ltd. (US$78
million). In addition, USAID has allocated US$268 million to build a power plant and a
deep-water port to support the CIP (GAO 2013). But alongside capital, the CIP required
land, so the government forcefully evicted over 400 peasants from 251 hectares of
agricultural land.
The site chosen for the CIP reveals how rural food security is being undermined
through land conversions associated with pushes to deepen and extend export
manufacturing in this post-earthquake period. Our research, conducted between January
and July 2012, is based on focus groups with: peasant groups, smallholders who were
evicted from their land to make room for the Caracol Industrial Park, community leaders,
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workers in the Caracol Industrial Park, and local government leaders ; and semistructured qualitative in-depth interviews with peasant leaders, municipal officials, and
leaders of civil society organizations. Interviewees were purposively sampled. Interviews
were coded and analysis led to the emergence of key themes. In this paper we highlight
the themes of environment and food security.
Community responses to the CIP highlight the links between the project and local
food security. In fact, one of the strongest themes that emerged during content analysis
was the expression of land appropriation as an abuse to peasant autonomy, food security
and well-being. Respondents consistently lamented that fertile land, which had been
passed down for generations, had been seized, making comments like:

•

“Where the CIP is, that’s the most fertile land, the best land in Caracol”
(Priest);

•

“This land had all sorts of fruits and there were plantains, corn, and sugarcane…that was how everyone lived” (CASEC);

•

“It gives the country food” (CASEC).

Another peasant said: “I’m 65, for me, at my age… my land had mangoes, chadek (a
cross between a grapefruit and an orange), I had 37 trees of bwa chenn (a hardwood tree).
Now I’ve lost it all.” Since they were displaced “the peasants are saying they can’t feed
their kids or send them to school” (CASEC). The Interim Mayor expressed: “we are
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Local government in Haiti comprises a CASEC (Conseil d’Administration de Section
Communale, CASEC), which is a Municipal District Governing Board and an (Assembles
des Sections Communales, ASEC), which is a Municipal District Assembly.
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already starting to lack food” (Interim Mayor): “There has been increased hunger in the
area because of the park” (CASEC).
Respondents also expressed concerns about the CIP’s environmental impact as
well as how environmental damage could impact their food supply (mainly fish). The
industrial plant is located in the middle of the Trou du Nord watershed, which empties
into Caracol Bay, a fragile and ecologically important marine ecosystem. Caracol Bay,
located 5 kilometers from the CIP, is part of the Caribbean Biological Corridor (CBC)- a
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and European Commission supported
framework established in 2009 and aimed at protecting ecological systems and reducing
biodiversity losses in areas in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba. The Bay is also
first on the list to be included in the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP) that was
initiated by the UN Development Program and Haitian Ministry of the Environment
(MOE) in 2010. The bay is home to one of Haiti’s last remaining mangrove forests and
coral reefs, which are valued at US$109,733,000 annually (OAS/IABIN 2009), and
provides habitat for multiple species that support the local fishing industry (including
lobster, prawn, pike, and mollusks).
In a 2011 environmental impact assessment, U.S. consulting firm Koios found that
the CIP “will affect critical natural habitats” and poses “significant adverse
environmental impacts” to Caracol Bay (Koios 2011, 126). Wastewater drainage from the
CIP has been identified as one of the most serious threats to the Bay. For example, the
textile industry requires vast amounts of water for dying and manufacturing, which
creates significant wastewaters requiring multiple treatments (HGW 2011). Although the
IDB has committed to financing wastewater treatment facilities, there is skepticism that
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this will adequately ameliorate the environmental consequences of wastewater drainage
into Caracol Bay. For example, Findley and Côté (2011) suggest that the increased runoff
and drainage from power plant operations will unavoidably cause soil and water
pollution. Furthermore, the Koios report suggests that whether or not the water is treated
other threats related to the industrial park put ecosystems at risk. For example, when the
water used to cool the CIP electrical plant leaves the building it is hot and unless it is
cooled to less than 3 degrees Celsius, it is likely to have negative ecological
consequences.
Alongside direct consequences of drainage from the CIP, the expected influx of
between 100,000-400,000 people to Caracol will also magnify pressure on the Trou de
Nord watershed and Caracol Bay. In a landscape that lacks landfills and sewage treatment
plants, increased solid sewage and trash waste, if not properly managed, will threaten
downstream marine and mangrove ecosystems (Findley and Côté 2011). In addition, the
vegetative clearing that has fostered wastewater drainage, as well as potential poor
disposal of toxic waste and petroleum products, may hamper normal vegetation growth,
and increase soil erosion and sedimentation in the watershed and Caracol Bay (Findley
and Côté 2011).
Though it is theoretically possible to diminish the environmental costs of the CIP
(Koios 2011), the costs are onerous. Haiti Grassroots Watch argues that sufficient
environmental assessments and environmental mitigation efforts would cost US$54.5
million, and since Sae-A Trading is exempt from paying taxes for the first 15 years of
operation, extracting sufficient tax revenues to fund environmental management seems
doubtful (HGW 2011). This has led to concern that the formidable financial cost of
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environmental protection will entail their neglect (HGW 2011). It is worth pointing out
that the Koios consultants concluded that to avoid impacts on sensitive environments like
the Caracol Bay, another site would be a better solution, but the CIP is now in operation
(Koios 2011).
Interviewees voiced their environmental concerns, often connecting them to the
harsher erosion of food security. The Catholic Priest said: “The industrial Park has a paint
company, and a textile company, they produce waste. The paint waste is running into the
water table, which feeds into the ocean and is killing all the fish.” Community members
agreed: “the industrial park is making huge amounts of waste and dumping it into the
water. It is pushing the fish further from the shore and threatening the fishers”
(Community Leader). Peasant producers and labourers in the CIP also expressed
nervousness for the environment: ‘We doubt they are treating the waste before they dump
it in the ocean’ (Peasant): “We think the waste goes into the sea” (Worker); “Now there
are no fish in the sea” (Worker). The Interim Mayor expressed the urgent need for
environmental protection:
With the environmental damage from the park we have to include some kind of
protection here…we have to have a means to protect the environment. I asked
them about the ocean’s ecosystem – the waste is toxic – if it is dumped in the
ocean won’t it kill the fish? Won’t it harm the people? And that is the biggest
livelihood for people – fishing. So if you throw waste in the ocean people will
lose their livelihoods.
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But in the same breath the Mayor expressed feelings of powerlessness: “But, we don’t
have any role in decisions about how companies manage the land or the natural
resources” (Interim Mayor).
4.8

Conclusion

Haiti’s ecological inheritance and food insecurity are the result of a centuries old
preoccupation with export-expansion (in agriculture and since the 1970s, in
manufacturing). Associated with this export orientation is a commitment to the pursuit of
comparative advantage and a faith in its ability to provide sufficient revenue gains from
exports to produce food security. We believe this approach to be misguided. Abandoning
the goal of self-sufficiency, as suggested by international creditors, is a risky proposition
– particularly in an era of unpredictable and volatile price fluctuations in food (Clapp
2009). Given the extreme vulnerability of Haiti’s poor, and that unexpected price hikes
harm lower-income groups most, a maximum degree of self-sufficiency should be the
goal (Otero et al., 276).
On a related note, the lack of attention to trade policy reform by the multilateral
development finance agencies and their bilateral allies the players Easterly (2009) has
aptly called the ‘aid cartel’ – is problematic, particularly given their unequivocal
commitment to food security. The absence of references to trade in post-earthquake
policy documents indicates a continued belief in the benefits of full trade liberalization
(Shamsie 2010). Despite the admission by United Nations Special Envoy to Haiti, Bill
Clinton, that US trade policy during the 1990s gravely undermined rural livelihoods,
creditor and donor institutions have little to say about how this policy set might be reshaped. This is difficult to understand given that trade liberalization, and the resulting
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decreases in national production have intensified the country’s dependency and its
vulnerability to speculation, supply disruptions, and food price fluctuations (Rights and
Democracy 2008). If there was evidence that food imports did not adversely affect Haiti’s
marginalized masses, one could be more generous regarding these obstructions. This,
though, is clearly not the case.
The growing disparity between rich and poor worldwide and the prevailing political
environment (neoliberal precepts) would seem to offer little hope for change. And yet,
the persistent disjuncture between the intents and outcomes of the current ‘food security
through trade’ paradigm might be shaking things up. Otero et al. (2013) note that some
creditor and donor institutions are questioning this approach to food security. The
Netherlands, for instance, has acknowledged that trade liberalization “benefited countries
competitive in the export market, but discouraged farmers where agriculture was not
competitive. They now rely even more on food imports than before and are more
susceptible to food price increases on the global market” (POED, 7 cited in Otero et al
2013, 285). Still, words must be accompanied by deeds. Donor policies need to support
small-scale farmers that produce for local markets, ensure they can remain on the land
and enhance their livelihoods. Trade rules in agriculture require major reform. Policy
sovereignty must be respected, particularly when it concerns those countries trapped on
the outer periphery. Haiti and its local communities must be allowed to determine and
carry out their own approach to food security, free from the dictates of external agencies.
At the same time, an important part of the food security puzzle is domestic in
nature. It requires political action aimed at dismantling authoritarian orders and
entrenched social hierarchies within Haiti. Moreover, past experience has shown that the
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poor are more likely to be treated equitably when they manage to organize themselves
into a powerful political movement. It is, therefore, significant that Haiti’s peasant
producers are well organized. They are asking for access to land, and autonomy over
what they produce and what they consume, which includes calls for lower food import
dependence. They are calling for ‘food sovereignty,’ a concept that entails not only
access to adequate food, but is also the recognition of the socio-political dimensions of
food and food systems, to give people control over what they consume and produce, and
to democratize the food system (Patel 2009). Indeed, it is a concept that resonated
strongly with the ideas articulated by the peasant producers we spoke with in the Caracol
area.
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5. Peasant balances, Neoliberalism, and the Stunted Growth of NonTraditional Agro-Exports in Haiti
Abstract
This paper examines divergent peasant responses to the various models of export mango
production that have been promoted in post-earthquake Haiti. These responses range
from outright rejection on one side to hesitant participation in new marketing
arrangements along with increased production on the other, and a spectrum in between.
The field research that forms the empirical basis of this paper was conducted between
November 2010 and July 2013 and included: qualitative interviews with leaders of
peasant organizations, Haitian advocacy and community organizations, and officials in
the Haitian government and in multilateral institutions; focus groups with peasant
farmers; and extensive participant observation. Our analysis of peasant responses to the
promotion of mango exporting is informed by a Chayanovian framework, and focuses on
the dynamic tension in peasant-capital relations and how this is simultaneously
influencing both peasant production and the ways that capital is attempting to organize
production.
While critical agrarian studies tends to focus more on the ways that capital
shapes conditions facing peasant producers, and how peasants resist or are transformed
into petty commodity producers, there has been much less attention to the ways that
peasant land use decision-making and marketing strategies can restrict how capital
operates and limit its pursuit of growth and accumulation. This paper argues that
peasants are seeking to balance a range of considerations that do not align with the
ambitions of the country’s political and economic elites, serving to limit the agro-export
expansion in Haiti, which in turn highlights some of the ways that peasant producers can
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push back against exploitative arrangements and maintain a degree of autonomy over
their cropping systems.
5.1 Introduction: The stunted growth of mango exporting in Haiti
As in many developing countries, neoliberal policy restructuring in Haiti has
compounded many of the historic burdens facing peasant farmers and served to make
their production and reproduction increasingly difficult.

38

The core aspects of this

include: trade liberalization, which enabled cheap food imports to flood domestic markets
and undermine prices; austerity, which cut the already meager agricultural supports to
peasants; and a focus on export-led growth, which for roughly three decades has been the
overwhelming priority for all agricultural investment from the state, foreign creditors and
donors, and NGOs. It is widely recognized that structural adjustment pushed both
traditional and ‘non-traditional’ agro-export growth in many countries with detrimental
effects, deflating earnings and export capacities for various countries seeking to expand
production of tropical agricultural commodities (Weis 2007; Robbins 2003; Thrupp
1998).

38

Throughout the paper we use the term ‘peasant’ principally because peyizan [peasant]
is how Haitians refer to smallholder farmers, and it is how producers self-identify,
including within representative organizations. In these organizations, and in Haitian civil
society more generally, peasants are understood as rural dwellers who provide for
themselves and their families by working the land, raising animals, or doing artisanal
work and who also sell their products and purchases items to fulfill household needs.
Although scholarly debates around the complexities and contradictions of what
constitutes a ‘peasant’ (Edelman 2013; Bernstein 2001; Shanin 1973; Wolf 1966) and the
particular dynamics and characteristics of Caribbean peasantries (Beckford 1985; Mintz
1989; 1985; Horowitz 1971) are beyond the scope of this paper, we recognize the term
‘peasant’ to include a wide variety of heterogeneous social groups, and agree with
scholars who conceptualize the peasantry as a process (Shanin 1973), peasant agriculture
as shifting activity (Ploeg 2009), and peasant producers as groups engaged in
pluriactivity and who are often partially engaged in markets (Kay 2008).
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From the colonial period into the 20th century Haiti’s agro-exports were
dominated by a few crops, mainly coffee and sugar. However, unlike most of Latin
America and the Caribbean, few large-holdings survived the colonial period, and instead
a patchwork of small farms prevails over most of the Haitian landscape. The land tenure
system in Haiti is extremely complex, as peasant holdings have been historically
subdivided among family members over many generations, resulting in a system where
many farmers possess multiple small fragments of land. Making matters more
complicated still, there has never been a national land registry and most peasants have no
formal title to land (Smucker 2000; Wiens and Sobrado 1998; Trouillot 1990; Zuvekas
1978).
As elsewhere, the onset of structural adjustment in 1986 in Haiti called for an
increased focus on non-traditional crops to foster agro-export growth. The primary source
of non-traditional export growth in Haiti was mangos, which first emerged as a minor
export crop in the 1970s and skyrocketed in the late 1980s, dominated by a single variety,
Mango Fransique. Yet while mangos remain Haiti’s leading agro-export by value, the
annual volume of Haiti’s mango exports has been roughly stagnant since the initial export
boom, fluctuating but never achieving the volume of 1991 (see Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Haiti's Mango Exports by Volume (000 MT)
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The initial boom in mango exporting reflected the fact that many peasants were
willing to participate in mango production and exporting to an extent, selling the product
of already established trees to exporters. At a basic level, the stagnation since the initial
boom in the 1980s reflects the fact that peasants have been unwilling to fundamentally
reorganize their cropping patterns to favour mangoes, as further growth would have
demanded. Another complicating factor has been the surge of mango exporting to US
markets, where Haitian exports are mainly oriented, by a few other countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. This competition is central to the dominant narrative put
forth by various government bodies, creditors and donor institutions, and merchant elites
in Haiti, which focuses blame for Haiti’s stunted export growth on the failure to scale-up
production in cost-efficient orchards. The vast majority of mango production in Haiti
occurs on peasant farms of 1 hectare of land or smaller, with mango trees planted at low
densities within poly-cropped systems, and there are only a handful of commercial
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mango plantations in the country (the largest of which is only about 160 acres). This
stands in marked contrast to the large modern orchards in countries such as Brazil and
Mexico, and relates to disparities in infrastructure such as irrigation, transportation, and
processing plants that affects all stages from production to packing to shipping (IDB
2013f; Pierreval 2012; Lundahl 2004; Abbott 1995).
The US has always been the primary destination for Haiti’s mango exports,
though in the past decade Haitian exports have also been increasingly oriented towards
Europe (FTF 2011). One of the clearest reflections that Haiti has failed to capitalize on
possible growth can be seen in the fact that its mango exports have stagnated over
precisely the same time that US mango imports have soared, as evident in Figure 11.
Whereas Haiti supplied roughly 50 percent of US mango imports in the late 1980s, this
had fallen to 16 percent by 2005 and a mere 4 percent of by 2013 (Hyppolite 2013;
Smucker et al. 2005). Yet while the superior cost-efficiencies of large modern orchards
elsewhere are undoubtedly a powerful force shaping the competition for markets in the
US and other industrialized countries, there continues to be a strong belief among the
government, influential development organizations (many of them dominated by
multilateral assistance), and agro-exporting interests (principally the country’s merchant
elites) that Haiti’s agricultural sector can and should be reorganized to increase mango
production and exports.
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Figure 11: US Mango Imports by Volume (000 MT)
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The belief that there continues to be considerable unrealized potential for export
growth has been a central part of the reconstruction and development planning for the
agricultural sector that has followed the disastrous earthquake that hit in 2010. Indeed,
the post-earthquake outpouring of development assistance can be largely seen as a
reinvigoration of the decades-old neoliberal prescription for agrarian restructuring, with
mangos again targeted as a key crop for agro-export growth. While Haiti obviously does
not have the scale or infrastructure of countries like Brazil and Mexico, it is understood to
have one decided competitive advantage: cheap labour, a product of the fact that it is by
far the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. For those interests seeking to foster
export growth, Haiti would be much better poised to leverage this cheap labour advantage
if either peasants could be convinced to plant mango trees in greater densities or else if
smallholdings could be consolidated in order to expand orchard-style production on
larger estates.
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This research sought to explore the relations between peasant farmers and the
various actors pushing to expand the scale of mango production and exporting in Haiti,
which are marked by increasing tensions and conflicts, including violent land seizures.
The discussion starts by introducing the core concerns of a Chayanovian approach and its
value in the Haitian context. Attention then turns to an examination of the constellation of
forces that have been propelling mango export growth in Haiti for some time and the key
strategies for accomplishing this. The empirical analysis focuses on the dynamic
relationships between capital and peasant producers, in particular how peasants are
actively resisting various attempts to expand mango production and struggling to
maintain a degree of autonomy over their cropping systems. The core argument is that
peasants are primarily concerned with achieving certain balances that are antithetical to
orchard-style production, and as a result they are actively constraining the class forces to
expand mango exports. This, in turn, highlights some of the ways that peasant producers
can push back against exploitative arrangements that would integrate them further into
global markets.
5.2 Exploring Peasant Balances
Neoliberal restructuring in agriculture has repeatedly paved the way towards highly
centralized and externally controlled food chains that have re-organized land and labour
relations, spurring both large-scale capitalist farming and contract relations with
smallholders (Watts 2009; Kay 2008; Bernstein 2005; Wiggins 2000), which obviously
poses different threats to smallholders. Whereas the expansion of large-scale capitalist
farms often leads to complete dispossession, the expansion of contract relations can
reduce smallholder autonomy, sometimes with highly exploitative terms but not always
in entirely negative ways. In some instances, peasants can gain certain advantages from
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the expansion of agro-export production, making use of new markets and supply
networks to increase earnings (Ploeg 2013, Bernstein 2010, Watts 2009, Kay 2008). In
short, the expansion of capitalist relations in agriculture is complex and dynamic, and
peasant responses to this expansion can vary and shift over time.
A Chayanovian approach helps to understand peasant responses to expanding
capitalist relations in agriculture. From this perspective, peasants are fundamentally
guided by goals of sufficiency and stability, prioritizing a spectrum of household needs
and seeking to optimize production accordingly, rather than simply trying to maximize
production and profit (Ploeg 2013; Bryceson 2000; Shanin 1986; Chayanov 1966). A
basic assumption is that peasant household decision-making includes (though is not
entirely dependent upon) an economic calculus, weighing a wider range of material and
non-material considerations on an ongoing basis. One of Chayanov’s (1966) core
arguments was that peasant decision-making is fundamentally motivated by a desire to
balance household consumption and labour outputs, in the belief that peasant producers
will tend to increase the overall labour expenditure and intensity of farming in order to
fulfill household consumption needs, but once these needs are met the utility of additional
labour goes down and is instead viewed in a more negative light, as drudgery. This
implies that peasant decisions are based on varying assessments of the specific contexts
and resources of individual households and involve the negotiation of balances that
include but are much broader than market incentives (Ploeg 2013; Thorner 1986).
Ploeg (2013) highlights and extends the modern utility of the Chayanovian
approach, suggesting that the advance of capitalist relations in agriculture everywhere
means that contemporary peasants juggle a much broader array of balances than in the
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past. At the core of this are: the social and natural realms of life; production and
reproduction; internal and external resource sources; the scale and intensity of farming;
and autonomy and dependence. In many instances, peasants navigate these balances in
order to maximize their autonomy and limit or diversify their dependency on markets.
Two key ways this can be accomplished are by increasing self-provisioning of food and
shifting towards low-input farming methods (Ploeg 2010; Holt-Giménez 2006). Another
key tenet in a Chayanovian approach is that peasant responses to the expansion of
capitalist relations in agriculture are not only heterogeneous but are regularly shifting in
response to changing external conditions. For instance, peasants assess various incentives
provided by purchasers, agro-input suppliers, NGOs, and the state, and resist some while
accepting others based on how they relate to household balances. Here, it is also
important to understand that capital likewise shifts in order to find new mechanisms for
accumulation and peasant cooptation, establishing continuously changing relations (Ploeg
2013). The capacity of peasants to shift their production decisions has the potential to
both enhance their ability to cope with unfavourable market conditions and to fortify their
ability to resist as a class (Araghi 2009; Chayanov 1966).
A Chayanovian approach is well suited to Haiti, as there has been a remarkable
persistence of very smallholdings and a stilted, complex expansion of capitalist relations
in agriculture. In stark contrast to the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean, large
capitalist farmers are extremely rare in Haiti while small peasant farmers still possess the
vast majority of all agricultural land, having long encountered exploitative relationships
with merchants while maintaining varying degrees of market orientation. Attention to the
balances that peasants pursue sheds insights into their responses to the concerted efforts
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to expand export-oriented mango production, and how they have constrained the growth
sought by Haitian elites.
But before the contemporary dynamics and struggles mango exporting can be
explored, they must first be set in a longer-term policy context.
5.3

The Forces Propelling Mango Export Growth

5.3.1

From Baby Doc to Structural Adjustment

Haiti’s mango exports first began to rise during the Jean-Claude Duvalier (‘Baby Doc’)
dictatorship (1971-1985), increasing from roughly 3000 to 6000 MT between 1980 and
1985 (see Figure 12). The growth in mango exporting was somewhat anomalous, as
agricultural production was largely neglected under Baby Doc and continued a long-term
decline while the light-manufacturing sector – which had been promoted as the most
promising vector of development in the 1970s and 1980s – experienced only modest
growth. During this period, U.S. development assistance and various forms of lending to
the Haitian government were linked to Baby Doc’s commitment to ensuring a friendly
investment climate for U.S. companies pursuing light-manufacturing, which included
suppressing minimum wage levels and labour unions and removing barriers to the
repatriation of profits (Hallward 2007; McGowan 1997). However, partly because
exports from the light-manufacturing sector never grew to the extent that was anticipated,
Haiti’s annual trade deficit climbed from US$12.4 million in 1970 to US$183 million in
1980 (Trouillot 1990). This chronic trade deficit was a major factor in the steady rise of
Haiti’s national debt, from just over US$50 million in the early 1970s to over US$300
million in 1980 – double the rate of external debt growth in Latin America (McGowan
1997).
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By the early 1980s, Haiti had one of the lowest per capita GDPs in the world,
around US$300, and the reality for most was even worse since 1 percent of the
population controlled 45 percent of the GDP while the state forcibly protected their
interests (Trouillot 1990; Haggerty 1989). Eventually, the combination of economic
inequality and political repression led to rising popular resistance to Baby Doc, which
succeeded in toppling him in 1985. Following this, the US created the National
Governing Council to rule Haiti, controlled by the Haitian army, which promptly turned
to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American
Development Bank for a series of loans that brought the standard package of policy
reforms known as structural adjustment (Podur 2012; Weisbrot 1997).
5.3.2

From Structural Adjustment to the 2010 Earthquake

Two of the central pillars of structural adjustment in agriculture were the liberalization of
domestic markets and the pursuit of export-led growth in order to generate foreign
exchange and service debts (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010; Watts 2009; Kay 2008; Weis
2007; Bernstein 2001). In Haiti, trade liberalization, beginning in 1986, triggered an
enormous wave of food imports, which rose by roughly US$80 million per year between
1985 and 1989, placing downward pressure on prices in domestic market and
contributing to a negative annual growth rate (-0.5 percent) over this period (Shamsie,
2010; Abbott 1995). In particular, imports of rice, Haiti’s most important food staple
severely undermining peasant farmers in Haiti’s Artibonite Valley. The pursuit of agroexport growth included a plan to reorient 30 percent of Haiti’s arable land from domestic
to export-oriented production in a context where Haiti’s traditional agro-exports, coffee
and sugar, had been in long-term decline and the prospect of reinvigorating them in the
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face of competition elsewhere was unlikely (Trouillot 1990; Dupuy 1989). As Figure 12
indicates, Haiti’s coffee and sugar exports have utterly collapsed since the onset of
adjustment in 1986.
Figure 12: Haiti's Traditional Agro-Exports by Volume (000 MT)
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Hopes for agro-export expansion were tied in considerable measure to the promotion of
non-traditional exports, as indicated earlier, with mangoes at the forefront. Initial
indications seemed promising, as mangos exports more than doubled between 1985 and
1991, from roughly 6000 MT to 13500 MT (FAOSTAT 2013). This burst in exports
spurred investment in mango packing and shipping, and by 1989 there were 10 firms in
Haiti who formed Haiti’s Association of Mango Exporters (ANEM).
The implementation of adjustment was briefly interrupted by the election of Jean
Bertrand Aristide as President in 1990 and the ensuing political chaos. Aristide
symbolized the best hope for a pro-peasant agenda, and won an overwhelming popular
mandate with promises to challenge neoliberal policies, but Aristide was overthrown only
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days after his inauguration in a military coup that was supported informally – though
unequivocally – by the U.S. government and the Haitian elite (Hallward 2007; Weisbrot
1997). Nevertheless, both the U.S. and the Organization of American States subsequently
imposed a crippling economic embargo on Haiti that lasted until 1994: Haiti’s GDP
declined by roughly 25 percent over the space of just a few years (Abbott 1995) and the
country’s debt burden rose from US$850 in 1990 to US$940 million in 1993 (Farmer
2003; IMF 2001). The embargo caused Haiti’s mango exports to fall almost five-fold
from 1990 to 1994, which pushed the fledgling merchant interests in mangos, dominated
by ANEM, to the brink of collapse. Recognizing this, the U.S. helped keep Haiti’s mango
exporters afloat by amending the embargo for the six-week peak of the mango season in
1993.
In 1994, the U.S. lifted the embargo and reinstated Aristide for the final few
months of his presidency with the condition that his administration comply with the
further implementation of structural adjustment reforms. A central part of this was the
slashing of import tariffs to an extent that made Haiti one of the most open economies in
the Western Hemisphere (Abbott 1995), a radical liberalization that had immediate
negative impacts on agricultural production for domestic markets (Dupuy 2012; Shamsie
2010; Oxfam 2010; Bello, 2009; Weisbrot 2007). Imports of rice from the U.S. is an
especially stark illustration as another wave of subsidized rice imports from the U.S.
swiftly followed the slashing of rice tariffs from 50 to 3 percent in 1995 (McGuinan
2006). From 1989 to 2004, the annual volume of rice produced in the Artibonite Valley,
Haiti’s most important rice-producing region, fell by on one-half (Lundahl 2004).
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The renewal of structural adjustment led to the deepening control of external
actors over Haiti’s agricultural policies. One clear indication of this is that the
Agricultural Policy Analysis Project (APAP), which was conducted in 1995 to guide the
agenda for Haiti’s agricultural sector, was heavily influenced by USAID, the IDB,
Chemonics International (a U.S.-based development company that partners with bilateral
donors and the private sector to carry out a range of development projects), US
agribusiness consultants (e.g. International Fertilizer Development Centre, the Citizens
39

Network for Foreign Affairs ), and the UN FAO. As with initial adjustment
prescriptions, the APAP again prescribed an export-led strategy for Haiti’s agricultural
sector, focusing centrally on mango production (as well as highlighting the hope of
reinvigorating

coffee)

rather

than

food

for

domestic

markets.

Other

core

recommendations of the APAP included: promoting enhanced trade and marketing
relations with the US; extending export tariff reductions; increasing agricultural credits to
agribusinesses and mango exporters; publicly financing infrastructure to support exportoriented commodity chains; and establishing a formal land registry to enable a more
active market for land transfers (APAP 1995). The desire to build a national cadaster and
encourage land sales is entwined with the belief that Haiti’s land tenure system of highly
subdivided small farms is a major barrier to scale efficiencies and increased export
production, and though no serious action has since been taken this has been repeatedly
flagged as a priority ever since.
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The Citizens Network promotes agribusiness alliances between the US and Haiti.
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Yet in spite of Haiti’s adherence to neoliberal policy restructuring, the agro-export
growth it promised has never materialized while, as noted, liberalization has transformed
domestic markets. As a result, rather than helping resolve Haiti’s balance of payments
problems, the period of neoliberal restructuring involved a spiraling trade deficit and
worsening debt problems; from 1995 to 1999 alone, Haiti’s external debt soared from
US$780 million to US$1.3 billion (Farmer 2003). The trade balance in agriculture was
especially bleak. Over the first decade and a half of Haiti’s neoliberal restructuring, from
1986 to 2000, Haiti’s agro-exports fell by nearly half, from US$44 to US$23 million,
while agro-imports roughly tripled, shooting up from US$125 to US$356 million (see
Figure 13).
Figure 13: Haiti's Total Agro-Trade Balance by Value (US$M base price)
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Source for data: FAOSTATS
However, despite this gaping and growing imbalance, seen clearly in Figure 13,
the dominant neoliberal narrative continued its grip on agricultural policy, with the
central goal being to enhance the competitiveness of Haitian exports. This was
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augmented by a US trade agreement in 2000, The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act 2000-2020 (CBERA), which granted Haiti duty-free access to US markets for various
products, though whatever incentives CBERA established for Haitian exporters were
quickly undermined by a US-led economic and aid embargo that followed the reelection
of Aristide in 2000 and triggered a massive decline in mango exports in the ensuing
years.

40

The crippling U.S.-led embargo lasted until 2004, when Aristide was overthrown

in a coup that the U.S. had a central hand in, along with Canada and France (Dubois
2012; Podur 2012; Hallward 2007). By this point, Haiti’s chronic trade imbalance had
reached staggering proportions – the cost of imports was more than 6 times greater than
export earnings in 2004, a gap that was partially plugged by more borrowing – and it is
notable that loan disbursements from international financial institutions were promptly
restarted following the overthrow of a democratically-elected President. In this context, it
was hardly surprising that the call to increase agro-exports rang out yet again from
various creditor and donor institutions, as well as being embraced by the internationallybacked coup leaders. Again, mangos were identified as a commodity where Haiti could
achieve export growth (ICF 2004).
Mango exports did recover to pre-embargo levels quickly but the generalized
decline of Haiti’s agriculture sector otherwise continued, as other agro-exports kept
falling while dependence on imported food kept intensifying. In assessing this problem,
dominant actors cast considerable blame on the small average farm sizes and the

40

In addition to the US cutting off aid, the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American
Development Bank froze loan disbursements, and foreign direct investment decreased by
56 percent almost immediately (Edmonds 2012; UNCTAD 2002).
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complexity of land titling in Haiti, arguing that these must be changed in order to attain
competitive efficiencies (CDB 2006). In the 2007 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,
agriculture was highlighted as one of four key growth pillars for the Haitian economy,
with key priorities identified as: modernization, including increased investments in
fertilizers and capital inputs; regulated credit for agribusinesses; improved infrastructure
to meet the agro-export standards and phyto-sanitary controls (as mandated by the WTO);
and the establishment of a formal land registry (Shamsie 2010; PRSP 2007). However,
these objectives were accompanied with little resources, and it took a catastrophe to bring
greater donor funding to bear on Haiti’s agricultural sector.

41

The earthquake sparked an

enormous influx of foreign assistance and new optimism that agriculture would be a key
pillar of Haiti’s recover and development, with mango-exports again envisioned as an
important vector of growth. In the next section we examine the post-disaster policy push
for mango-export expansion and the initiatives that have developed as a result.
The field research that informs the following analysis was conducted from
November 2010-July 2013, including 2 focus groups with peasant producers (n=15-20)
who are directly involved in a land conflict with Haiti’s largest agribusiness; and
qualitative interviews with key informants, including government officials (n=7),
representatives of AgroTechnique (n=2), Technoserve officers (n=2), representatives
from bilateral organizations (n=4), legal representatives for the peasant group that has
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The international response to the earthquake was a clear example of Klein’s (2007)
disaster capitalism: with much of donor funding going towards security and policing and
open-door encouragement of foreign corporate investment geared towards modernizing
agriculture and investing in export-processing zones driven by the logic that Haiti could
recover and expand in its global economic niche as a seller of cheap labour.
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suffered the land seizure (n=1), and leaders of Haitian peasant and civil society
organizations (n=10). Throughout the discussion, participants are referred to by the
acronym or short name of their affiliations, as identified in Figure 14, but in some cases
anonymity is protected by referring to informants as ‘local leaders.’
Figure 14: Organizational Affiliations of Key Enformants (English in brackets)
• MITPA: Mouvman Inite Ti Peyizan Latibonit (The United Movement of Small Peasants
in the Artibonite)
• CASEC: Le Conseil d’Administration de la Section Communale (Council for the
Administration of the Communal Section)
• KOPAV: Kooperative Prodikte Agrikol Vigilan (The Cooperative of Vigilant
Agricultural Producers)
• MARNDR: Secretary of State for Re-launching Agriculture of the Ministère de
l’Agriculture des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural (The Ministry of
Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development)
• MPP: Mouvman Peyizan Papaye (The Peasant Movement of Papaye)
• GASA: Groupe d’Accord Solidarité Action (Group of Agreement for Solidarity Action)
• IDB: Inter-American Development Bank Haiti
• ODD: Oganizasyon Devlopman Dezam (ODD the Development Organization of
Dezam)
• ODVA: Former Director of L’Organisation de Développement de l’Artibonite (The
Organization for the Development of the Artibonite Valley)
• PAPDA: Coordinator of La Plateforme Haïtienne de plaidoyer pour un développement
alternatif (The Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development)
• PLD: Partenariat pour le Développement Local (Partnership for Local Development)
• Tét Kole Ti Peyizan (Heads Together Small Peasants)
• TNS: Technoserve
• USAID: United States Agency for International Development Haiti Office
5.4

Post-Earthquake Reconstruction: Old wine in better funded bottles

The 2010 earthquake disaster was in many ways a reflection of the intersecting rural and
urban development problems in Haiti, as the large majority of the roughly 220,000 people
killed lived in very poor quality housing stock on the margins of Port-au-Prince, which
has proven unable to absorb the level of rural-urban migration generated by the
countryside. As a result of both the nature of the earthquake itself and the flows foreign
aid that followed, a new wave of external intervention in development planning was
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unleashed, along with renewed assessments of what was wrong with Haiti’s agricultural
system and how to fix it. While there was much continuity with the decades-old
neoliberal development prescriptions, the great difference is that post-disaster
development schemes have been met with financial support. There was a huge influx of
post-earthquake financing, with nearly US$9 billion in foreign aid dispersed between
2010 and 2013 (Ramachandran and Walz 2013), and while only a modest share (less than
one-tenth) was pledged for agricultural development this still constituted a enormous
increase in funding for the sector.

42

The 2010 Haitian National Agricultural Plan (NAIP

2010) was the cornerstone document laying out the priorities of leading donors, lenders,
NGOs, and the Haitian government for agricultural development and yet again mangos
feature prominently, identified as an underdeveloped source of foreign exchange
generation.
In April 2010, just a few months after the earthquake, the National Mango Forum
was convened in Port-au-Prince to identify strategies for mango export growth. The
forum was attended by key domestic stakeholders including Haiti’s Association of
Mango Exporters (ANEM), as well as the US National Mango Board and foreign
organizations with an influence over agricultural development planning, including
representatives from the USAID and the USDA. The conclusions of the forum were
synthesized in a report drafted by the USAID, which identified barriers to increased
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The Action Plan for National Recovery and Development (2010), the chief postdisaster plan that has guided both short and long-term disaster response programming,
budgeted an initial US$40 million for agriculture for the first 18 months following the
disaster, and the NAIP (2010) budgeted nearly US$800 million to agriculture from 20112016.
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production and ways of overcoming them, and set the ambitious goal of doubling mango
exports between 2010 and 2015, to 22,500 MT, roughly two-thirds greater than the record
level (USAID 2010). Two other reports from this same period attempted to specify the
extent of unrealized growth, estimating that there is sufficient international demand for
Haiti’s mango exports to increase five-fold if production could be ramped up (CFI 2010;
IDB 2010).
One of the central barriers to increased production identified in the Mango Forum
Report was land tenure insecurity and, in an echo of past plans (PRSP 2007; ICF 2004;
APAP 1995), the report urged the Haitian government to establish a formal land registry
in order to enable the development of larger-scale orchards. The Action Plan for National
Recovery and Development (2010) and the Haitian National Agriculture Plan 2010 also
laid out the goal of establishing a national land registry in order to formalize land tenure,
enable a land market, and increase possibilities for large-scale agriculture, though by
2015 there are still no palpable signs that any of this has materialized. The continuing
absence of a land registry two decades after it was flagged as a major priority (APAP
1995) reflects not only budgetary limitations but also enduring fears among the Haitian
government and the donor community that peasants would resist it. This was expressed
clearly by key informants from the USAID and IDB, with one USAID Office Chief
commenting that renewed plans for a land cadaster likely meant little because “in reality
we don’t think the government will touch this issue.”
Two approaches to expanding mango production have predominated in practice in
the post-earthquake period, which partly reflect different responses to the still unfulfilled
calls for a land registry. The first is a development project called Haiti Hope, jointly
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financed by the USAID, the IDB, the Clinton Bush Haiti Fund and The Coca-Cola
Company,

43

which was designed to transition some peasant farmers into entrepreneurs

and stands at odds with the orchard model for agro-export production put forth in postdisaster plans. The second is a new push to expand large-scale orchard production being
made by Haiti’s largest agribusiness, AgroTechnique, which reflects a belief that largescale orchards are still possible in spite of informal land tenure arrangements.
Both the attempt to commercialize some peasants in Haiti Hope and the effort of
AgroTechnique to scale-up mango production are rife with tensions, which are the focus
of the remainder of the paper. In both cases, as will be seen, the goals of agricultural
development butt up against strong peasant aspirations to maximize autonomy and
balance market earnings (and risks) with cultivation geared to meeting household
consumption needs.
5.5

Peasant Responses to the Post-Earthquake Push for Mango Exports

5.5.1 Peasant Responses to Contract Relations
The core goals of the Haiti Hope project are to contribute to mango export growth,
double the mango incomes of 25,000 small farmers, and strengthen the productive base
from which ANEM members can draw from (TNS 2015; MIF 2013; IDB 2010). In
addition to their expectation that peasant would resist a land registry, key informants in
the IDB and USAID also indicated related beliefs that future attempts to scale-up
production would almost certainly be met with peasant resistance, and gave this as an
important reason for the approach of Haiti Hope. For example, an IDB official stated that
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The initial funding was modest, just US$9.5 million over 5 years, but concentrated in a
small area and in a context of almost no state support for agriculture.
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“the high potential for land conflict entails that it is easier to get results by working with
the small peasants,” while a USAID representative said that his agency “recognize[s] that
the strategy of the Haitian peasantry is to mitigate risk, and donors have learned that we
have to go to farmers on their terms”. A different USAID representative went further in
his explanation of how peasants have conditioned the USAID agricultural development
initiatives:
Peasant risk-aversion is a barrier to USAID programming. We’re grappling in
agriculture, and it will be hard to be transformational in mangoes if a farmer only
has 3 trees in his backyard. But, if only small holders are willing to participate in
our program, we can only work with small holders.
On the ground, Haiti Hope has been largely implemented by TechnoServe (TNS), a
US-based, non-profit development organization that works in over 30 low-income
countries with a strategy to offer “business solutions to poverty” (TNS 2015).
Technoserve receives donor support from multilateral development institutions, the U.S.
government, individual donors and private enterprises, and in 2007, the Financial Times
rated TNS among the top five development NGOs based on corporate partnerships. In
various contexts TNS has partnered with Cargill, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Google
Nestlé, Peet’s Coffee & Tea and Unilever, among others (Bjerga 2011; TNS 2007). In
Haiti, TNS recruits growers who have relative land security, and facilitates connections
between producer groups and an exporter in Port-au-Prince. To incentivize peasant
participation, TNS offers credit (which otherwise few peasants would have access to) and
grants to support labour and supply costs to fence mango plots, subsidies on mango
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seedlings, and a range of production supports (e.g. cases and bags for packing, basins for
washing, and large drums for collecting water).
The approach of Haiti Hope has arguably succeeded in deterring peasant resistance
but peasant reactions to Haiti Hope have still been decidedly mixed. The contract
arrangement that TNS offers has certain features that are advantageous to peasants
including an assured market (capable of receiving bulk sales), guaranteed prices, and
access to credit before the harvest so that cash-starved peasants are not forced to harvest
and sell mangos early. However, there are also significant disadvantages as peasants lose
the freedom to switch contracts to pursue better terms and forfeit the ability to negotiate
prices or, crucially, use production to meet household needs. One peasant leader put it
this way:
Peasants won’t accept mango export orientation because the income he receives
will never give him what his garden gives him. When a peasant plants sweet potato,
he can take a bit of that sweet potato every time he goes to his garden – he can eat it
any time. He can’t do that with contract mangoes!
Although a TNS representative claimed that, “peasants really appreciate the
program,” he also admitted that TNS has had considerable difficulty recruiting producers.
By the end of 2013, TNS had recruited fewer than 30 producers in the Verette region, and
in an effort to boost uptake they halved the land requirement for participation from
roughly 1.5 acres to 0.75 acres. Another TNS representative, a former recruitment officer,
explained that peasants were unwilling to join Haiti Hope because the price (which
included a fair trade premium) was little different than what was provided by other
purchasers. In 2013, for example, peasants selling through Haiti Hope earned
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approximately US$0.45 per dozen mangoes and an additional US$0.15, specified as fair
trade premium, for mangoes that passed US certification, whereas peasants could
typically sell for more than US$0.45 per dozen mangoes through other outlets, sometimes
for as high as US$0.65.
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In short, there was limited price incentive to sell through Haiti

Hope. Tied to this was the belief that the high rejection rates of the processing plant that
partners with Haiti Hope further eroded peasant earnings to an extent that deterred
peasant engagement in Haiti Hope (with peasants lacking confidence in the quality
standards used). One gwo planté [a term given to a peasant with relatively large land
holdings, in this case roughly 20 acres] expressed frustration both with the TNS contract
arrangements and with the rejection rates at the TNS-affiliated mango processing plant in
Port-au-Prince:
The terms that [TNS] described when they explained the mango contract, that’s not
what the peasants find! That’s not how it really is! I told TNS that I have mangoes
to sell. But the problem is that they accept mangoes only if they’re perfect. Even if
they have a little black mark they reject them. And they’ll only take the huge ones.
When I went to sell at the TNS processor I gave 124 dozen mangoes and they said
only 50 dozen were good! And what’s more, they said I had to sell the rejected ones
to them anyways, and that they would only pay US$0.30 per dozen. No! This
project is not good for me!
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Hypollite (2013) corroborates this, finding that in 2013, export-oriented mangoes
produced in the Artibonite Valley sold on the conventional market for approximately
US$0.55 per dozen.
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While many described their aversion to Haiti Hope in terms of the prices paid
through the program, it is also important to consider that this was only one component of
peasant decision-making (Ploeg 2009). One peasant leader explained how the widespread
frustration about prices was rooted in a fear of becoming too dependent on markets:
The money they are giving peasants for the mangos isn't real money – it can’t even
begin to support his/her life or family. The strategy [of Haiti Hope] is to get
peasants to abandon their own production – the production that supports their lives
– to plant mangoes to sell!? No way! The peasants might get some money, but he'll
soon be in a position where in spite of that money, he won't have food!
Related to this, a number of key informants suggested that peasant reluctance to join
Haiti Hope runs deeper than the prices offered, noting how many peasants strive to
maintain autonomy, do not want to be accountable to an institution, and are suspicious of
TNS, believing the terms of the contract arrangement to be exploitative, with those
growing mangos reaping too little of the ultimate profits. A peasant who served as a
former TNS recruiter illustrates this view clearly, expressing his belief that: “[TNS] takes
advantage of peasants … and they make huge profits off of the peasants.” Another
peasant echoed this view, insisting that “in this set-up, peasants sell mangoes for next to
nothing and other people make a lot of money off of us.” Other interviews with peasants
revealed similar responses:
•

“Projects to get peasants to sell mangoes will always have a tendency to exploit
the peasants.”

•

“The interests of the peasants are not the first thing being considered with these
mangos that they are pushing. It’s the international community! And with political
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support, judicial support, with state support, they are dismissing what the peasants
want to plant and choose crops for the international market.”
•

“In this set-up, we peasants sell mangoes for next to nothing and other people
make a lot of money off of us.”

The Chayanovian approach also contends that peasants’ decisions are influenced by
natural and ecological realities, by peasant assessments of balances between autonomy
and dependency, and between the scale and intensity of production, and this was true of
peasant evaluations of Haiti Hope. For example, peasant leaders and key informants
regularly described that peasants were hesitant to join Haiti Hope because of general
risks associated with mango production. That is, fruit trees are seen as being extremely
risky from year-to-year while unit prices are usually meager. This general reluctance was
also recognized by an official from USAID, who explained his sense that peasants are
wary of jeopardizing food security by relying too heavily on unreliable markets,
especially with production that is seen to contain inherent risks (e.g. disease, hurricanes).
Peasants repeatedly affirmed this in interviews and focus groups, making comments like:
•

“We can only harvest mangoes once a year, and so if a strong wind comes, and it
knocks off all the mango buds, our harvest is lost.”

•

“The peasants know that if the mango has a bad year, if the flies come to the
mangoes, they will lose out.”

•

“In [Haiti Hope’s] arrangement all the risk is on the peasants. Because the mango
business doesn’t want to hear about it if the harvest is low, if the flies get the
mangoes! He doesn’t want to know if the workers are sick! He doesn’t want to
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know about those things. He’s only interested in the mangoes when they’re ready
for harvest.”
•

“We’re not against mango production for export. Naturally I would like for the
Haitian peasants to find more ways to access earnings. But if you’re going to only
plant mangoes you’ll only have mangoes. If the U.S. decides they’re not going to
buy Mango Fransique again – we’re dead, we’re finished. That’s why we have to
diversify production.”
Peasants are hesitant to join Haiti Hope for various reasons: apprehension about

affiliating with an institution and forfeiting autonomy, unwillingness to accept the terms
of TNS contracts, or broader aversion to the risk associated with fruit trees, and their
reluctance to join Haiti Hope has constrained the project’s success. A TNS representative
described plainly that in 2012, the quantity of mangoes exported from the Artibonite
Valley was much less than anticipated because peasants were nervous to join Haiti Hope.
In addition, a 2013 evaluation of Haiti Hope determined that there was “low probability”
of project completion, and emphasized that a major barrier to mango export growth and
the success of Haiti Hope was a lack of peasant enrollment in the project and that without
the buy-in of peasant farmers the sustainability of the program was in jeopardy (MIF
2014). One peasant leader described the widespread refusal of other peasants to
participate in Haiti Hope as “a form of resistance” against foreign intervention in
agriculture. Yet it is also important to remember that while many peasants have abstained
from participation in Haiti Hope (enough to threaten the project), some peasants have
engaged with in Haiti Hope. As Ploeg (2009) suggests, peasant households facing similar
structural challenges might assess their material realities in different ways, or prioritize
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different things, like household consumption over the risks of increasing dependence
upon markets. In this case, a few peasants have perceived sufficient benefits from Haiti
Hope to join, for the majority the rewards have been too modest in relation to risks of
reduced cultivation for household needs, and the fact that this balance weighs heavily for
peasants has severely constrained the project.
5.5.2

Peasant Responses to Large-Scale Mango Production

Haiti’s largest agribusiness, AgroTechnique, controls 2 of Haiti’s 5 commercial mango
orchards and claims ownership over the largest mango orchard in the country, a roughly
160-acre estate located in the Artibonite Valley. AgroTechnique has made multiple
attempts to expand its mango orchard in the Artibonite Valley in the face of resistance
from local peasants, who have been farming a large portion of that land for decades.
Representatives of AgroTechnique expressed strong views that insecure land tenure and
peasant resistance are barriers to mango-export growth, along with a conviction that
large-scale production is the most efficient and lucrative option for Haiti.
Since the 2010 earthquake, the simmering land dispute surrounding this 160-acre
estate has escalated into a violent conflict. Part of the complexity of tenure here extends
back to 1952, when peasants in the region collectively donated the land for a term of 50
years to an American couple who established a hospital in the area. In 2002, recognizing
the expiration of this land deal, peasant inheritors of the land reclaimed and began
cultivating a portion of it that had been fallow. However, that same year, the hospital
directory board rented out parcels of the land to various tenants, frustrating peasants and
complicating the question of who had rights to the land. One tenant was Fruits et
Legumes (F&L), a subsidiary of AgroTechnique, which established a mango orchard.
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Peasants allege that threats from the coordinator of AgroTechnique began almost
immediately and that forceful evictions ensued, with one focus group participant
commenting that:
[He] started to threaten the population. [He] killed animals – even animals that
were pregnant. The peasants suffered many threats. Then [he] kicked all of us off
the land! The peasants didn’t have other means. We don’t have a government that
gives any support. We don’t have any other recourse to eat, to pay for school, to go
to the hospital. Our hope depends on the land. [He] arranged to have all the
peasants kicked out, to take the land and to produce mangoes to export!
In 2006, the hospital directory board met with key stakeholders in an attempt to resolve
the conflict, presenting a letter that outlined a continued tenancy agreement for 220 acres
of land, of which F&L would occupy 130 acres. A former legal representative of the
peasant group explained that peasants were furious, and described that many peasants had
deeds linked to portions of the land and felt that the contract with their forefathers was
not respected. The peasants started a legal case against AgroTechnique, but allege that the
AgroTechnique coordinator bribed the judges and threatened peasant lawyers. One local
leader explained that “the owner of AgroTechnique has enormous financial and political
power,” and another insisted that “with his Makout money,
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he bribed the courts and in

This comment reflects a common allegation that the coordinator of AgroTechnique was
a former member of the feared and despised Tonton Macoute, and that he used the wealth
he gained from brutalizing peasants to bribe the judiciary to support his land claims. The
Tonton Macoutes were personal security forces for the Duvalier’s who were formally
called the Volunteers for National Security.
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return they gave him justice.” One peasant involved in the land dispute described that it
was the corrupt judicial system that motivated peasants to take direct action:
[He] has old military people who will kill people en masse at his direction. He will
terrorize the population, and our corrupt courts will never stop him. So we swelled
our power. First we reacted peacefully, but we could see our voice was blocked.
In September 2007, as the likelihood of regaining their land legally grew dimmer,
more than 300 peasants invaded and reclaimed over 150 acres of the land. Over the next
three years tensions brewed, before conflict escalated in 2010, to an extent that the former
legal representative for the peasant group stepped down from the case in fear his life was
threatened. In interviews, local leaders described the hostility of AgroTechnique
representatives towards peasants, making comments like: “the director is arrogant and
uses the logic of guns,” and “He intends to put those peasants out – off their land!”
Several key informants emphasized the severity of AgroTechnique’s disdain for peasants
by recounting an incident where the coordinator proclaimed that, “one of my mangoes
has more value than one of you Haitians!” In an interview in June 2011, the manager of
AgroTechnique’s mango processing plant described the situation in this way:
Haitian peasants are like a load of bricks weighing us down. They are either trying
to take advantage of us or sabotage us. Everywhere we go people don’t like us.
Now it’s a land conflict.
Throughout 2011, peasant protests and roadblocks were frequent, and some dug trenches
in feeder roads to prevent access to the orchard. The coordinator of AgroTechnique
responded harshly to these actions, engaging in a range of violent acts designed to
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intimidate and seize peasant landholdings, the multiple stories recounted in interviews
and focus groups. According to one local leader, the coordinator of AgroTechnique:
Cut down plantain trees and used his tractor to bulldoze the peasant’s sweet
potatoes. [He] cut down so many huge mango trees because he only wants the
Mango Fransique variety. He cut down those other mango trees that peasants used
to eat from. The peasants lost that food.
Another respondent noted that:
Our animals would go by and he’d shoot them. Even children couldn’t pass near
him. We yelled Amwe [Help us]! Enough! He bulldozed our sweet potatoes with
his tractor, and our plantain trees. He cut them all down and burned them.
In addition to shooting at peasant-owned horses, bulldozing sweet potato harvests, cutting
down and burning plantain trees, others noted how he poisoned animals and even shot at
peasants themselves.
In September 2011, the coordinator of AgroTechnique orchestrated the illegal
arrest of four peasants from their homes after midnight. One of the victims described how
his: “daughter came out and asked what they were doing with me. They pointed their
guns at her and told her to go in the house and be quiet. This was a kidnapping!” While
these men were in prison, others continued to struggle to protect the land, and in May
2013, after 20 months in prison, the four men were released when a new judge presided
over their case and dismissed it as unlawful.
The ways that peasant households strive to balance an array of considerations,
while seeking to enhance autonomy and household consumption, can contribute to
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numerous forms of resistance (Ploeg 2009; Long 2007; Scott 1985), and a Chayanovian
lens helps to understand the escalating peasant resistance to AgroTechnique. Peasants are
aware that the threats to the balances they are pursuing are dynamic and constantly
shifting, and in this case it seems clear that when AgroTechnique first planted a mango
orchard in 2002, though many peasants objected, they did not feel their livelihoods were
sufficiently threatened to overtly resist. Rather, the land that they maintained was
perceived as sufficient to provide for their families. It was only when the degree of the
threat to peasant land and food security grew to an intolerable extent that peasants began
to actively resist the mango plantation.
In focus groups, peasants repeatedly described how reclaiming their land and
resisting mango orchard expansion was necessary to protect both immediate food security
and long-term ability to reproduce themselves. As one put it:
Mangos can’t do anything for us. They are only harvested once a year and are a
small dessert for a brief moment. We don’t need mangos to plant in this land, and
we don’t agree for AgroTechnique to come here and plant mangos. This land
needs corn, sweet potatoes, plantains, pigeon peas, and sorghum. It’s these foods
that we need, nothing else.
Others were similarly adamant that they will never accept orchard-style mango
production, making comments like:
•

“Only AgroTechnique profits from profits from mangoes, the peasants don’t see
any advantages! For us peasants it’s better to produce our own food.”
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•

“Planting all this land with Mango Fransique is like tying up all of us peasants
and throwing us in the river. There would be no other means for us to live
anymore!”

•

“This land is the last gasp of breath for the peasants of the area. It’s the source of
life for all peasants. Because we have taken back our land we can feed ourselves.”

•

“For us, whether we turn to blood or to dust, we’re not going to let go. We’re
never going to let go! Even if we die, our children will fight and die before we
would permit [AgroTechnique] to have our land!”
While is impossible to assess the impact of peasant resistance to AgroTechnique’s

overall mango exports, there is reason to believe that peasant resistance has constrained
mango production in this area of the Artibonite region. In July 2013, peasants continued
to occupy the land – over 150 acres – and harvested the mango crop on the orchard
themselves. The extent of peasant mobilization was such that local leaders scoffed at the
question of whether AgroTechnique would ever successfully develop a mango orchard in
the area, reflected in comments such as:
•

“The peasants will always occupy that land! Ha! Even if people die, peasants
will stay on their land. Even when the peasants were in prison [AgroTechnique]
couldn’t take that land – the other peasants continued to occupy it, and continued
to cultivate it!”

•

“I know AgroTechnique will never be able to go on that farm again. The peasants
will never let him.”

•

“The peasants will never cede that land. In Haiti the voice of the peasants is the
voice of God.”

192

An IDB representative with expertise in the area conceded that this orchard was likely
bound to fail too, suggesting that, “AgroTechnique’s approach will create a lot of
problems with burglary and conflict. I don’t think they will succeed,” as did the former
Director of the ODVA who insisted that:
“Mango orchards will never work [in Haiti]. Even if you offer employment in a
mango orchard people will not accept it because it’s only for a season. You haven’t
provided a way for them to live. They will not accept it. They will rise up in
protest!”
Peasant responses to AgroTechnique have clearly been influenced by their goals
to maintain autonomy and adequate household consumption, as they have had to reassess the degree of threat that AgroTechnique poses over time. As these assessments
have shifted, so too has the range of responses: first to begin to occupy fallow land; then
to seek justice through the judicial system; and finally to engage in direct actions against
AgroTechnique and land occupation. Yet it is also important to recognize that peasants
are not inherently opposed to mango exports, reflected in the fact that peasants in the area
have been engaged in exporting mangoes for decades and tacitly accepted
AgroTechnique’s mango production on a portion of the land for years. They are willing to
grow and sell mangoes on certain terms, producing them when they do not adversely
affect the cultivation of other (mostly) household-oriented food crops, as part of their
desire for autonomy, and selling them to export markets when margins are sufficient. In
this case, peasants began to resist the expansion of mangoes as the threats to household
provisioning became too great.
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5.6

Conclusion

Despite the persistent stagnation of mango exports, the perceived potential for agrogrowth with mangos has been a major part of Haiti’s agricultural policy agenda
throughout the neoliberal era, including post-disaster development planning, echoed
again in 2013 by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MARNDR)
alongside many foreign donors and NGOs. However, while there have been enormous
increases in agricultural investment since the 2010 earthquake, the continued push for
mango export production seems bound to meet widespread peasant resistance.
Thousands of peasants are involved in the mango supply chain, which suggests
that they will engage in mango export initiatives when they are advantageous. However,
peasants resist agro-export promotion where expected earnings do not compensate for the
threats to household food provisioning. This resistance was seen in different ways in
peasant responses to the predominant post-earthquake initiatives to boost mango exports,
both the encouragement of small-scale production proffered by Haiti Hope, and the largescale orchard production pushed by AgroTechnique. According to one peasant leader,
whether the powerful agents are seeking to commercialize or displace peasants, both are
to be feared:
The strategy of [Haiti Hope] is still an imperialist one, and imperialists won’t
always fight directly. There are places where they will fight with force, like
AgroTechnique, and other places where they’ll be cunning, where they will give
an appearance of peasant participation. But both will make peasants give up their
land and their food security to plant mangoes to sell.
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The importance of land and the strong desire to reduce risk and maximize
autonomy are well-established aspects of the culture of Haitian peasants (Dubois 2012;
Smith 2001; Trouillot 1990; Dupuy 1989). Haitian peasants also have a long history of
retreating from agro-export production “as a gesture of resistance” (Trouillot 190, 122),
though they will engage with export markets when sales and cash earnings are perceived
as necessary or advantageous, as evident in the participation in mango supply chains at
small levels. In the post-disaster period of intensified development expenditure, some
peasants are selectively engaging with markets and schemes bent on enhancing their
export orientation while others are activity resisting them. In both cases, decisions to
engage or resist reflect household-level assessments of the balances between increasing
sales and market orientation (and associated risks) and meeting consumption needs. So
while domestic elites and foreign development organizations may continue to push
mango export schemes, either by seeking to commercialize peasants or promoting largerscale production, the responses to Haiti Hope and AgroTechnique in the Artibonite
Valley suggests that peasants will resist initiatives that reduce their autonomy or increase
their risk to intolerable levels.
This raises serious questions about the trajectory of agricultural development
planning in Haiti and the continuing prioritization of agro-exports, and whether peasants
– and national food security at large – would not be much better served if state and donor
resources (including investments in research, extension, infrastructure, credit, and
appropriate technologies) were reoriented to support production geared towards
household consumption and local markets.
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6. Conclusion: Research reflections, contributions and future directions
When I first set out to explore the struggles of the Haitian peasantry as a doctoral student
I had just completed a term as a Policy Analyst and Advocacy Worker with the
Mennonite Central Committee in Port-au-Prince, during which time I also sought to
contribute to a number of Haitian advocacy organizations concerned with broad issues
surrounding food justice and peasant livelihoods. I was privileged to have been in a
position where I learned from leaders of organizations who were deeply engaged in
issues I believe in and struggles to which I wanted to contribute. Some of these leaders
became mentors over time, and taught me about how the colonial plantation economy,
recurrent foreign interventions in Haitian politics, and the country’s parasitic merchant
elite and predatory state have together impoverished the masses, undermined democracy,
and denied the rural citizenry access to most basic services, from potable water to
electricity to decent education and health care facilities. But, equally importantly, these
leaders also emphasized the enormous historical fortitude of social movements and the
long legacy of peasant resistance to injustice, pointing to such things as the persistent
pride in the Haitian Revolution, the struggles of the caco-s, and the rise of the Lavalas
movement from the late 1980s onwards. One core belief that resounded among these
organizations was that agriculture is fundamental to Haiti’s development prospects and
that any meaningful pro-peasant change to Haiti’s agriculture and food systems must
involve the revalorization of traditional diets. This dissertation was motivated both by the
lessons I learned from these Haitian mentors, and by a strong desire to contribute to
peasant movements in some way.
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The 2010 earthquake magnified the urgency and magnitude of challenges facing
peasant agriculture in Haiti. It was a tragedy of enormous proportions, and the influx of
reconstruction funding and policy intervention marked a watershed for the country: for
some, it was an opportunity to continue liberalizing Haiti’s economy and intensifying a
particular development trajectory, but for others, it represented an opportunity for change,
for different sorts of broadly pro-poor development priorities. My friends and former coworkers described the immense human suffering that enveloped Port-au-Prince in the
first 24 hours after the quake, the piercing fear that returned with every tremor, and the
grief and deep sense of loss that have lingered ever since. Yet many also emphasized an
overwhelming spirit of solidarity and collaboration in the immediate aftermath of the
disaster, sharing stories of earthquake victims crying, praying, and singing together, of
the poor and the wealthy sleeping side by side in open quarters, and of strangers sharing
food and shelter. One of my most inspirational and visionary mentors, Ari Nikola,
described the energy this way:
The bond of people was something that hit me with great force. It was reminiscent
of konbit! Haitians stood up – strong! Before this, there were always trucks
bringing food to the provinces, but now, peasants were coming in with food to
give Port-au-Prince! This was so powerful. It was moving. And I reacted
emotionally, I saw that Haitians can! This was a season where the planting season
was approaching; I had enormous hope that Haiti would change because people
were working together. It was there in the eyes of everyone that – We Can! We
can!
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In the days and months following the earthquake some of this energy dissipated, with
peasant and Haitian advocacy organizations becoming increasingly critical of responses
being led by the state and by an array of international actors. The more I dug into my
research, the clearer it became to me that the disaster marked somewhat of a crossroads
for development policy. On one hand, there were immediate efforts by local elites and
foreign contractors to capitalize on the disaster, using reconstruction-related funding to
support things like light manufacturing and commercial agriculture. On the other hand,
the tragedy was the impetus for a powerful resurgence of optimism and hope among
Haitian advocacy and peasant organizations that alternative methods of development and
a pro-poor agenda were possible. Agrarian landscapes have been a key battlefield of this
struggle, and while the future of Haitian peasants is being influenced by decisions coming
down from above, they are also very active in fighting for their future.
Ploeg’s (2013, 16) description of peasants beautifully summarizes my sense of the
Haitian peasantry: at once “downtrodden and misunderstood… [yet also] indispensable
and proud. The peasantry both suffers and resists: sometimes at different moments,
sometimes simultaneously.” A core objective of this dissertation has been to explore this
tension and examine the prospects for Haiti’s agriculture and food system in this postearthquake crossroads, and how peasants and peasant movements are responding to the
obstacles and opportunities associated with increasing funding and intervention.
6.1

Contributions and Future Research

The manuscripts that comprise this dissertation are united by a concern about the
injustices faced by Haitian peasants, an understanding that these have deep historical
roots, and a sense of solidarity with the struggles of peasant producers for autonomy and
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dignity. In some ways, this harkens back to my first conversation with Ari Nikola in
2007, which is engrained in my memory:
To understand Haiti, you first must recognize that for 300 years we were forced to
believe that we were inferior and these ideas have not gone away. Although we
haven’t been physically enslaved for over 200 years, these ideas persist – the
reference point of what is good is what is white, what is Western. The enduring
mentality of enslaved people today is the consequence of slavery. To understand
Haiti, you need to understand this history.
One aim of Chapter 2 was to respond to Ari’s call for an historical approach to
understanding the contemporary struggles of the Haitian peasantry, and examine how
widespread food insecurity and rural poverty (which is entwined with excessive
urbanization and the devastation wrought on Port-au-Prince) are rooted in a long history
of peasant marginalization and exploitation. Chapter 2 focuses on the long history of
surplus extraction from the peasantry by the Haitian state (which relates partly to the
onerous debt burden that began shortly after independence), the bourgeoisie who have
dominated the wealth of Haiti’s international trade, and the debilitating history of foreign
political and economic intervention, with particular attention to how neoliberal economic
reforms have shaped rural development. Chapter 2 also explores the divergent visions for
agriculture and rural development outlined in post-disaster plans and those offered by
leaders of peasant organizations. While others have critically analyzed post-disaster
development plans (Shamsie 2012) and urban-based demands of civil society
organizations (e.g. reconstruction of poor neighbourhoods; supports for under-serviced
refugee camps; and attention to the harrowing vulnerabilities of female disaster victims)
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(Polyné 2014; Schuller 2012a, 2012b; Edmonds 2012), there has been a striking lack of
attention to how rural development projects are being pursued in the post-disaster period
and how peasant movements are responding to the influx of foreign loans, grants, and
‘experts’, and this chapter aims to fill this void.
As my relationship with Ari grew stronger, we often shared meals – pitimi, viv,
and mayi moulen – foods that I noticed were never served at roadside restaurants, at other
peoples homes, or even at the office where I worked, which were more inclined to serve
white rice, pea soup, and white-flour based French baguettes. When I first asked the
women who worked in the office kitchen if we could cook pitimi together they initially
laughed but then in seriousness told me that pitimi was a peasant food and refused to
serve it. In Chapter 3, I try to unpack the complex relationship between race and class
hierarchies and peasant dietary aspirations in an effort to understand how enduring racist
ideologies impede prospects for food sovereignty. While it would be impossible to
quantify the influence of dietary aspirations on total food consumption, and in turn the
threat they pose to peasant producers, this paper illustrates that there is striking symbolic
alignment between peasant and elite values with respect to food preferences. A central
argument is that peasants often seek to escape their social position by mimicking the
consumption patterns of the dominant class groups, including the urban elite and foreign
segments of society. This suggests that, at least at some level, the Haitian peasantry
accepts the prevailing social order and identifies with the oppressing class (Scott 1976),
which indicates an enduring ideological control that the Haitian elite exerts over the
masses. Negative attitudes towards the peasantry and towards peasant diets raise serious
questions about the role that food cultures can have in limiting the sorts of localization
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and pro-peasant aspirations associated with food sovereignty. In the process, it also opens
up some new directions for future research on what food sovereignty might entail, and
why it is necessary to consider food culture in Haiti in discussions of agrarian change.
Yet while my research indicates that dietary aspirations tend to be geared towards the
consumption practices of the elite, some countervailing food values do exist. For
example, some Haitians believe local chicken is more nutrient dense and better tasting
than imported chicken, and there are other examples such as soup joumou [pumpkin
soup], which was not explored in Chapter 3. In the colonial era, soup joumou was
reserved only for blan colonizers, but following independence peasants Haitians of all
class groups came to celebrate the revolution and emancipation from slavery by feasting
with soup joumou every independence day. Such non-elitist food values demand further
attention and could provide the basis of greater solidarity among the poor and between
urban and rural areas. As it is, the main advocates of traditional diets are Voudizan groups
46

Rasin movements and a number of peasant movements, and I believe they need to work
more consciously (and cohesively) to devise strategies geared towards reorienting diets
towards locally grown foods, and I hope that my research can have some applied
contribution in this regard.
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The Rasin [roots] movement is largely associated with a musical style in Haiti that has
embraced Voudou beats, but also is strongly supportive of peasant clothing, the Kréyol
language, and peasant foods. This movement is most popular among some urban
intellectuals, musicians and activists. Voudou practitioners and lwa-s [gods/spirits] also
embrace traditional peasants foods in ceremonies, with many telling me that lwa-s do not
eat foreign foods. Although I did not explore these countervailing food movements in this
dissertation, I conducted interviews with Bòkò-s [Voudou priests] and an Oungan [a
Voudou priestess] and have attended Voudou ceremonies, and I have a strong impression
that the Voudou religion is an important site of pro-peasant food values.
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I am confident that this research speaks to a central aspect of Haiti’s food culture
that bears heavily on its agricultural system, but it also left me with a number of
questions. Some of these relate to insights from Scott’s (1976) classic study of the
Malaysian peasantry, in which he suggests that peasants engage in various forms of
‘pragmatic compliance’ whereby their adherence to dominant ideologies is not fixed and
is rather more of a continuum. Is it possible that Haitian peasants do not wholly submit to
dominant food values even as they articulate them? Are peasant preferences for elite and
blan foods only ‘skin-deep’? (by which I mean, is it possible that food preferences
change depending on company or environment?). I have some suspicion and indeed hope
that dietary preferences for elite and blan foods among Haiti’s poor are more prominent
in various public settings and that such hierarchies might carry less weight in private life.
The coordinator of PAPDA points to the complexity of Haitian food values and how food
choices may change depending on setting and also on who is present, suggesting that “If
a Haitian receives a visitor for dinner, he’ll strategically align himself with the values of
his guest. But that doesn’t mean he adopts those values [sic].” Perhaps it is more that
peasants have been resigned to dominant food ideologies rather than having entirely
embraced them as legitimate, and further research is necessary to better understand the
social contexts and physical spaces in which the dominant food values are challenged in
Haiti.
Chapters 4 and 5 critically examine two prominent post-earthquake rural
development schemes: an industrial park in Haiti’s North Department and mangoexporting initiatives in the Artibonite Valley. Both papers consider the powerful interests
propelling these projects, and argue that while they face enormous infrastructural costs
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and other barriers, peasant resistance has been pivotal in their limited success to this
point.
A central contribution of Chapter 4 is to provide a critique of the persistent efforts
of bilateral donors, multilateral organizations, NGOs, and the Haitian state to establish
competitive export platforms in such things as light manufacturing and mango
production, which rest upon Haiti’s comparative advantage in low wages and are oriented
largely towards the US market. An extension of this has been to pursue ‘food security
through trade’ which, it is argued, is bound to exacerbate food insecurity in Caracol as
the project further degrades agrarian landscapes and fisheries in the area. This paper also
sheds light on undemocratic nature of development planning, as the decision-making
surrounding the CIP occurred without any consultation of local leaders or attention to
peasant perspectives, and the social discontent with the project stems from the
interwoven frustration over the displacement, the nature of the jobs created, and the
exclusionary political process. An overarching argument of this paper is that the
development through trade paradigm needs to be challenged. Rather than assuming that
increased exports are bound to create jobs and reduce poverty, poverty reduction in
Caracol, as elsewhere in rural Haiti, should start from listening to peasant perspectives
and visions for rural development and consider the broad aspirations of food sovereignty
in development policy (Edelman et al. 2014).
Chapter 5 reveals how development schemes geared towards boosting mangoexports have threatened peasant livelihoods (and with it, local food security) in the
Artibonite Valley, while also emphasizing how peasant responses have constrained the
expansion of mango production. While the forced and attempted evictions in both
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Caracol and the Artibonite Valley illustrate the enormous risks that peasants face in
resisting displacement, they also illuminate the enduring power of the Haitian peasantry
to rise up in the face of injustice. Indeed, one of the overarching messages from this
dissertation is that there is nothing inevitable about the decline of the peasantry, the
mobilization evident in these cases are among many signs of hope that Haitian peasants
are going to continue to fight for their autonomy long into the future.
Chapters 4 and 5 also draw attention to the growing threat of land grabbing and
peasant dispossession in the post-earthquake period, as the huge influx of reconstruction
funding has helped spur new commercial land deals. For example, in addition to the land
seizures in Caracol and the Artibonite Valley, the Haitian state recently appropriated the
entire island of Île à Vache (almost 13,000 acres with 20,000 inhabitants), declared that
local land ownership is no longer recognized, and designated it for the development of
tourism (Schuller 2014). Another notable case is along Haiti’s Massif du Nord
Metallogenic Belt, where the state has granted nearly 600,000 acres of land to domestic
subsidiaries of Canadian and US mining companies. This land deal has been met with
resistance from peasants who have long lived and worked in the region, leading to some
violent conflicts (Ives 2014). These and other cases of increasing dispossession demand
urgent attention, and future research on land grabbing in Haiti should consider the
political and economic dynamics and social implications, including forms of resistance
and risks of violent repression.
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6.2

Concluding remarks: Pathways forward

6.2.1 Belonging, Exclusion and Solidarity
My PhD journey seems like it exists in two different universes. The disparities between
my life in Dezam and London are cavernous. My son described this plainly one morning
when he was contemplating the contrasting bathroom he has in London in relation to the
latrine his dear friend Maylov has back in Haiti:
Mummy, Maylov has a toilet too! Well… hers doesn’t have this white lid on it, so
that’s different. And hers doesn’t have a place to sit, so that’s different. And it
doesn’t have a house for it, so that’s different too.
When I asked him what Maylov’s latrine does have, his reply was that “it has sticks and
a curtain.”
Acknowledging the gaping inequalities between Dezam and London can be
overwhelming, and grappling with how best to confront these has sometimes been
paralyzing for me. My memories of Dezam generally come with a flood of emotion,
sometimes with an overwhelming sense of loss and longing, though more often with
feelings of angst deep in my gut. They are memories that for the most part simmer just
below the surface of my consciousness and it would be dishonest not to admit that most
days I prefer to forget that the suffering and struggles of my former neighbors and friends
are ultimately related to my privilege. But when my kids ask of their former playmates,
when a friend calls, or when I happen upon a calabash bowl that once held my rice and
beans, I’m forced to confront the chronic, silent injustice of the luxuries that I enjoy (or
take for granted) in Canada. It is both painful and humiliating to at once be sipping fair
trade coffee in my sunlit kitchen and also remembering the circumstances of those dear to
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me in Haiti – holding these two realities in my mind forces recognition that those of us in
the ‘developed’ world owe our comforts, privileges, and status to those suffering in the
underbelly of the global economy. I continue to struggle for answers about my role, and
how to confront this injustice in some sort of meaningful way.
As I set out to conduct this research, I was driven by a strong desire to contribute
to Haitian advocacy and food justice organizations by exploring the struggles and
ambitions of peasant groups. When my family returned to Haiti in November 2010, one
of my most cherished friends, a brilliant Haitian activist and scholar, told us that we
wouldn’t last a year in Dezam. He told us plainly that the peasantry would devour us, that
our difference would be impenetrable, and that our ability to tolerate rural Haiti would
erode quickly. I was admittedly hostile to this prediction, though now I realize there was
more truth to that than I was willing to hear at the time. I am fairly confident that I was
not naïve about the deep race and class fractions in the country; but I may have been
overly hopeful, starting out, that with patience and perseverance I could make more
meaningful connections in Dezam than I was able to in the end. As I reflect on some of
my social struggles in Dezam, to build the sort of camaraderie I had previously imagined
possible, Orwell’s question following his ethnographic experience in mining
communities in early 20th century England rings out loudly: “Is it ever possible to be
really intimate with the working class?” (Orwell 2013 [1937], 55). He concludes, and I
am loath to agree, that:
However much you like them, however interesting you find their conversation,
there is always that accursed itch of class-difference, like the pea under the
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princess’s mattress. It is not a question of dislike or distaste, only of difference,
but it is enough to make real intimacy impossible (Orwell 2013 [1937], 73).
Living in Dezam often felt like I was an onlooker of a social clique of which I could
never be considered a member. I wanted to understand the struggle and be part of it. But
the reality is that I was never invited.
Although the broad suspicion of and hostility towards blan may have been painful
for me personally, it also gives me hope. I believe it was an expression of community
glue and resistance to the enduring injustices people faced. This kind of ‘othering’, of
aversion to difference, may act as a buffer against cultural incursion at the community
level and perhaps as a tool to ensure solidarity in the face of further incursions and
uprooting of land and livelihoods.
6.2.2 Future Steps
A core goal of this dissertation was to explore the contemporary problems facing Haiti’s
peasantry, and the prospects for the sorts of development policies that could improve
their circumstances. As critical scholars so often wrestle with, the matter of praxis has
weighed heavily on me: what is to be done?
I firmly believe that Haiti has the potential to reduce dramatically the extent of
rural poverty and improve the state of food security if peasant farmers are better
supported by a range of public policies, a stance that is aligned with many other activists,
scholars, and Haitian advocacy organizations (Bell 2013; Dubois 2013; POHDH 2006).
The social and environmental advantages of many small-scale farming systems are well
recognized in the field of agroecology (Bello 2009; Altieri and Nicholls 2008; Weis
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2007), as well as by UN agencies (UNCTAD 2013; FAO 2001b; UN 2010), global
peasant organizations (Via Campesina 2000), and Haitian civil society and peasant
organizations (PAPDA 2010; Claxton 2010). I have no doubts that the broad set of
possibilities associated with food sovereignty offer the greatest potential to enhance
stable and dignified livelihoods, food security, and poverty reduction in Haiti. This
includes the need for: agrarian reform to establish a more equitable distribution of land;
substantial investment in rural infrastructure and agricultural production (with a focus on
improving domestically-oriented crops); policies to protect domestic agricultural markets;
and the democratization and decentralization both of state power and public services.
Where light manufacturing and commercial estates are pursued, there is a need for new
tax and labour laws to ensure that businesses contribute meaningfully to government
revenues and provide dignified wages.
But centuries of exploitation and marginalization suggest that these kinds of
changes will not happen without Haitian peasants struggling for them. My encounters
with many visionary and passionate peasant leaders and resolute peasants in the
Artibonite Valley give me hope that peasants will continue to refuse exploitative
conditions. Building a more just agro-food system in Haiti will also require action at
other scales. There is a need for a fundamental overhaul of the way that international
actors understand and interact with Haiti. Haiti is utterly beholden to multilateral
agencies, bilateral donors, foreign investors, and an army of NGOs, and while aid, loans,
and investment are all needed, the arrogance that often accompanies it must change. As
has been stressed throughout this thesis, development policies and projects are typically
determined from above without any local dialogue, which involves the complicity of
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Haitian elites who have eagerly exploited their fellow citizens. This may sound
revolutionary, but I think the path could be much more pragmatic and incremental.
At a personal level, I continue to struggle with how best to utilize my written and
research contributions to assist peasant struggles, and I intend to present my published
papers to the leaders of peasant movements who have so supported me through the course
of my research and who can read English. I am also debating how I might summarize and
translate some key findings in ways that could have a wider circulation among peasant
groups in Haiti. My deep emotional, intellectual, and personal ties to Haiti remind me
that I’m in a relationship with everything else on this planet, and this is something that
will continue to affect my life, scholarship, and activism. I hope that through future
writing, teaching, organizing, and small daily actions, I might make some contribution to
repositioning people’s consciousness to acknowledge their connections with others and
their role in perpetuating inequality.
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Appendix 2: Key Informant Interview Guide
Name:
Gender:

Place of Residence:

Questions for Political Leaders:
1. Length of time in office?
2. Were you formally elected or selected? What was this process?
3. Description your role and responsibilities.
4. Do you or have you had parents or relatives in office?
5. What are your core goals for agriculture and rural Development in the area?
Community Leaders and Organizations
1. Number of Members?
2. Who are the key members and what are their affiliations?
3. What is the reporting structure?
4. Organizational schedule (meetings, shared resources or labour)
5. What sources of funding does your organization rely on?
6. Describe your organizational philosophy?
7. a) Describe some limitations and successes of your organization.
b) With these in mind, how might you shape your program differently to address
limitations or enhance successes?
8. What is your role in agriculture and lives of the peasantry? Describe the
agricultural techniques that you promote. (Some prompts: fertilizer use, multicropping, crop rotation).
Post-Earthquake and Agriculture/Food
1. Broadly speaking, discuss whether you believe agricultural plans developed postearthquake have been appropriate. (Try to give specific examples).
2. How has the earthquake influenced agricultural landscapes and the rural poor in
Haiti (or in the area)?
3. Do you feel there are divergent approaches to agricultural development in Haiti
(or in the area)? Explain.
4. What was the expectation of local leaders post-earthquake? Expectation?
Trepidation?
5. How has the Action Plan for National Recovery and Reconstruction 2010 been
implemented in the Verette Commune?
6. Did your organization/office receive funding/aid after the earthquake? Describe
what type.
7. Is there funding competition between organizations? How is this expressed?
8. Is there a pecking order among local institutions? How is this expressed?
9. Is there funding competition between zones/communes? How is this expressed?
10. Can you identify and describe some post earthquake initiatives or projects in the
area:
a. Initiatives by Government?
b. Initiatives by NGOs?
c. Initiatives by local organizations?
11. Who are the key decision makers in projects (local institutions, CASEC/ASECs,
population, NGOs? Is there local participation?
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12. Describe how you envision a positive and appropriate agricultural development
for rural Haiti.
13. What are the barriers to the vision you just outlined?
14. What has been the role of neoliberal reform on agriculture in Haiti?
15. How might a farmer respond to the above question?
Land and Community Resources
1. Are there taxes on harvests? Customhouses? What other fees do peasants pay to
the government?
2. How are water resources governed?
3. Who owns the mills, are they taxed?
4. Describe landlord/ tenant relations in the area. Are there expectations of the
landlord beyond rent? (gifts? charity? celebrations? School costs?)
a. Has there been a decreasing tendency of the provision of mid-day meals
with the commodification of agricultural labour?
5. What are the ratios of tenants to wage labourers to share tenants?
a. Which of these has more social prestige?
6. Has landlessness increased, stayed the same? Over what time period?
7. Describe food insecurity in the area.
a. How does this reveal itself? Is there malnutrition?
8. a) Does this area export any crops? Specify regions and growers.
9. Who is responsible for facilitating export agreements (wage rates, harvesting
regulations)
10. What are your core goals and aspirations for agriculture in Dezam?
11. In tenancy and sharecropping relations who decides what is planted? How are the
harvests and profits divided?
Community Culture
1. What are the community traditions/glue that binds communities?
2. Are the internal divisions among communities sharp or few?
a. What are the key divisions and how are they expressed? (investigate:
class/race divisions and land ownership).
b. What are the major conflicts in the area?
i. How are these expressed? (community, familial, class)
3. Are there dietary and/or agricultural links to racial/class divisions?
4. Is there a communitarian logic that is shared around certain resources i.e.)
communal water, fruit -trees, outsides of vehicles, attitudes of ‘moun pa m’ (my
people)?
5. How are community policies established, who are key decision makers and what
are their affiliations?
Food Culture
1. What are (or perhaps: can you rank) the most important factors that influence what
Haitian’s eat? (some prompts: socio-economic level, location, age, gender, “race”)
2. Describe a typical Haitian diet.
a. Explain if/how this diet differs from a century ago.
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3. Can you identify any linkages between Haiti’s history and consumption patterns?
(some prompts: the influence of slavery and colonialism, the U.S. occupation, or
the neoliberal reform on the production of certain crops i.e. sugar, coffee). Explain.
4. Describe any connections between Haiti’s history and social perceptions of food
(prompt: social perceptions of sugar).
5. Are there any foods that are considered ‘taboo’ by certain population sub-groups?
6. Are there any foods that are considered superior or inferior to others? Explain.
7. Are there any dietary and agricultural preferences linked to class divisions? Are
there any foods that are not ‘cool’ to eat in public? Are these associated with
peasants?
Questions on Class and Inequality for Intellectuals and Peasant Leaders
1. What are some of the predominant means by which the Haitian state and elite
acquire their wealth?
2. What is the potential for a class struggle in Haiti?
3. Is the exploitation of the peasantry inherent in the capitalist system?
4. Is the average Haitian peasant class conscious?
5. What is the character of the alliance between the Haitian national bourgeoisie and
the international bourgeoisie? (competition or compatibility?)
6. What is the trajectory for the Haitian peasantry? (i.e. disappearing peasantry or
repeasanzization?)
7. What is the status of left-leaning civil society organizations in Haiti? Is there
conflict among and/or solidarity between organizations.
8. Is there funding competition between national peasant organizations? How is this
expressed?
9. Are there cultural aspirations towards Westernization? What is the
weight/strength of this?
10. How does Haiti’s high food import dependence and aspirations to assimilate to
Western culture, relate to goals of food sovereignty?
Community Level Questions on Peasants and Politics
1.
2.
3.
4.

Are peasants in Dezam exploited? Describe. If so, by whom?
Are peasants discriminated against (in gest or in real instances)?
Is there any pride in being a peasant?
Can you describe some the history of peasant resistance and protest in the area?
What prompts this? Examples?
5. What was the tenor of the Lavalas movement in the area before the 1st coup? 2
a. 2nd coup?
b. Was there large public support? How was this manifest?
c. Was the Lavalas rhetoric popular or criticized by the peasants here, and/or
were rural peasants largely absent from these debates?
d. Is Aristide were to run for presidency again, what do you think his level of
support would be in this area?
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Appendix 3: Inter-American Development Bank Key Informant Interview Guide
Name:
Gender:
Place of Residence:
Position with IDB:
Roles and Responsibilities:
Introduction: Some questions I have been exploring in my research are:
• The global trend towards a shrinking peasantry and ‘slumification’ in urban centers.
Ask about:
1. Clashes between large-scale agricultural enterprises and small holding peasants or
farmers
2. Changed and homogenized global diets, displaced traditional diets
3. Privatization of land and market based land reforms and the advantages they provide
to moneyed peasants (gwo planté), and agro-enterprises
4. Trend of new agricultural export commodities (i.e. mangoes)
5. Has the IDB brainstormed about these trends as they relate to Haiti?
Question Lead-up: Land tenure has been suggested as a major barrier to agricultural
development in the MARNDR’s Politique de Développement Agricole (2010-2015, p.
15). And in IDBs Country Strategy Paper it outlines goals to “facilitate rural land tenure
regularization.” In an article in the Caribbean Journal (June 19th 2013), it mentions the
recent 15 million USD grant from the IDB to Haiti’ agriculture sector, includes financing
for “land tenure clarification.”
1. What does this entail?
2. Is land consolidation something on your radar? Is it something they are concerned
about?
3. Do they work in the area of peasant land conflicts?
4. BID has a 20 million USD Water Management Program in the Artibonite Basin: have
you thought about the impact of more valuable (irrigated) land on land conflicts?
5. Where does the IDB sit regarding debates on the future of the peasantry in general?
How does this position influence its development efforts?
Question Lead-Up: The IDB has helped finance rural value chains by: collaborating
with Coca-Cola and Technoserve in the Haiti Hope Lime-Aid project (US$3 million);
and MIF is backing a project with French development agency AFD, Nestle,
Agronomists and Veterinarians without Borders and the Colombian coffee growers’
federation to restore Haiti as a premium producer and exporter.
1. What have been the successes and challenges of these projects?
2. When you worked for the CNSA you said “Ankouraje pwodiksyon dives kalite danre,
se youn: men se yon gwo danje pou peyizan Ayisyen rantre nan pwodwi danre pou
ekspòtasyon sèlman” (p. 13) [to encourage a diverse range of agricultural production
is one thing, but it would be dangerous to encourage peasants to produce only for
export]. What is your perspective on export-oriented agricultural development and
the balance with providing for domestic markets?
Question Lead Up: When you worked for the CNSA you said “Pa ka gen sekirite
alimantè nan peyi Dayiti si pa gen ogmantasyon nan pwodiksyon manje…premye objektif
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la ta dwe vize pou ogmante pwodiksyon manje…mete plis manje disponib, dezyem n ap
ogmante rantre lajan ann men peyizan yo.” [There will not be food security in Haiti if
there is not an increase in food production. The first objectives there should be a vision to
increase food production…make more food available, then we’ll increase the earnings of
the peasants].
1. Do you still agree?
2. This logic seems to adhere to the IDB country strategy paper which aims has a goal
for agriculture in the Artibonite and the North to develop export crops for export to
the Dominican and to CARICOM countries.
3. To clarify- does this mean production for competitive advantage will enable enough
capital to spend on other products?
4. Is the inevitable gas price increase and depleting global petrol reserves on IDB’s
radar? (in terms of influencing export market feasibility?)
5. In Dezam, peasants have been reluctant to form cells for Technoserve. What model of
production for export does IDB advocate?
Question Lead-Up: In the IDB Haiti Country Strategy Paper it says: “NSG interventions
are planned with SCF supporting agribusiness projects with new production
technologies” (p21) and IIC focusing on agricultural export promotion. In addition, IDB
has a US$17.25 million program towards micro, small and medium-sized enterprises: to
include use of a business incubator and the creation of "micro-parks" that foster micro,
small, and medium-size enterprises linked to industry, tourism, and agribusiness value
chain. The IDB says it will “include small-farmers”- how?
1. Can you provide an example of an agri-business that you support?
2. How do you balance supporting agri-business vs. peasants? Is peasant differentiation
and class conflict on your radar at the IDB?
3. Do you work with Agro-Service
Question Lead-Up: In the past, Haitian exports have met the needs of international
markets (predominantly the U.S., Canada and Europe), and the results have been mixed
(i.e. post WWI decrease in sisal market, floundering rubber plantations under SHADA,
plummeting world coffee prices in the late 1980s).
1. Currently the NAIP (2010) hopes to focus on mangoes, does IDB support this idea?
2. IDB-financed Agriculture Intensification Program aims to increase: improved seeds,
fertilization, pest control, and other technologies. (in the Artibonite, Petite Rivye)
3. Is the potential dependency of Haitian farmers on agro-inputs on IDB’s radar?
Question Lead-Up: As with most of the Caribbean region, the cultural effects of slavery
in Haiti are persistent and complex, as the racial stratification and accompanying violent
oppression and psychological abuse produced deeply-rooted ideas of inferiority along
with aspirations to assimilate to the planters culture. However, for most social mobility
has proved elusive, I suspect one of results of this has been that the consumption of
‘prestigious goods’ has come to be seen, for many, as a means to symbolic mobility. I
suspect ideas of cultural inferiority have not only infused consumption patterns, but have
also devalued agricultural work and peasant livelihoods. Ie. “Pitimi pa monte tab”
1. Are there ‘racialized’ hierarchies of food in Haiti?
2. Is there (to some degree) ‘culinary colonialism’?
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3. Do Haiti’s food hierarchies, and consumption patterns interfere with the core goals of
food sovereignty?
• Prompts: Food hierarchies: spaghetti vs. Mayi Moulen, Rice-mayi-pitimi
hierarchy, bonbon siwo vs. bonbon sél).
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Appendix 4: MARNDR Additional Questions To Interview Guide
Question Lead-Up: The Politique de Developpement Agricole PNA (2010-2025)
mentions a phenomenon of “disparition de produits traditionnels” (p. 11). This is a
phenomenon that is consistent with other Latin American and Caribbean countries. As
with most other LA/Caribbean country policies, the PDA (2010-2015) discusses the
influence of free markets policies (including d’Ajustement Structurel Renforcé), decrease
of preferential agreements (l’Organisation mondiale du Commerce- OMC) as depleting
domestic production.
1. Has the MARNDR discussed the possibility of cultural aspirations towards the
consumption of imported goods? Is this something on their radar?
Question Lead-up: Land tenure is presented in the PDNA (2010-2025) as a key
limitation to realizing Haiti’s agro-productive capacity. Likewise, in the Haitian National
47
Agricultural Investment Plan (p. 3), The PARDN suggests land tenure regulations will
aim to protect private property and to “facilitate the advancement of large farms”
(PARDN) and enterprises (with a focus on commercial orchard-style mango production
(NAIP).
1. What will the implications of this policy be for ti peyizan?
2. Have you witnessed land consolidation for large-scale agriculture?
3. What is MARDNR’s role in managing land conflict?
Question Lead-up: The PDNA suggests that the national production of Haiti is
insufficient to meet the countries demand (p. 7) and goes so far as to say there is a threat
of “nettement dependant des importations de produits alimentaires.”
1. Is it possible for Haiti to feed itself (in the future)? (increased irrigation, changed
diets, tariffs on imports?)
Question Lead-Up: The PDNA (2010-2025) mentions agricultural initiatives should
include exportation of: mangoes, plantains, avocados, coffee, cacao, and fruits (p. 20).
1. How will export-oriented agricultural programs influence total import dependence?
2. What style/model would this adopt? (i.e. large farms, small-scale).
3. Has the MARNDR thought about which type of agriculturalists would benefit from
this?
4. Is the potential dependency of Haitian farmers on agro-inputs or petrol on
MARNDR’s radar?
Question Lead-Up: The PDNA (2010-2025) mentions food sovereignty: La réduction de
la dépendance alimentaire dans une perspective de souveraineté alimentaire (p. 16).
1. How does MARNDR understand food sovereignty?
2. How does this relate to the objectives of increasing: modern agricultural system based
on l’efficacité et l’efficience et la promotion des enterprises agricoles”? (p. 17).
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L’insécurité foncière constitue un blocage important à l’aménagement des exploitations
agricoles. (HNAIP p. 3).
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Appendix 5: USAID Additional Questions to Interview Guide
Question Lead-Up: The USAID project WINNER, “brings together farmers, NGOs,
agribusinesses, and government actors to increase productivity and post-harvest
efficiency”. “WINNER uses a value chain approach for focus crops in the productive
plains.” Goals to -increase market driven access to inputs (seeds, fertilizers,
technologies), post-harvest operations, establishes public-private-producer partnerships
(PPPPs). Agriculture Intensification Program aims to increase: improved seeds,
fertilization, pest control, and other technologies (in the Artibonite, Petite Rivye).
1. Has WINNER now transitioned into Feed the Future North/West?
2. Which value chains? Mangoes only? Is this project (WINNER) linked to Haiti Hope?
3. What have been the farmers’ perspectives? (FTFW reached more than 30,000 farmers
in Cul-de-sac and St. Mark areas.)
4. Cooperates with which agribusinesses?
5. Is the potential dependency of Haitian farmers on agro-inputs on the IDB radar?
6. Where are the seeds sourced?
Question Lead-Up: Haiti Hope: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
today announced that USAID will provide an initial contribution of $1 million to the
Haiti Hope Project, a public-private initiative that aims to develop a sustainable mango
industry in Haiti.
1. What have been the challenges/successes of Haiti Hope Project?
2. Who is meant to benefit from this project?
Question Lead-Up: Land tenure has been suggested as a major barrier to agricultural
development in the MARNDR’s Politique de Développement Agricole (2010-2015, p.
15). And in the IDB Country Strategy Paper it will “facilitating rural land tenure
regularization.” In an article in the Caribbean Journal (June 19th 2013), it mentions the
recent 15 million USD grant from the IDB to Haiti’ agriculture sector, includes financing
for “land tenure clarification.”
1. Is land consolidation something on your radar? Is it something the USAID is
concerned about?
Question Lead-Up: The USAID works with MARNDR The new Feed the Future North
is a five-year, US$88 million project that will focus on expanding farmers’ yields of
primarily five key crops—corn, beans, rice, plantains and cocoa.
1. Are these for domestic consumption or for export?
2. What is your perspective on export-oriented agricultural development and the balance
with providing for domestic markets?
3. A World Food Programme representative mentioned that they are trying to transition
to local purchasing. Is USAID doing this too?
4. What is the USAID long-term commitment to Haiti? What will be the trajectory of
programming in agriculture and rural development?

Appendix 6: Food Survey Participant Sample
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Name of Abitasyon
Age 18-29
Men

Women

PM

Participant Name

Participant Name

PwM

Participant Name

Participant Name

M

Participant Name

Participant Name

PM

Participant Name

Participant Name

PwM

Participant Name

Participant Name

M

Participant Name

Participant Name

PM

Participant Name

Participant Name

PwM

Participant Name

Participant Name

M

Participant Name

Participant Name

PM

Participant Name

Participant Name

PwM

Participant Name

Participant Name

M

Participant Name

Participant Name

PM

Participant Name

Participant Name

PwM

Participant Name

Participant Name

M

Participant Name

Participant Name

PM

Participant Name

Participant Name

PwM

Participant Name

Participant Name

M

Participant Name

Participant Name

Age 30-49
Men

Women

Age 50+
Men

Women

*Categories: Plis Mwayen- PM (an individual of some means); Plis w mwens – PwM (an
individual who gets by); Malere – M (Very Poor)

Appendix 7: Study #1 Community Member Survey
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A. Baseline Information:
Name:___________________ Place of Residence:_____________________
Age:________
Activity/Occupation:______________________________Parents:Occupation:________
____________
Level achieved in school?____________ Literate? Yes
/ No
How many pieces of land:____Land quantity nan kawo [carreaux]?________________
Do you own animals? Yes / No
Which animals and how many?______________________________________________
Where do you access water? Tiyo Piblik [Public Pipe]  Tiyo Lakay [Pipe to lakou]
Achte [purchased]  Rivyè/ Sous [from a river or spring] 
Do you have any medical conditions that influence what you eat? Yes / No
Marital status? Yes / No
How many people live at your home?:_________
Is your courtyard for your family alone or shared? _____________________________
Description of your roof: Tòl [Corrugated Tin] Dal [Cement]  Pay [leaves/vines]
Lòt [Other] ____________________
Description of your house:
Wòch ak tè [Mud and Rock]  Blòk [Concrete Bricks]
Lòt [Other] ____________________
B. Food Recall Survey [see attached food recall survey]
-Participants list on a separate sheet the foods and locations they ate in the 24 hour period
previous to interview

247

C. Food Frequency Survey
Frequency
Consumed:
1=Always
2=Often
3=Sometime
s 4=Never
TSC Rice

Frequency
Consumed:
1=Always
2=Often
3=Sometim
es 4=Never

Where does it
come from:
1)Land/home
2)Street restaurant
3) Market
4)
Supermarket

Miami Rice

Milk from can
Powdered
Milk

Corn flour

Cows milk

Cornmeal

Coffee

Sorghum
Noodle
casserole

Black Beans

Spaghetti
Wheat flour
porridge
Plantain
porridge

Butter Beans

Cornflakes

Local Chicken
Imported
Chicken

Bread

Local eggs

Stew

Imported Eggs

Oatmeal
Cornmeal
Porridge

Goat

Cassava
Boiled
Plantain

Fish

Breadfruit

Hotdog

Sweet Potato

Sausage

Sweet bread

Magi

Cheezy

Mayonnaise

Cracker

Tomato Paste

Fried snacks

Ketchup

Cheese

Margarine

Bottled juice

White Sugar

Pop

Brown Sugar

Natural Juice

Rapadou

Sweety

Canned Foods

Beef

Salted fish

Where does it
come from:
1)Land/home
2)Street
restaurant
3) Market
4)Supermarket
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D. Other Questions:
1.Yesterday did you consume more or less than usual?_______________
2. Do you associate any foods with blan? Describe.
__________________________________________________________
3. Do you associate any foods with the rich? Describe.
__________________________________________________________
4. Do you associate any foods with rural dwellers? Describe.
_______________________________________________________________
5. Do you associate any foods with the poor? Describe.
_______________________________________________________________
6. Do you associate any foods with urbanites? Describe.
_________________________________________________________________
D.2 Class the following foods, which is “cooler”.
a) Cornmeal _____ b) Butter Beans______
c) Oatmeal
______
Rice______
Black Beans______
Cornflour porridge _____
Sorghum _____
Red Beans _____
Plantain porridge
_______
Corn _______
Wheat flour porridge ______
d) Cornflakes ____ e) Cassava & P/B____ f) Natural Juice ____ g) Crackers ____
Cassava &P/B ___ Bread &PB _____ Pop____
Sweet Bread _____
Egg Sandwich ____ Fine Sorghum ______Sweety_____
Cheezie _______
Fried snacks _____
h) Cornmeal porridge ____ i) Yellow rice _____ j) Plantain/sweet potato ______
Corn flour porridge _____ Miami rice_____
Cornmeal ______
Oatmeal _____
White Rice ______ Spaghetti _______
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Appendix 8: Study #2 Community Member Survey
A. Baseline Information
1. Number of people in house? __________2. Number of rooms in house?___________
3. Are you housing/caring for children other than your own?
Wi
No
4. Have you sent your children to live with others? Wi
No
5. What is your primary source of revenue? Land 
Business
 Salary 
6. Do you own a: Motorcycle 
Bicycle 
Vehicle 
B. Land and work situation
1. How many pieces of land do you own? ____ 2. How much (carreaux)?: _________
2. How long does it take to get to each piece of land (hours)?1 _____ 2 ____3 ____
3. Do you rent out/lease your land seasonally?
Yes
No
If yes,
a. How long is the contract? ________________________
b. How much land (in carreaux)?__________________________
c. What is the leasing price? ___________________________
d. Is it a fixed price?
Yes
No
e. Does the price change if the harvest wasn’t good?
Yes
No
f. Do you lend money to the tenant or give food if they need it before the
harvest?
4. Do you rent (buy a season of land) from anyone? Yes
No
If yes,
a. How long is your contract? ________________________
b. How much land?__________________________
c. What is the price? ___________________________
d. Is the price fixed?
Yes
No
e. Does the price change or alter if it is a bad harvest?
Yes
No
f. Does the landlord lend you food or money if the harvest is bad or late?______
5. Do you work as a labourer on land?
Yes
No
What arrangement do you have for that work: _______________________
a) Sharecropping (What percentage of the crop do you need to give to the
landlord)
b) Daily labourer
If yes, is food included in the arrangement? Yes
No
What is the normal price for a day of work? What is the length of time?
________________________
6. Do you “hold people’s” land (i.e. if one owes the other money and offers land instead
until the debt can be repaid)? Yes
No
If yes, what quantity of land? _________(carreaux)
If yes, how much money did you get in return? ____________
7. Do you have someone else holding your land? Yes

No
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If yes, how much land? ____________[carreaux]
If yes, how much money do you owe to get your land back? ____________
8. Do you take care of others animals?
Yes
No
a. What arrangment do you have for this work? Are you paid in cash? Yes No
Are you paid in future animals ? Yes No
Other?_________________________________________________
C. Production
1. Describe your harvests from last year
Production
Month

To sell=1
To eat=2
For both=3

May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
2.
Harvest
Rice
Corn
Sorghum
Sweet
potato
Beans

How much have you harvested

Greater Harvest (P), Less
(M) Equal (E) to Last year?

3. Do you work the land more to sell (=1) or to consume (=2)? _____
4. What harvest do you sell to find the biggest economic return?__________________
5. What crops are it difficult to sell and get a return? ___________________________
6. Which crops re produced more for selling?_________________________________
7. Which crops to gardeners produce for subsistence? __________________________
8. What do the large landowners produce? ___________________________________
9. What do small peasants produce?_________________________________________
10. Do you sell crops to send overseas? Yes
No
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If yes, which? __________________________________________
What price do you receive for these? ___________________________________
D. Agricultural Practices:
1. Land use:
a) Chemical Fertilizer
b) Herbicide/insecticide
c) Compost
2.
3.
4.
5.

Always
Always
Always

Often
Often
Often

Sometimes
Sometimes
Sometimes

Never
Never
Never

What types of gardeners use chemical fertilizers?__________________________
Do you want to use chemical inputs?
Yes
No
Do you want to use compost?
Yes
No
What type of seeds do you use?
a) Seed stock
b) Purchased seed
c) Seeds gifted from an organization
d) Shared seeds
e) Hybrid
f) GMO

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
No

I don’t know it
I don’t know it

6. What do you do with your post-harvest compost? _________________________
7. Do you think the agricultural techniques of farmers in your area has changed since:
a) 10 years ago? Yes
No
How: _____________________________________________
b) 50 years ago? Yes
No
How: ____________________________________________
c) 100 years ago?
Yes
No
How: ______________________________________________
E. Agricultural Support
1. Are you a member of a peasant organization?
Yes
No
If yes, site
them?________________________________________________________
2. Where/how do you find inputs for your land? (seeds, seedlings, fertilizer, tools,
compost)_____________________________________________________________
3. Do you receive credit/loans from someone or an organization that allows you to work
your land? Yes
No
If yes…. Which organization? _______________________________________
How much are you allowed to borrow? _________________________
Interest rate?________________
If no….
That means you support your land yourself? Yes
No
You get seeds yourself?
Yes No
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F. Agricultural plans/Post-earthquake reconstruction
1. Did you received aid after the earthquake?
Yes

No

If yes, from who? __________________________
When? __________________________________
2. After the earthquake did you receive IDPs at your home? Yes
3. Did your household consumption change after the earthquake? Yes

No
No

If yes, how?____________________________________________________
4. Did what you decide to grow on your land change after the earthquake?
Yes
No
If yes, how?_____________________________________________________
G. Food Associations:
Mete: Haitian=1
American=2
Dominican=3 European=4 Don’t know =
(5)
a) Pop _______
b) Coffee ________ c) Magi _________ d) Bread __________
e) Casserole ________f) Spagetti _____

g) Cornflakes_____

h) Oatmeal________

i) Cheezy ________ j) Cheese __________k) Sugar ___________ l) Tomato Paste___
m) Rapadou_____

n) Salted Fish_________o) Sausage__________

H. Class the food in order of the “coolest”?
a)Miami rice ____
b)Butter beans ___ c)Imported chicken___
TCS Rice _____
Black beans____ Local chicken____
Chela Rice _____
Miami beans ____
e)Salted Fish____
Beef____
Goat____
Chicken____

d)White sugar ___
Brown sugar ___

g) Canned milk____
Cow’s milk_____
Powdered milk______

H. Class the agricultural practice that is more prestigious?
a) Chemical Fertilizer_____ b) Traditional Seed _______
Compost ________
Hybrid _______
GMO ________
I. Which do you think is preferable:
a) Chemical Fertilizer
v.
Compost
Why?
______________________________________________________________________
b) Manual labour
v.
Tractor
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Why?
________________________________________________________________________
c) Monoculture
v.
poly culture
Why?
________________________________________________________________________
J. Agricultural Recommendations, Food security for Dezam/Haiti
1) Where do you think the decisions that influence the agricultural sector in Dezam are
made?
a) Land owner
b) Local authorities
d) Local organizations
c) NGOs
d) International organizations
e) Other
1. How do these decisions affect your land and agricultural decisions?
_____________________________________________________________________
2. What might help you cultivate your land better?
_____________________________________________________________________
3. What is your biggest barrier in agriculture?
_____________________________________________________________________
K. Life aspirations and satisfaction
1. In your life are you (circle one): Fulfilled
Satisfied Not content Miserable
Explain:______________________________________________________________
2. Are you satisfied with your agricultural work and production? Yes
No
Explain.
3. What objectives do you have for your life?
_____________________________________________________________________
4. What objectives do you have for your children?
_____________________________________________________________________
5. If you had more money what is the first thing you would do?
_____________________________________________________________________
6. In terms of food, what is the necessary minimum for a person to consume in a day?
Describe.
_____________________________________________________________________
L. Food recall survey
1. Did you consume more, less or the same as what you would eat in a normal day?_____
1
2
3
4
5

Manje/Bwason

Ajoute?

254

Appendix 9: Peasant Groups Represented in Caracol Focus Group
Acronym Name

# of Members

ADTC

N/A

Asosyason pou la defans travayé Karakol (The Association
for Defending Worker Rights in Caracol)

AFK

Asosyason Fanm Karrefour Jesu pou Devlopman (Women’s

70

Association of Jesus Intersection for Development)
BMAC

Brigad Maritime an Aksyon de Karaol (Maritime Action

70

Brigade of Caracol)
KFG

Kredi Fanm Gaskil (Women’s Small Credit of Gaskil)

55 (all female
membership)

KOSIK

Kodinasyon Kominal (Communale Coordination)

N/A

MGDK

Mouvman Jenn pou Devlopment Karfou Jesu (Youth

27

Movement for Development of Jesus Intersection)
Mouvman Peyizan pou Avansman Karakol (Peasant
MOPAK

36

Movement to Advance Caracol)

MOREK

Mouvman pou Rebati yon Karakol (Movement to Rebuild

A

Caracol)

OBDK

Oganizasyon Basaline pou Devlopman Karakol (Basalin
Organization for Development of Caracol)

63

65
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Appendix 10: Caracol Interview Guide
Main questions:
1. How did local actors (residents, representatives of associations, and local politicians)
receive the project? With hope and enthusiasm, trepidation, cynicism, curiosity?
2. What were their expectations?
3. Did local actors want to get involved in the development of the zone? This question
is aimed at understanding whether rural Haitians are glad to get any kind of
development at all, so they accept it. Or whether they are selective and want input
into what comes into their community.
4. Was the state a facilitator of local democracy, ie: devising participatory mechanism,
eliciting local views, dialoguing with local residents and those affected by the
development.
5. How did Haiti’s formal political institutions CASEC and ASECS inform plans for
Caracol’s development?
Some specific questions that will help answer the above:
1. Were there opportunities to debate the project in public settings? For instance, to
question the parameters…. issues such as transportation, housing, and services that
would be brought into in the area.
2. Of the interchanges between planners and locals that did actually take place ... as
insignificant as they might have been, they deserve to be chronicled; and
3. What aspects of the Caracol development raised concerns?
4. Was there discontent displayed? (how did locals feel? Gauge the weight -- ie number
and status of individuals-- of those in favour and those against through interviews and
focus groups)
5. Was discontent diffused? If so, by whom? The state, private sector, strong local nongovernmental actors?
6. Was there collective resistance, if not was it prevented by specific state strategies (ie:
lack of publicity, lack of platform for disseminating information)
7. Were workshops organized to discuss (share, consult allow for participation) the
project?
8. Did residents receive feedback or follow up when they asked for more information or
made suggestions?
9. If workshops were organized by the developers or the central government, how were
they organized? By theme (housing), or by community, or sector (farmers)?
10. Was there genuine consultation or were there “therapy session”? [Officials: We’ll
listen, now don’t you feel better?]
11. Was there openness or opacity around the parameters of project? How were these
manifested?
12. Was there an identifiable and sustainable link between the residents and one or
several key persons in local government?
13. Was there an identifiable and sustainable link between local politicians and national
politicians in Port au Prince?
14.
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Some things to listen for when listening to respondents:
*How are historical legacies present in this case?
*Does there appear to be a mistrust of local political institutions and actors? How do
citizens view local vs. national politicians?
*Use the interviews to help us understand how the context (culture, history, rural models
of authority, where are the "legitimate" actors in the communities, assuming that groups
and individuals struggle to establish that legitimacy; what does clientelistic forms of
participation among the popular classes look like (which is a part of everyday life in
Haiti.
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